Egyptian Exile in England:
A Study in the Mechanisms of Contentious Politics

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I confirm that the word count of this thesis is less than 100,000 words

For Anna

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Article 9

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Abstract

Does exile affect activism and if so how? This question is both perennial and timely given the frequency of political upheaval and the current salience of migration. Non-democracies use exile to end domestic opposition. Existing research has gone someway to challenging the assumption that exile does put a stop to activism but for the most part has focussed on the effects of exile on individual psychology. In this thesis exile is viewed through the lens of social movement theory as a political process, not a legal category or personal identity, meaning it is not necessarily the end of activism. The case of Egyptian activists exiled in England is studied in depth, taken as illustrative of processes typical of exiled activism. The analysis contributes to research on Arab activism, particularly highlighting the ways individual activists can be both constrained by and actively shape their own political context, even from exile.

The case study draws on primary and secondary sources including a series of biographical interviews with exiled activists. The analysis, based on three layers of coding, compares activism in Egypt with exiled activism in England and uses the participants' critical self-reflections to explain the causal mechanisms mediating the changes.

Contrary to reasonable expectations that exile is a spontaneous response to a change in political context, the conditions for exile predate banishment and lie within the institutions of dictatorship which decertify activism. Decertification itself continues throughout the exile process as the fear of repression becomes internalised within the movement. Within the sanctuary of the host country a process of brokerage counteracts decertification as activists network with newfound allies and modify their repertoire. However, in the case described in this thesis, a third mechanism, boundary formation, survives exile, bringing old intra-movement hostilities to the new context.

Acknowledgements

The thesis is about activists from Egypt who are for one reason or another in England now. I am grateful to them for their help in completing the research and hope they benefit from the findings of this study. The research was supported partly with a DEL scholarship for which I am grateful.

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In the field I met activists and scholars who know more about Egypt and activism than I do. Professor Philip Marfleet, an inspiration in any case, was generous to me, both with his advice and by sharing contacts. I am grateful for the doors he opened to me.

Everybody who taught me before I began doctoral studies deserves credit for my work in this thesis. At UWS, CEU and Stirling I had the privilege of working with great teachers and researchers who shaped the work in this thesis. When my research is at its best this is largely down to what Lea Sgier taught me. I am lucky to know her. The biggest influence on my research career has been Kevin Adamson. I just don't have the words to thank him. Finally my greatest debt is to my wife Anna McKeever. Any shortcomings in this thesis are entirely my own of course.

List of Abbreviations

AI	Amnesty International
ASU	Arab Socialist Union
E4D	British Egyptians 4 Democracy
EAD	Egyptians Abroad for Democracy
AGEG	Egyptian Anti-Globalisation Group
ESI	Egypt Solidarity Initiative
FO	Free Officers
FP	Framing Process
FPTP	First Past the Post
GJM	Global Justice Movement
ICPJ	International Coalition for Peace and Justice
LR	Liberation Rally
MS	Mobilising Structure
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NU	National Union
NUJ	National Union of Journalists
POS	Political Opportunity Structure
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
RCT	Rational Choice Theory
RSE	Revolutionary Socialists of Egypt
SCAF	Security Council of the Armed Forces
SMO	Social Movement Organisation
SPOT	Synthetic Political Opportunity Theory
WUNC	Worthiness, Unity, Numbers, Commitment

List of Figures and Tables

Note on Access to Contents

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Introduction: Varieties of Exile

1. The Case of Egyptians in English Exile

Speaking outside number 10 Downing Street, a woman wearing a Niqab, the Muslim veil which covers all but the eyes, asked Channel 4's political correspondent Michael Crick, "Where are the British values, when he is shaking hands with a killer?" (*Channel 4 News*, 2015). She was referring to the Conservative UK Prime Minister who was at the time greeting President Sisi, the Egyptian military dictator. She was one of a number of Egyptians who had relocated to England, at least in part due to political repression in Egypt where she could not have openly made such politically contentious claims.[1]

The day had been one of public contestation on the streets of London. Egyptian exiles and their allies organised under the banners of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt Solidarity Initiative, Campaign Against Arms Trade, the Stop the War Coalition, the Muslim Association of Britain, April 6 Youth Movement, the Federation of Student Islamic Societies and representatives from the National Union of Students marched through the capital city to express their outrage at their dictator being welcomed to the United Kingdom (Interviews 7, 10; *Mada Masr*, May 5, 15). They had joined forces with student protesters marching against austerity before congregating at the door of number 10 where they staged a human rights focussed 'die in' (Interviews 15, 16). Six protesters were arrested (ESI, 2015). This thesis tells the story of these Egyptian activists in exile and situates their struggle in the wider context of political exile.

[1] Their journey to England happened suddenly. In 2011 citizens in Cairo and across Egypt brought three generations of continuous dictatorship to an end when the army joined their revolution. The president of 30 years, Hosni Mubarak, was forced from office (Cook, 2012). For a period the army formed a provisional administration, the security council of the armed forces (SCAF), until a civilian government was democratically elected under the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. However this religious government, while supported by a majority, was divisive, controversial and tried to make undemocratic changes to the constitution. It is no exaggeration to suggest that their electoral success was largely due to the absence of any organised political opposition in Egypt, a country that had suffered under dictatorship for almost a century (Marfleet, 2016). In 2013 the army again removed the government, this time acting on its own initiative rather than following a popular uprising. The army installed one of its own generals, al-Sisi as president (Housden, 2013). In the early days of his term Sisi established a rule of terror, jailing many political opponents and even critics of his rule, including foreign journalists, and outlawing protest. A small number of activists with means relocated to England where they continue their struggle.

I will return to the question of why this seemingly esoteric example, Egyptians in English exile, illustrates exiled activism generally so well before the end of this introduction.[2] For now it is enough to note that this thesis rests on the argument that this case is interesting enough on its own to merit study, but typical enough that lessons can be drawn for other cases of exiled activism. In England exiles have, with sympathetic activists, grouped together into a number of social movement organisations (SMOs) that form an activism network. In some ways their activism is unremarkable and resembles that of other activist groupings in the UK and elsewhere. For example, their marches, protests and occupation of public spaces have been drawn straight from the contentious repertoire familiar to all western social movements. In other ways they have innovated and developed their own methods of activism, or at least adapted them to their new context. These have included bringing the protest songs of Tahrir to the night clubs of Brighton, forging international alliances and staking out their own small space for Egyptian activism outside the Egyptian embassy in London.

While the range of SMOs exhibit a variety of views and ideologies ranging from the religious to the liberal, secular and socialist, the activists generally agitate for a democratic conception of Egyptian politics. This movement, although excluded from their home country, is at the forefront of the contemporary democratic struggle and therefore merits investigation in its own right. Yet despite the movement's significance, the dearth of knowledge on Middle Eastern exiles and the innovation of some of their performances makes them a case from which scholars and other activists can learn.

More broadly, this thesis is about how exile changes activism. By exile, I mean a political process, not a legal category or personal identity. I will argue this is a process that changes, not ends, activism. Those who are said to be exiles in this study are groups of people, not individuals, who collectively cannot return to their home country at least until the political context changes. The actions they take based on their political views are what signal their status

[2] The exact contours of the case study, the decisions about who to include within the sample and other related questions, such as the focus on England at the expense of the rest of the UK are taken up in detail in chapter three, section 2.2.1.

as exiles, for whether they or anyone else recognises the legitimacy of the label 'exile', such actions would and do make them enemies of the state at home. Regardless of the status of the individuals involved, it is safe to say the activism itself is in exile. The factor that distinguishes their activism as that of an exile, rather than any non-exiled expatriate, is their subjective articulation of loyalty.[3] Exiles oppose the government of their home country, but remain loyal to their view of what constitutes their nation.

This introduction will do several things. It will establish the meaning of terms used in the thesis. It will then introduce the methods used in the study and the case under investigation. It will also provide a detailed plan of the coming chapters. Before that though it is necessary to consider my overall aims.

2. Aims

My aim in this thesis is to answer the research question 'how, if at all, does exile change activism?' This presupposes more specific descriptive and explanatory aims.

Explanatory aims:

1. **Develop a mechanistic explanation for how exile changes activism.** The primary aim of the study is to explain how exile changes activism. It is conventional in political science to privilege explanation over description because the predictive and prescriptive benefits are greater (King *et al*, 1994; Ragin, 1986). A proper explanation of how exile changes activism consists of causal mechanisms, rather than simply correlating dependent and independent variables (Ragin, 1986; McAdam *et al*, 2001). In political science there is no substitute for case study based on qualitative evidence for observing mechanisms as no standardised indicators have been agreed, or are likely to be agreed.

2. **Contribute to existing accounts of activism and exile.** Often the best gauge of the value of a theory lies in the number of cases it explains (Van Evera, 1997).

[3] It is necessary to shift the focus of the definition from the causes of exile to the actions of exile in order to articulate a definition that is viable for political scientific analysis. As Shain put it, "[t]he reasons for the exiles' status—that is, why they left their country—then become secondary, or at least they must be held in suspension, while attention shifts to exile activity abroad" (Shain, 1989: 7).

Consequently I aim to suggest that my explanation may hold for other cases of exiled activists and hence my study can contribute meaningfully to literature on social movements and exile. Strictly speaking there is no way to have complete confidence that theories drawn from non-random data can be generalised. Nonetheless there are several methodological tools I employ to suggest that my theories may have some generality. I used process tracing and within-case comparison to specify the relevant variables and the relation between mechanism and context thereby providing grounds for generalisation, while criteria for generalisation and the scope of the theory are specified within a typological theory of exile in the 20th and 21st century.

Descriptive aims:

1. **Reconstruct the events of activism in a case study.** Explanation, however, depends on description, as it is necessary to first establish the events to be explained. Therefore, my secondary aim in the study is to author an account of the activism of exiles, before, during and after their exile. My aim is for that account to be holistic, covering context, a full profile of activism and the causes and effects of activism. As I describe in section 3.1, the exiles are a small group (who could be characterised as an elite, in a loose sense), drawn from a population that shares important similarities. In that sense, telling their story is not an impossible task.

2. **Supplement the account of activism with an interpretation of what activism means to activists.** Beyond simply stating the 'facts', I aim to use insights from interview data to develop an interpretation of how exile and activism are meaningful political phenomena to those involved. This aim provides a means of incorporating information on activists' motivations and *perceptions* of political opportunities into the argument of the thesis (therefore blurring the distinction between description and explanation). Completing this task elevates the quality of the account from simple description to 'thick description', which is an appropriate research aim (Geerz, 1973).

The descriptive aims incorporate the notion of 'thick description'. Thick description is a valid goal in social scientific research as it surpasses simply 'stating the facts' by also interpreting events. The quality controls on interpretation are discussed in Chapter three, section 2.3, but from the aims discussed here it is clear that interpretation is achieved, in part, by adopting a theoretically informed approach to data collection and analysis. In turn, this provides a degree of sophistication to the explanatory aims that merits mention. Exile is among the lesser studied phenomena of interest to political science. The interpretations developed in this thesis make a valuable contribution to the field by bringing contemporary findings from social movement theory to develop understanding of exile.

2. Terms and Concepts

The notion of exile has already been established as a political process that changes the character of activism. This definition is fully set in context and justified in chapter two, section two. The other concepts that matter in this study are fully discussed in chapter one, yet to make the following introductory sections meaningful it is necessary to state the definitions I work with. These definitions are not intended to provide full, dictionary sufficient meanings, but simply to establish the aspects of each concept that matter to the argument in this thesis.

First, activism is used as a shorthand in this thesis for the political participation of individuals through the medium of social movements.[4] Social movements are taken in this study to be campaigns of contentious performances and displays of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (Tilly, 2004). Another, less technical summary of the concept of social movement, is that they are interpretive categories used by scholars to describe periods of protest. One aspect of the technical definition that requires specification is the 'contentious performance', but this in turn relies on knowledge of contentious politics. The study of social movements falls within the wider field of contentious politics. Contentious politics is a relatively new field of enquiry that studies events as disparate as activism, revolution, democratisation or civil war.

[4] The definitions given here are not controversial. The definition of activism given here is in a sense more conservative than that given in the Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Social Movements; "activism is the action that movements undertake in order to challenge some existing element of the social or political system and so help fulfil movements' aims" (Saunders, 2013: 29).

Formally, it can be defined as the study of events in which two or more groups, where one group is a state or government, make claims on one another's interests (McAdam *et al*, 2001). Following that logic, the contentious performance can be understood as a metaphor implying that in contentious politics, making such claims on another party's interest happens in ways that can be rehearsed and carried out in public, for an audience.

These definitions have been simply stated here as though they are fact for the sake of brevity, yet as with most definitions they are open to debate. Exile will be discussed fully in chapter two, section two and the remainder are discussed in chapter 1. The definitions stated here are provided to make the following sections intelligible. The next section describes the methods used in this study.

3. Research Design

Table one contains a typological theory of exile.[5] This theory sets out the cases of exile political scientists have already studied and provides the point of departure for the design of this research. Knowledge of exile in political science in its current state is non-systematic and non-exhaustive, based largely on case studies of exile in South America where the practice has been overt. This thesis adds the Egyptian case to this list and no doubt there are other undocumented examples. The cases in this table are drawn in the first instance from the Post-Conflict Justice (PCJ) Dataset and supplemented with other cases studied in the literature reviewed in chapter two. The PCJ dataset, compiled by a research team led by Jon Elster is the only publicly available large-*n* dataset to include exile as a variable (Binningsbø *et al*, 2012).[6] The reasons for this apparent lack of interest are set out fully in chapter two, but to borrow the phrase of one

[5] I use the phrase 'typological theory' in the sense that Bennet and George established: "a theory that specifies independent variables, delineates them into categories for which the researcher will measure the cases and their outcomes, and provides not only hypotheses on how these variables operate individually, but also contingent generalisations on how and under what conditions they behave in specified conjunctions or configurations to produce effects on specified dependent variables… a fully specified typological theory provides hypotheses on *all the mathematically possible types relating to a phenomenon*…" (Bennet and George, 2004: 235 [my emphasis]). The typological theory of exile is therefore restricted in comparison to Bennet and George's ideal comparison of existing explanations, this is due to the novelty of the topic. I have therefore categorised cases by proximate causes instead.

[6] As with any dataset the PCJ data has its own limitations, depends on the interpretation of its authors and only describes cases until 2012, the point at which it was published (Binningsbø *et al*, 2012). The data is more than suitable for my purposes here, to provide a systematic basis to my decision in case selection. The data from Heindl's 2013 paper on exile SMOs was used to augment the typological theory but does not provide enough observations to form the basis of the theory as Heindl's data is at the level of SMO rather than country, accounting for only three cases, Cuban, Jewish and Irish exiles.

TABLE ONE. (MODIFIED) TYPOLOGICAL THEORY OF EXILE

	Country (year)	Exile Outcome
Independence Movement	Algeria (1962)	Military
	Brunei (1962)	Rebel Leaders
	China (1952)	Rebel Leaders and Activists
	Madagascar (1947)	Rebel Leaders
	Mozambique (1964 – 1974)	Activists
	Soviet Union (1946-1947)	Rebel group and activists
	Soviet Union (1946-1947)	Rebel group and activists
	Soviet Union (1946-1948)	Rebel group and activists
	Soviet Union (1946-1948)	Rebel group and activists
	Soviet Union (1946-1950)	Rebel group and activists
Revolution	Burkina Faso (1987)	Deposed leader
	China (1946-1949)	Military and activists
	Cuba (1956-1958)	Deposed Leader
Coup d'état	Argentina (1955)	Deposed Leader
	Argentina (1963)	Military
	Bolivia (1952)	Military
	Burundi (1965)	Deposed Leader
	Chile (1973)	Activists
	Comoros (1989)	Deposed Leader
	Dominican Republic (1965)	
	El Salvador (1972)	Military and opposition leaders
	Gabon (1964)	Opposition leader
	Gambia (1981)	Opposition leader
	Ghana (1966)	Deposed Leader
	Guatemala (1954)	Deposed Leader
	Haiti (1989)	Military
	Haiti (1991)	Deposed Leader and Activists
	Liberia (1980)	Deposed Leader

author, exile remains among the "unrecognised institutions of political science". That is, because regimes tend to enforce exile informally rather than as a matter of statute, it has often evaded explicit analysis by researchers (Caldwell, 1943: 239). Rarely do dictators announce their intention to exile but they nonetheless

put their opponents in a situation where they have no choice but to flee or face martyrdom. Herein lies the reason political scientists have more often than not shied away from addressing the phenomenon head on: almost every case of exile from the Dalai Lama to Edward Snowden is inherently arguable.

My typological theory is therefore an imperfect starting point from which to consider the universe of cases of exile in its varieties. In this theory exile is operationalised as the dependent variable and cases are categorised by their proximate causes. Exile itself is subcategorised by groups; a quick look at typological theory (appendix) suggests that when exile is used as a political tool it is more often than not selective rather than indiscriminate.

(Modified) Typological Theory of Exile (continued)		
Coup d'état	Liberia (2000-2003)	Deposed Leader
	Paraguay (1989)	Deposed Leader
	Syria (1966)	Government and Military
	Togo (1991)	
	Venezuela (1992)	Military
Civil War	Argentina (1973-1977)	Opposition leader
	Chad (1990)	Deposed Leader
	Congo/Zaire (1964-1965)	Rebel group
	Congo/Zaire (1967)	Rebel group
	Costa Rica (1948)	Deposed Leader
	Ethiopia (1991)	Deposed Leader
	Greece (1949)	Activists
	Guinea-Bissau (1999)	Deposed Leader
	India (1966-1968)	Rebel leader
	Indonesia (1950)	Rebel group
	Indonesia (1976-1978)	Rebel group
	Lebanon (1975-1990)	Rebel leaders
	Nicaragua (1978-1979)	Deposed leader and military
	Nigeria (1967-1970)	Rebel leader
	Pakistan (1990)	Rebel leader
	Rwanda (1990-1994)	Government
	Yemen (1994)	Rebel leaders
	Yemen (North) (1962-1970)	Rebel leader
	Yemen (South) (1986)	Deposed Leader and Activists

More deposed presidents have faced exile than any other group.[7] Since the Second World War military takeovers have produced more exiles than any other critical juncture in a country's history, followed closely by civil wars. No doubt this is in part due to the decline of interstate warfare in the years since the collapse of the Third Reich (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).[8]

Of interest to social movement theorists are the cases of activists sent into exile. These are the rarest outcomes as regimes have tended to banish their prominent opponents selectively rather than indiscriminately. The exception has been in cases of anti-colonial independence movements, but this observation is misleading and easily explained away. The reason activists are over-represented in this category is due to the terror tactics of Stalin in his attempt to secure the territory of the Soviet Empire (Gentes, 2008). As with exile in general, other than

[7] It is also worth noting, although incidental to the argument in this thesis, that exile has a tenuous association with democracy. Democracies are recorded in the data only as utilising exile when dealing with anti-colonial movements.
[8] N.B. Following Elster *et al* I have only included cases of exile post 1945. Exiles during the two world wars would have skewed the distribution of cases as during the second world war alone almost every west European government spent a period in exile in London (Iwanska, 1981). These cases are well documented in their own right and the phenomena of exiled governments has consequently received more treatment in political science than any other kind of exile (see chapter two). Theoretically there is good reason to date the universe of cases within the post-war period as the context of 'total war' is among the rarest historical events and does not pertain for any subsequent case.

independence movements, coups d'etat have been more prone to sending activists into exile than any other type.

3.1 Case Selection

This leads to the rationale for putting Egyptians in English exile at the heart of this study. As mentioned previously the case is intrinsically important for political reasons following the Arab Spring. Egyptian activists are at the forefront of the democratic struggle in the 21st century (Marfleet, 2016). Yet situating their case in this wider population of cases reveals the significance of their continuing activism. For well-documented topics case studies are often most useful for exploring outlier cases. Exile, and in particular exiled activism, is (as I will argue at length in the first part of the thesis) both under documented and under theorised. For this topic case study research is necessary to understand the processes at work in *typical* cases. Here as the typological theory demonstrates the case of Egyptians in English exile, as a case of exiled activists fleeing a coup d'etat, sit on or near to the line of best fit in the distribution of cases.

While in the typological theory I view exile as the dependent variable in the rest of the thesis I treat it as an independent variable; the thesis asks how exile changes activism. In part this is because the causes of exile, at face value, are no mystery.[9] Theoretically it is the political outcomes of exile that are most underspecified in the literature and where I saw the most valuable contribution this research could make. It is too easy to treat exile as the end of the story when in fact it may create new opportunities for activism. Yet mostly my designation of exile as an independent variable is grounded in sound methodology. Selecting cases based on the dependent variable is a classic error which creates selection bias, hindering the plausibility of causal claims (Geddes, 1990). Selecting cases based on the independent variable is better practice as it enables researchers to make observations of the conditions under which a causal process does and does not occur, in this case with a before and after comparison. Treating exile

[9] As it happens the research does go on to problematise the causes of exile by suggesting that a particular form of institutional path dependence, dating back half a century, created the context that made exile possible in this case. The findings of this study do suggest that the causes of exile are far from clear cut and would benefit from further consideration in future research. This ability to uncover new information is one major benefit of the case study approach.

in this way enabled the research design to account for both the changes exile produces in activism and the mechanisms by which those changes occur.

Treating exile as the independent variable aided the research design in another respect. While the typological theory helps to specify the cases the findings of the study can generalise to (activists exiled after coups) viewing the findings comparatively allows me greater confidence when attributing outcomes to exile or to competing variables. Exile, as the independent variable, lends itself excellently to a 'before and after' style comparison facilitating within case analysis. So while there is only one case given full treatment in this study it retains a comparative element and logic by comparing activism before and after exile.

3.2 Scope Conditions

In addition to specifying the cases which can be generalised to, the typological theory also provides grounds for delineating the scope of the theory developed in this thesis. It is reasonable to assume that the dynamics of exiled activism are similar in other cases, in similar contexts, yet it is less reasonable to assume the findings of this study would hold for cases of deposed leaders, governments, armies, rebel groups or prominent opposition figures in exile.

Beyond the range of cases described in the typological theory there are other constraints that must be placed on conjecture from this research. Theoretically the findings are context bound to cases of exiled activism. This is significant given that the reach of social movement theory is wider. Exiles carry a unique range of restraints that are not applicable to domestic or other transnational movements. Methodologically generalisation from the data is hampered as it is qualitative, non-random and interpretive. Within these caveats it would be in error to suggest that the findings of this study are bound entirely to the English case as the rigour of the comparative method built into the case combined with the data analysis techniques of structured, cyclical coding are established methods of generalising from such evidence.

4. The Exile Process

Here is a preview of my argument in this thesis. Exile is a political process that changes the character of activism and may have implications for its efficacy. It transforms political opportunity structures and mobilising structures. The process is composed of the interaction of

three variables; political opportunity structure, mobilising structures and framing processes, with three casual mechanisms; decertification, brokerage and boundary formation. The process has no unique outcome variable, instead it is a feedback loop varying the forms and outcomes of activism. It is initiated even before the expelling authority banishes activists. Through the institutions of dictatorship the mechanism *decertification* works to delegitimise activism or opposition politics. This creates the context in which, faced with a critical juncture, in this case coup d'etat, authorities begin to make life so dangerous for activists they are left with the choice to flee or face martyrdom. Banishment transforms the political opportunity structure they operate within. From their sanctuary activists find they retain limited access to the closed political opportunity structure of their sending country but are offered a range of opportunities by their new host country.

From this modified context two causal pathways open in tandem. In a process of *brokerage* activists reconvene, begin to connect with empathetic local activists and to engage with activism in their new country. However the exiles are not always at the centre of initiating new activism and partnership as in their new context *decertification* continues to operate on a micro-sociological scale as fear and rumour pervade the exile community. Simultaneously activists share knowledge of contentious performances thereby establishing an exile repertoire. The range of opportunities available therefore facilitate the growth of activism networks and expansion of activism repertoires. At this point cognitive mechanisms begin to occur at the discursive level. As networks and repertoires expand, exiles find productive means of framing their discourse on the side of pro-democracy activists. Through doing so the mechanism *boundary formation* ensures that while activists are able to find common cause with sympathetic activists in their new country, old intra-movement enmities also survive the exile. This initiates changes in both political opportunity structure and mobilising structures as it establishes the availability of political allies for the movement.

This account of the process of exile is a simplification yet it is helpful in introducing the argument. The argument can be put even more broadly: politics can change people, but sometimes (when they work together) people can change politics. This is to take us further away

from specificity of exile but is helpful in framing the detail of the study that follows. The detail of the mechanisms connecting these variables is the point of the study. As Bunge put it, "If we want to explain real things… we must understand how they work" (Bunge, 2009: 1). This thesis suggests that exile works in ways similar to other forms of contentious politics, and that that knowledge is helpful for scholars and authorities who want to understand or even influence activism, and for activists themselves who want to achieve their political aims.

5. Plan of the Thesis

The thesis can be described as a single case study that has simultaneous revelatory, explanatory and theory-building purposes. As the study investigates the aggregation of causal mechanisms into the political process of exile it can be characterised as an exercise in process tracing, but other labels are equally apt. The evidence for the study comes chiefly from a series of biographical interviews and in that sense is an exercise in life-history. The data analysis techniques employed combine three layers of coding through two cycles of analysis, description and explanation, and the study therefore qualifies as a thematic analysis. Indeed, the handling of the data makes the presentation of results difficult to categorise as life-history as the analytical chapters do not follow the narrative of participants' biographies, thus masking their identities, but instead is categorised according to propositions derived from literature review of social movement theory. This situates the study within the disciplines of political science and sociology, the two principal areas of social movement research.

The thesis has two parts. The first contains an account of the methods used in the study and an extensive literature review. The literature review is divided into two chapters as the thesis brings two fields together, the study of exile and the study of social movements. The reviews first of all identify gaps for the study. The study of exile can be characterised as comprised of two approaches, an international relations approach that views groups of exiles as actors in international affairs, and an identity politics approach that studies on the effects exile has on individuals. Very little has been written about the activism of exiles specifically, and even less has looked to existing theoretical approaches for explanations. This study takes social movement theory as a lens through which to view the changing activism of exiles. There is also

a geographical bias in the field as little work has been done on Middle Eastern exiles. After establishing the grounds for the study the reviews then look to competing accounts of social movement formation and activism to generate hypotheses for testing. The structural approach is contrasted with the rationalist approach and it is hypothesised that among other things, exile changes activism according to mechanisms that have mediated other forms of contentious politics and that much of that has to do with a political opportunity structure that varies the context for activism.

The first chapter reviews social movement theory, arguing that this theory can help inform the account in this study by exploiting the main insights of a well-developed theory to explain exiled activism. Chapter two reviews the literature on exile. It argues that there have so far been two approaches to exile, those who view exiles as actors in international relations, and those who study the impact of exile on personal and political identities. Little work has been done describing or explaining the activism of exiles and less has been done exploiting the insights of existing theory. Chapter three then goes on to describe the methods used in the study.

The second part of the thesis contains the empirical work of the study. This is a case study of activists exiled from Egypt to the UK. The case study is based on biographical interviews with activists providing a holistic account of their activism before and after exile. The case study first of all seeks to establish the events of activism in exile. It then, based on theory, consultation with participants, and analysts' input, seeks to extract an interpretation of how exile changed the observed activism. In order to make the findings meaningful in contexts other than the one studied, the research is designed to overcome, albeit in a limited capacity, shortcomings of the single qualitative case study. Most importantly a within-case comparison is engineered into the study facilitating a comparison according to the logic of the method of difference, comparing activism before and after exile. In addition to this logical trope, efforts are taken to systematise the data to maximise confidence in the accuracy of interpretation. This is achieved by abstracting from the participants' accounts through three layers of coding across two cycles of analysis. The coding combines inductive and deductive logic to first of all create an events database from the interview transcripts that forms the raw observations of description.

The later codes are driven by theory to categorise the events data and activists' critical self-interpretations into the variables and mechanisms that comprise the main propositions of social movement theory, that were earlier identified in the literature reviews.

The case study has three chapters and each contains a comparative element, comparing before and after exile. The first case study chapter, chapter four, describes the movement's political opportunity structure. This chapter will argue that opportunities for activism vary according to context and this variation in turn shapes activism. This chapter therefore sets the movement in its political and historical context. Chapter five describes the movement's mobilisation structures which are composed of activism networks and repertoires of contention. This chapter therefore contains an account of the activism itself and how it changed. The final analytical chapter, chapter six, describes the framing processes that mediated the activists' discourse. This part of the argument has an important role in moving the explanation beyond the simple realist one of understanding the movement's causes and actions to also account for its critical self-interpretations. Each of the three analytical chapters contains a comparative element and is focussed on linking the relevant main category with causal mechanisms mediating activism and change. The thesis ends with a conclusion, summarising the argument, restating the main findings and drawing lessons for scholars and activists interested in other cases.

Part One: Theory

[T]o be wrenched from home, family, everything pleasant and familiar, and forced into a world that is cold and hostile, whether the expelling agent is the Angel of God or Stalin's NKVD: this is the defining experience of exile. The word itself carries powerful connotations of sorrow and alienation, of the surrender of the individual to overwhelming strength, of years of fruitless waiting. It was Victor Hugo who called exile 'a long dream of home'. — John Simpson, *Driven Forth*

Chapter One
Transnational Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach

1.1. Introduction

Social movement theories explain activism, which is the business of social movements. In this chapter I offer an account of the (sometimes) competing approaches to theorising social movements and provide a contemporary reading of the field's findings. While important cases, such as the civil rights movement, have been studied by scholars of many disciplines, I focus here on research in political science and sociology in particular. These disciplines are the natural home of social movement theory, conceived as a generalisable, testable, explanation for the formation and outcomes of social movement organisations and activities.

Social movement theory, developed by mainly western scholars to explain, initially, western cases seems far removed from the activism of exiled Egyptians this thesis is concerned with. Yet I argue it points in the direction of the answers to the questions about exiled activism I have posed in this thesis and is therefore a suitable starting point. Discussing methodological challenges in studying Middle Eastern activism since the Arab Spring Philip Marfleet recently posed the following question to researchers,

> How are micro-level perspectives made relevant to 'high politics' — because certain aspects of the latter do remain important? As we learned in 2011, 'Ash-sha'b yurid isqat an-nizam' (The people want/will the fall of the order/regime). The 'order'/'the regime' has indeed been a focus of the movements. How are studies of those 'below the radar' to be integrated into mainstream scholarship, with its emphasis on institutional actors? (Marfleet, 2016: 10).

I argue, and present the work in this thesis as one example, that social movement theory presents an adaptable framework to understand the relations between activists and the political systems they operate within.

Through its review this chapter begins to identify theories answering the research questions addressed in the study, by describing the main categories of analysis (political opportunity structure, mobilising structures, framing processes and mechanisms). It also begins to identify the contributions the thesis will make to political science. The thesis seeks to describe and explain the role of exiled activists in contentious politics, and how exile changes their activism. Social movement theories are explanations for collective activism. The thesis

therefore contributes knowledge of exilic activism to social movement theory. The review in this chapter stops short of identifying specific gaps in the literature beyond the need for study of exilic activism. This is because gaps for this study are not within the field of social movement theory but within the study of political exiles. These gaps are discussed in chapter two, section two. This introduction begins with a discussion of the alternative conceptions of how to characterise the literature on social movements (section 1.1) before providing a plan (section 1.2) of the coming chapter.

1.1.1 Structure and Agency Based Views of Social Movements

This section focuses on interpretive methods of categorising and arguing about the literature rather than on systematic methods of identifying sources, which are fully discussed in chapter two, section three.[10] This discussion is warranted by the nature of social movement studies. The literature is advanced and existing reviews follow good conventions. Following Hart's arguments about literature reviewing this chapter has been written with several goals in mind. The chapter (1) will distinguish the work to be done from the work previously completed. It will (2) outline the main variables (and mechanisms) comprising social movement theory. It will also (3) seek to theorise the properties of these variables and mechanisms salient in specifically transnational activism given the focus of the study. All of these goals are facilitated by an introductory section (section two) contextualising the contemporary state-of-the-art within its historical development (Hart, 2002: 27).

Such reviews require typologising bodies of research. In social movement studies, as in contentious politics, there are several live and several ‘timeless’ debates. The debate the review is structured around therefore orients the research that follows. For example, Lichbach (2003) in his review perceives a debate between rationalists, culturalists and structuralists.[11] His

[10] This chapter does not discuss literature review methods. The methods used in this chapter, including interpretive methods, are common to this review and that in chapter 1. These methods are discussed in chapter 2, section 3. In short, the approach to reviewing is based on best practice in source selection and analysis. The strength of the account in the next chapter is that it makes both source selection and source analysis methods transparent and systematic and attempts, as much as possible, to standardise methods across both parts of the thesis, literature reviewing and case study.

[11] Rationalists are characterised as contending that participation in collective action occurs when rational actors decide to participate, that is they view motivation as causal. Culturalists are characterised as contending that social movement activity is an outcome of intersubjective articulations of meaningful discourse. Finally structuralists are

interpretation posits that social movement researchers debate as much over ontology as over the most salient causes of social movement activity (Lichbach, 2003: 13,14). He favoured the approach because it demonstrated the gap for the rationalist hypotheses he sought to develop. In an earlier review McAdam (1996) distinguished the field according to three more precise hypotheses about social movement formation that nonetheless share common ontological assumptions.[12] In doing so McAdam emphasised the overlap between these theories.

In a sense, these two examples represent opposing theories of epistemology that I characterise as a conflict/consensus opposition. On one hand Lichbach views scholars and their theories as competing, tending toward one ultimately correct theory. On the other McAdam views (or attempts to encourage) research as a consensual profession that excels in problem solving.[13] The approach to categorising existing research taken in this chapter is in a different tradition (e.g. Emirbayer, 1997; Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994; Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Livesay, 2003; Sewell, 1992).[14] This review distinguishes between research that views structure as causal and research that views agency as causal.[15] I present social movement theory, referred to throughout as SPOT (synthetic political opportunity theory), in the form it is commonly understood as a structural view. I contrast this with rational choice theory which places greater emphasis on human agency independently of context.

Skocpol described the structural view as "an impersonal and non-subjective view point — one that emphasises patterns of relationships among groups and societies" (Skocpol, 1979: 18). Her analysis of social revolutions which made states and their relations causal is

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described as those scholars who seek to separate the outcomes of contentious politics from subjective motivations and look instead to historical institutions as causal factors (Lichbach, 2003: 13,14). The review in (McAdam et al, 2001) mirrors this view.

[12] These are the hypothesis of political opportunity structures, resource mobilisation theory and framing theory.

[13] More or less this is what Kuhn characterised as 'normal science'.

[14] The structure of this review and the arguments it develops have been influenced by previous reviews. There is a lot of social movements research. It is unrealistic to pretend this chapter accounts for every relevant study. Rather it is hoped the sample presented is representative, a contention supported by the concurrence with other reviews.

[15] This division is imperfect in many regards. But the imperfection is a necessity of categorising which afflicts all reviews. Categorising research entails blurring distinctions between thick and thin versions of theories. Furthermore entire categories of research remain debatable, due in part to debate (or confusion) within. This is particularly apparent in this review which basically 'claims' 'culturalists' for structural theory. McAdam et al do likewise in *Dynamics of Contention*. Lichbach does the exact opposite in his review. Part of this is undoubtedly due to the reluctance of cultural researchers to engage in causal debate which leaves their arguments open to interpretation and/or falsification. However some such as Howarth and Glynos (2008) do consider their work as contributing roughly to the structural tradition while others (Geerz) are more oriented toward methodological individualism.

characteristic of structural theories. That is, while structure can be logically thought of as those factors beyond agency political scientists have tended to think of historical institutions as structure.[16] Downs describes agency as the role of "decisions [that look] as though they were made by rational minds" (Downs, 4). Hayek concurred with Downs' view of choice in social causation when he wrote the "aim [of the social sciences] is to explain the unintended or undesigned results of the actions of many men" (Hayek, 1952: 25). Theorists of agency therefore argue that social outcomes are consequences of aggregate individual choice.

The agency/structure dichotomy postulated in this chapter is intended to present a 'third way' between the conflict/consensus literature review typologies discussed above. The debate contains competing propositions on both ontological and substantive points. Yet the debate remains an unresolvable philosophical problem, no key data unit will falsify either claim. In reality it is reasonable to think that social causation lies somewhere in between. In empirical data the distinction between structure and agency can be blurred in aggregations of individual actions into social variables where the whole can be greater than the sum of parts. So by reducing the review to irreconcilable differences I hope to contribute a valuably different perspective from reviews that emphasise conflict or consensus in research. As the debate does not tend toward one 'correct' theory it is reasonable to draw lessons from both sides. The synthesis I propose recognises the importance of individual decision making within the aggregation of structural effects yet does not rely on assumptions about rationality. Yet I do not gloss over disagreements, a practice in theorising that reduces falsifiability.

1.1.2 Plan of the Chapter

The chapter starts by recounting the development of the field of contentious politics and the contested position of SPOT within that literature (section two). This discussion entails a definition of 'social movement' (section 2.1). With this discussion, as with others in the chapter, examples will be drawn from Egyptian activism but also from studies of other notable cases. Following the initial review of contentious politics and social movements the chapter proceeds to discuss competing perspectives on social movement formation, recruitment and outcomes

[16] For a full review see Munck, 2007.

(section three). Lastly, the structural propositions of SPOT will be contrasted with purposive rational choice theories (section 4).

The findings of this review therefore establish the format of subsequent chapters and the research. The synthesis of the field provided aims to elucidate the gaps which this study plugs in existing knowledge. Having outlined the salient variables of SPOT the chapter develops operational definitions for explaining transnational Egyptian activism. Finally this chapter, in identifying the variables and mechanisms known to facilitate contentious politics, theorises the phenomena which I dissect in the methodology chapter (chapter three, section 4) into constituent evidence units.

1.2. Social Movements in Contentious Politics

1.2.1 The Emergence of the Field of Contentious Politics

The phrase 'contentious politics' predates the publication of *Dynamics of Contention* (McAdam et al, 2001), the text it is normally associated with, by some years (for example, it was used in Guigni et al 1998; Tarrow, 1996: 874), but *Dynamics* marks the establishment of its fixed meaning as an orienting concept in the field. 'Contentious politics' is the interaction of contention with politics, according to particular definitions of 'contention' and 'politics'. Contention is a form of public claim making. Politics, as understood here, consists of interactions involving states and/or governments (McAdam et al, 2001: 4-5).[17] The definition of politics is controversial and would at first glance vex some readers because it implies interactions not involving states or governments are not political. Undoubtedly these critiques are valid. Yet the point of this definition is not to provide the complete, dictionary sufficient meaning of politics. Rather it is to establish clear criteria for case selection. It is clear, concise and provides unambiguous grounds for categorising cases. Contention and politics interact in episodes of claim making, cross-cutting the interests of states and non-state actors (McAdam *et al*, 2001).

[17] The distinction matters. Not all states are governments and not all governments control states. Governments can exist in exile and occupying armies can control the administrative functions of states.

This definition makes contentious politics a field that appropriates the findings of earlier studies that may have been authored for a different audience. Social movements are one sub-form of contention but the overall contention framework enables social movement scholars to learn from scholars of revolution, civil war, democratisation and other forms of contention.[18] In turn this makes it possible for scholars of contention to argue that knowledge has accumulated and to describe that narrative.

If there is such a thing as 'social movement theory' it is the hypothesis that contentious politics happens when opportunities are present, perceived and acted upon (Snow et al, 2004; McAdam et al, 2001; Tarrow, 1994: 17–18; Tilly, 2004: x). While this is broadly true, the messier reality is that there is no such theory that could be summarised in one sentence, but a cluster of related hypotheses concerning mid-range mechanisms and variables of contention.

Yet if the cluster of theories is viewed collectively (the label 'social movement theory' being a shorthand) these theories could form one possible answer to the collective action problem. This puzzle, which has become a standard point of departure for political economists (e.g. Stiglitz, 2002; Waterbury, 2002) and social movement scholars alike,[19] was first outlined by Mancur Olson (1965). Olson noted goods obtained by collective action can logically only be public goods,[20] so it follows that, for individuals,[21] pursuit of these goods by collective action is irrational as the goods can be obtained through free riding (Olson, 1965).[22] Following Olson's

[18] Although theoretically the distinction between contention and politics matters, practically the only form of contention this study considers is political. Therefore for brevity 'contention' will be used interchangeably with 'contentious politics'.

[19] The centrality of Olson's work for social movement theory cannot be overstated. To provide any examples of research citing his work would be unjustifiably arbitrary given that basically every study regardless of epistemological vantage takes the collective action problem as the point of departure. It is no exaggeration to claim that his work created the academic environment in which social movement studies changed from the (basically pro-establishment) social psychological efforts of earlier theorists (e.g. Le Bon) to the empirically focussed research agenda that dominates today.

[20] Public goods are goods that if one member of a group consumes it, others in the group cannot feasibly be excluded from its benefit (Olsen, 1965: 14). Examples include military protection and democracy.

[21] Olson acknowledges that the theory does not hold for 'small groups' yet the precise boundary between small and large groups cannot be satisfactorily determined.

[22] An example will help. Imagine a single Egyptian who longs for democracy. Imagine Egyptians collectively protest for democracy in Tahrir square. Imagine the regime concedes and transitions to democracy. That single Egyptian will enjoy her desired outcome of democracy whether or not she participated in the protest.

This argument, as with RCT broadly, rests on a series of assumptions about the nature of rationality that some scholars may object to. For instance it assumes that individuals can realistically predict the consequences of their action. Yet researchers have found repeatedly that individuals unpredictably misperceive their own influence on groups; Klandermans, 1984; Muller and Opp, 1986; Finkel, Muller and Opp, 1989; Opp, 1989. The counter

logic provides the methodological justification to view collective action as an object of research, as it is intrinsically puzzling every case therefore requires explanation (Lichbach, 1996: 13,14). Social movement theory[23] is therefore one explanation for contentious politics. The remainder of this section describes in narrative format the evolution of these theories. Although it begins before Olson's intervention it is nonetheless possible to look at these earlier studies as attempts to solve the collective action problem.

The earliest social scientific claims about contentious politics were sociological hypotheses on the break-down of societal 'systems'.[24] These theories, broadly in the Parsonian tradition, assumed that societies are ordered and that collective action, an event out of the norm, was therefore a symptom of a breakdown in the order (Blumer,1951; Turner and Killian, 1987). The crude form of these theories has been described as the theory that "…[t]he cause of civil violence was the breakdown of rational control over human behaviour through the spread of what one might call 'crowd mentality'" (Rule, 1988: 83).

Throughout the 1960s these theories were refined to account for subjective perceptions and the notion of relative deprivation came to be agreed as a powerful motivating cause (Davies 1962; Geschwender 1968; Gurr 1970).[25] Due mainly to the empirical impossibility of demonstrating the 'breaking point' these theories fell out of fashion and undoubtedly influenced

arguments have been put most forcefully by Amartya Sen in his paper Rational Fools (1977). Yet the consensus view in social science tends to be that even if researchers do not agree with RCT it is best to engage with it on its own terms. If for no other reason this is because Olson's argument, while it may appear counter-intuitive at first glance, serves an important role in many legitimate research designs by helping categorise cases of collective action as puzzles to be researched. Probably the most cogent counter argument to Olson was put by Tarrow, that protesters may seek not the collective good but the thrill of activism itself. It is instructive that even with such insights Tarrow still employs Olson's puzzle as a framework through which to view collective action, and recommends students of contention do likewise.

For even if researchers aim to surpass a rationalist account of collective action, or prefer structuralist explanations to those which perhaps overstate the role of agency, there remain sound reasons to depart from the prisoner's dilemma.

[23] SPOT stands for 'synthetic political opportunity theory' which is a more literal title for the theory. The acronym was invented by Mark Lichbach, (2008).

[24] Some reviews begin from earlier social-psychological accounts such as Le Bon's *The Crowd*. These studies are interesting but do not conform to modern standards of scientific neutrality.

[25] For example, one of the best known early explanations forwarded for explaining revolutions was the 'J-curve' theory (Davies, 1962). The theory suggests revolutions will follow periods of sustained growth which give way to sudden periods of decline hence its representation on a graph as a J-curve (albeit upside down). The theory posits that what matters for systemic change is not material conditions but subjective perceptions and is therefore nuanced and persuasive. Yet it is unsubstantiated by evidence as it is impossible to specify exactly which levels of relative deprivation are required for revolution, it has no predictive power as its variables are subjective.

the rise of falsifiable mid-range theories.[26] Subsequent generations of scholars also took issue with breakdown theories because the assumptions of order and breakdown presuppose a conception of collective action as deviant rather than political.[27]

Theories inspired by Olson's turn to economics then found favour among researchers looking for plausible explanations of collective action.[28] Resource mobilisation theorists postulated that protest and grassroots political groups were not different in any meaningful sense from any other organisations. Therefore they thought good explanations could be found in the bureaucracy and inner structure of social movement organisations (SMO). Resource mobilisation theory retains its modern adherents and has contributed numerous findings and hypotheses to the literature.[29] Chiefly resource mobilisation theory has contributed the SMO as a basic unit of analysis and comparison in cross-movement and cross-national studies (McCarthy and Zald, 1976).

Resource mobilisation theory was criticised by political process theorists who argued that studying activists independently of context was to misunderstand the webs of social causation they are embedded within. These researchers came from backgrounds in history and were inclined to see social movements as part of a larger picture of contentious processes.[30] Yet their main contribution has had wider significance for the discipline of political science; the

[26] Charles Tilly's earlier work, particularly *From Mobilisation to Revolution*, was central in criticising these theories. This book proposed a conflict model of society that at its core posits competition between interests as explanatory for collective action. This is a clear precursor to resource mobilisation theory.
[27] In fact the tendency to view social relations as fundamentally ordered has endured heavy and influential criticism. "…the systematic theory of the nature of man and of society all too readily becomes an elaborate and arid formalism in which the splitting of Concepts and their endless rearrangement becomes the central endeavour" (Mills, 2000: 23).
[28] This theoretical turn coincided with the rise of 'social movements' as an object of study, largely in order to explain the ongoing civil rights movement in America.
[29] Although his work is more sophisticated than could be encapsulated by any one 'approach', Kalyvas' *Logic of Violence* can be interpreted as an illustrative case of resource mobilisation theory. Kalyvas argued that in civil wars the most important factor determining a civilian's decision to resist or collaborate is the mobilisation of information. Collection (or hoarding) of information, Kalyvas postulates, depends on the relative organisation of militias or civilians. Information is a suitably abstract resource so that the theory is complicated by layers of perception (simplifying; decisions are taken based on perceptions of who knows what).
[30] Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow had both studied and published on European medieval and twentieth century history.

concept of a 'political opportunity structure', operationalised as a variable set that provides some specificity to the contributions of contextual factors in explanations of social outcomes.[31]

The dominance of resource mobilisation and political process theorists was challenged by a third group of scholars who critique both approaches for their common materialism.[32] Inspired primarily by the arguments contained in Goffman's (1974) *Frame Analysis* social constructionist (or constructivist) scholars sought to introduce ontological questions to the debate. In summary it could be said the framing process theorists argued that the fortunes of social movements depend on factors to do with discourse. However this is a simplification and the contribution of constructivists to the field has in fact been diverse. It is more realistic to distinguish 'thick' and 'thin' versions. 'Thick' constructivists, poststructuralists, basically refuse to recognise the validity of existing debates, maintaining that questions of cause and effect are neither here nor there (Hansen, 2011: 168). They argue that social movements are networks of discourse, and can be described but not explained. Their accounts retain some limited generality as they argue the logic of protester discourse can recur across context (Laclau, 2005; Glynos and Howarth, 2008). 'Thin' constructivists have engaged more with positivist interpretations. They have argued that in addition to material factors of networks and opportunities movement outcomes vary according to discursive and/or cultural matters (Benford and Snow, 2000).

The field of contentious politics was born of these debates. It was announced in the book *Dynamics of Contention* in which McAdam *et al* (2001) tried to persuade scholars to recognise one another's achievements and to agree on the work remaining for the field. "In recent years, specialized scholars have made substantial advances in describing and explaining

[31] The term 'political opportunity structure' was first coined by Eisinger (1973) to explain variation in protest at city level in the US.

[32] Another contender attempting to critique materialist approaches has been the literature on 'New Social Movements'. Scholars often write of NSMs that supposedly flourished in the mid twentieth century in western Europe and America, particularly around 1968. These 'new' social movements were said to differ from 'old' ones — usually the labour movement, in terms of issues, tactics and constituencies. That is they focused on identity rather than economy, operated outside political institutions and involved people other than political anoraks. Examples have included the green movement, the peace movement and feminism. The NSM thesis belongs in the footnotes as it has been thoroughly refuted by Craig Calhoun and following his line of argumentation (equally critical of materialist approaches) scholars have largely abandoned the NSM line of critique in favour of refined materialism. Calhoun pointed out teasingly that the standard definition of NSM described most social movement activity in the eighteenth and nineteenth century; all social movements make identity claims and even many of the performances attributed to NSMs can be traced back as far. Hardly 'new' (Calhoun, 1993).

each of these important contentious forms. On the whole, they have paid little attention to each other's discoveries." (McAdam *et al*, 2001: 10) Their basic claim is that resource mobilisation theory, political process theory and framing theory are not mutually exclusive. All three have identified causal factors. Yet with the partial exception of framing theory all have focussed on the causal factors to the detriment of mechanisms and causal processes. Hence the focus in this study and others on specifying the mechanisms linking cause and effect. Exile is one such social process that affects the forms and outcomes of activism and has thus far been studied by scholars of diaspora rather than contentious politics.

1.2.2 The Definition of Social Movement

Social movements are a particular form of contention that have rightly received significant attention. The phrase 'social movement' itself is among those rare terms to have passed from the obscurity of social scientific discourse into the everyday language of politics and activism. Something was lost in that translation. Consider an illustrative example. In the immediate aftermath of the Scottish independence referendum commentators remarked on the sudden formation of a nationalist social movement but debated whether the movement should continue or disband, in the process articulating varying definitions of 'social movement'. These ranged on one extreme from Gallagher's (*The National*, December 16, 2014) view of it as cult-like to Macwhirter's (*The Herald*, November 11, 2014) more nuanced idea of a civic society alliance. These accounts essentially view the movement as more or less legitimate protests. Yet if it were just a fancy way of saying protest it would be of little use to scholars who characteristically favour parsimony over complexity in prose. If a phrase is so vague it can be interpreted in opposed senses scholars must state their definitions clearly in order for their findings to understood.

The remarkable difference between everyday and scholarly accounts is the level of consensus among scholarly accounts, at least amongst the core texts.[33] In fact, general agreement over definitions of social movements is among the strengths of the field. Authors have offered superficially distinct definitions in accordance with taste in prose. Tarrow's

[33] However it is uncommon to read research that frames the concept in any other way that discussed here.

definition in his textbook *Power in Movement* establishes the format most scholars agree on. That is, movements consist of "sequences of contentious politics based on underlying social networks, on resonant collective action frames, and on the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents." (Tarrow, 1994: 7). This definition is repeated by Klandermans, who prefers a social psychological view of the causes of mobilisation to the structural view proposed both in this thesis and by leading researchers such as Tarrow and Tilly: "Rather than adding a new definition to the already far too long list of social movements, I will apply the definition proposed by Tarrow (1994) because it suits the approach to social movements I am taking here very well" (Klandermans, 1997: 3).

Take Tilly's precise formulation as broadly representative of the field. According to Tilly social movements consist of three properties:

> 1. a sustained, organised public effort making collective claims on target authorities (let us call it a campaign); 2. employment of combinations from among the following forms of political action: creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and pamphleteering (call the variable ensemble of performances the social movement repertoire); and 3. participants' concerted public representations of WUNC: worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment on the part of themselves and/or their constituencies (call them WUNC displays) (Tilly, 2004: 3,4).

Tilly's three categories correspond to the three identified by Tarrow; networks, performances and claims. The definition is perhaps uncontested due to its abstraction; it says nothing about particular forms of organisations or networks that count as movements. Yet in its abstraction the definition is undoubtedly accurate and has analytical merits. According to this definition social movements are interpretive categories constructed by scholars to aid describing and explaining periods of protest. Therefore any movement encompasses various protests from different locations and times (Tarrow, 1994: 15–16; Tilly, 1999: 257).[34]

Movements by this definition consist of networks, performances and claims. The 'classic' examples of social movements are the civil rights movement in the USA, the labour movement and the feminist movement. Egypt has known many social movement activities

[34] This is not to suggest that scholars 'own' social movements. The concept belongs to activists as much as it does to scholars. However for the purposes of clarity and accuracy this study narrows its focus to purely academic understandings of social movements.

ranging from worker mobilisations in the Nasser period,[35] student mobilisations against Sadat[36] to pro-democracy groupings such as Kefaya and the April 6 youth movement against the Mubarak dynasty.[37] The most established movement in Egypt is transnational: Islamism (Singerman, 2004, Richards and Waterbury, 2008). Social movements have occurred in democracies and non-democracies, but Tilly (2004) has observed a correlation between movements and democratising states leading him to argue that social movements are an integral part of democracy and possibly a cause and/or effect of democratisation.[38]

1.2.3 Summary

Social movements are campaigns of contentious performances and WUNC displays. They are a special category of contentious politics. This definition has been developed from the findings contained in contentious politics literature described above. Its three categories mirror the findings and central claims of the three most compelling approaches discussed; resource mobilisation theory, political process theory and framing theory.

Scholars have previously viewed social movements as symptoms of break down in societal order. Today this view is largely discredited as scholars tend to agree social movements are a legitimate and ordinary part of democratic politics and are a common feature of democratising systems. Other hypotheses forwarded to account for social movements have been resource mobilisation theory, political process theory and framing theory.

The following section discusses the contributions of these three approaches to informing current understandings of social movement causation. Following the detailed

[35] In this period when the regime attempted to channel protest into unique corporative institutions that replaced political parties and trade unions the only contentious activity other than state sponsored performances were those occasions when tempers rose unexpectedly at industrial disputes. Kerbœuf, 2005: 194-216; Vatikiotis, 1978: 113; 121-122; Beinin and Lockman, 1988; 421-423.

[36] In this period that witnessed the reemergence of political parties student activism became the primary forum of Egyptian contention however it often overlapped with religious activism. political opportunity structure theory predicts that the institution of competitive elections depressed much of the violence of earlier contention while Egyptian scholars commonly attribute the rise of student activism to the conjunction of the increase in higher education provision and the intellectual freedom afforded on university campuses. Abdalla, 1985: 177; Beinin, 2007; 71; Waterbury, p. 355.

[37] During Mubarak's term pro-democracy activists became increasingly bold and active. al-Sayyid. 2009; Mansour, 2009.

[38] Tilly (2004) has traced the history of social movements to the anti-slave trade movement which he claimed was the first social movement proper. Keck and Sikkink also describe the anti-slave trade movement as the earliest case of a transnational activism network (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 10).

elaboration of SPOT (section three) there will be an account of the rationalist critique (section 4).

1.3. SPOT

1.3.1 Cause and Effect in SPOT

SPOT posits that political opportunity structure, mobilising structures and framing processes are conjuncturally causative variables. Their conjunction results in contentious politics (McAdam *et al*, 2001: 14–17). The timing, form and outcomes of contention are all determined partly by this variable overlap and partly by the mechanisms mediating the process. The extent of each variable results from changes in the other variables.[39]

These formalisms help us to understand sociologically what occurs in periods of contentious politics. Contentious politics, when two or more parties (including a state or government) make claims on one another's interests, happens when there are opportunities, people get organised and frame grievances in a manner enough people find compelling. The formalisms of the preceding paragraph reveals, if anything, why this causal relation is so complicated it is unlikely to ever follow directly comparable paths.

Social movements can only mobilise if the political and historical context provides opportunities (Kitschelt, 1986: 58). Activists will mount their challenges according to mobilising performances they have rehearsed over time, learned from elsewhere or even sometimes improvised (Tilly, 1986: 391–2). Mobilisation as such can only happen when activists have negotiated, through formal or informal channels, space for it with those who might stand in the way (McAdam *et al*, 2001: 46). Depending on the risks involved ordinary citizens may only participate in collective political action if social movement claims are articulated within frames that are emotive or inclusionary (Poletta and Ho, 2006: 198). All of

[39] Variables are concepts that have a range of values. There are two main categories of variable. Independent variables are concepts that frame a cause. Dependent variables are concepts that frame an outcome (Van Evera, 1997: 10-11). There are various relationships that can exist between variables. Relationships can be coincidental, linear, nonlinear, co-variational and causal. The relationship between these three variables is conjuncturally causal. To say the relationship is causal is to say that one or more of the variables cause one or more of the other variables, which is the effect. Cause and effect relations can be either direct or conjunctural. A direct relation is when changes in one variable result in changes in another variable (King et al, 1994). A conjunctural relation is when the coincidence of various scores on a set of variables results in changes in another variable (Ragin, 1987: 34-54).

this in turn can come full circle as ultimately the actions and discourse of protesters can on occasion lead to an expansion, contraction or general change of political opportunities (Kriesi, 2007: 79).

1.3.2 Political Opportunity Structure

The terms of SPOT ensure that investigations begin not from the movement itself but from contextual factors (McAdam et al, 2001: 15; Tarrow, 1994: 85). These are relative to particular cases. In general, however, they tend to include things like the development of a political system over time; economic, social and demographic trends; and even international processes such as diplomacy, financial flows and warfare (Eisinger, 1973: 11; Yavus, 2004: 272). This broad constellation of factors is generally what researchers take as 'political opportunity structure' (Lichbach, 1998: 406). The political opportunity structure is in essence a concept researchers use to specify the aspects of context that affect a movement's outcomes. The breadth of these factors has led McAdam to state "consensus regarding the term 'political opportunity' has proven elusive'' (McAdam, 1996: 24).

Social movements are therefore partly a product of their environment. Factors that may seem distant or even irrelevant to particular disputes can have direct impact, albeit one that is hard to measure. Yet to make the concept useful analytically its contours require specification. As a point of departure it is worth noting that the name 'political opportunity structure' implies a hypothesis central to SPOT, namely that opportunities that are both political and structured matter more than those that are neither. Not all are (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999: 30–33; more generally Sartori, 1970).[40] Gamson and Meyer (1996) noted this challenge that political opportunity structure poses, "It threatens to become an all-encompassing fudge factor for the all the conditions and circumstances that form the context for collective action. Used to explain so

[40] Political theorists Fearon and Laitin (2003) have modelled the factors determining civil war onset. Their study challenged existing notions of civil wars as the outcome of ethnic or ideological divides but, importantly for our purposes, they found a remarkable correlation between civil wars and terrain. Civil wars correlate with the percentage of mountainous terrain. If this finding is interpreted within the terms of SPOT it provides the theory with something of a corroboration; mountainous terrain provides opportunities for guerrillas to group, hide arms, train, and attack. Yet by no definition can mountains be considered political and only by the most tenuous definition can they be thought of as structural. Proper analysis of contentious politics is wary of this and categorises opportunities appropriately so as to avoid conceptual stretching of the political opportunity structure. In causal analyses political and non-political opportunities can be compared (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999. 30–33).

much it may explain nothing at all" (Gamson & Meyer, 1996: 275). Researchers working with this view of context need to find justifiable means of operationalisation.

The literature contains two approaches to theorising political opportunities, a broad view and a narrow view.[41] One valid approach would be to adopt a 'focused' view such as della Porta (1995) took in her study of Italian and German social movements. She advocated focussing on only one of the variables constituting the set of political opportunities and measuring it as a barometer of the remainder. She argues that in the democratic context political opportunity structures are comparable enough that protester-authority interactions can function as a cross-national indicator of available opportunities. This, she argues, is a reliable indicator as from the protester's perspective, police are often the first point of contact with the state, and therefore the attitude and behaviour of police can be taken as indicative of the attitude of the state to challenge more broadly (della Porta, 1995, p. 55–58). This view, while valid, is inappropriate for this study as the aim of description of the movement's causal context is just as important as explaining the movement's emergence.

Instead this study follows Tarrow and Tilly[42] (2012) in taking a holistic model of political opportunities designed to account for the full range of factors which could be conceived as part of the relevant variable set.[43] They identify six factors of a (usually national) political system, where 'political system' is a short hand for the institutions, conditions and events that form an opportunity context, that constitute the full range of opportunities for activists.[44] These factors are "1. The multiplicity of independent centres of power within it. 2. Its openness to new actors. 3. The instability of current political alignments. 4. The availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers. 5. The extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim making. 6. Decisive changes in items 1 to 5" (Tarrow and Tilly,

[41] The broad view has been treated as largely compatible with qualitative data and the narrow with quantitative. This is not to reify the relationship between methods and theories. It is well established in the literature that both qualitative and quantitative methods conform to a common logic of inference (King et al, 1994: Ragin, 1988).
[42] Other researchers in the same tradition include Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi, 1991; Abdel-Samad: 2014.
[43] This list of contextual factors is a development of the one authored by McAdam (1996: 27). Both are syntheses of relevant research.
[44] Volpi (2014; 154,155) argues counter to contemporary social movement theory that while there can be political opportunities afforded by structural factors such as institutions and the economy agency, often of an intersubjective character, has a role to play in determining the onset and outcomes of contentious politics. He argues cogently that opportunities can be constructed by activists rather than simply taken.

2012: 59). This model has the strength of demanding a dynamic (realistic), historical view rather than a static 'snapshot' that would in a sense decontextualise context. In order to document point six (decisive changes) researchers must understand and describe the history of the institutions and conditions forming the opportunity structure in question.

The choice between a broad or a narrow view of political opportunities is a methodological trade-off, with both options presenting costs and benefits. Essentially the trade-off is between complexity and precision. The broad view can account for the full range of factors involved but lacks a means of measuring the impact of any one factor while the opposite is true of the narrow view. Yet the decision between a broad and narrow view is restricted by properties of cases. Della Porta notes that her method of viewing police violence as an indicator of wider opportunities is more reliable when limited to domestic or even local cases (della Porta, 1995: 56). Tarrow contributes to the debate by arguing that when social movements cross borders, as in transnational activism, political opportunity structures become so complicated by competing governments, interests and international institutions, it becomes misleading to treat any one factor as indicative of the rest (Tarrow, 2005: 25).

Some examples of research in this tradition should help illustrate the relevance of these factors. Both of these examples feature a more or less holistic view of political opportunity structure though the first relies on quantitative evidence and the latter on qualitative case studies. In the 1960s the USA operated a domestic system of racial segregation. In *The Political Process* McAdam studied the civil rights movement that sought to challenge this system. Counter-intuitively he argued that the international context of the Cold War between, in particular, the USA and the Soviet Union enlarged the opportunities afforded to black activists for contention. The USA as a political entity was (and obviously remains) a federation of states with multiple levels of governance. Segregation was broadly supported and enforced at state level in some states, while federal government may or may not have had a different view on the matter. Regardless, domestically federal government was constrained by its reliance on political and economic support from the mainly southern states economically reliant upon segregation. Changes in the international context forced the US government to reassess its domestic

interests. The Soviet Union was able to compellingly utilise the USA's domestic racism in their Cold War propaganda thereby damaging the USA's international interests. These came to trump domestic interests as the US federal government was forced by concerns over its international image to intervene in local politics by providing assistance and even platforms to civil rights activists.

To use another example, Nepstad compared three successful nonviolent revolutions (East Germany, Chile, Philippines) with three failed campaigns (Tiananmen Square, Panama, Kenya) in order to understand the determinants of success.[45] She identified four variables which functioned as a facilitative context; economic decline, political opportunity, divided elites and free space (Nepstad, 2011: 125,126). Most of these are self-explanatory. By 'free space' she literally meant buildings, usually churches, or public areas where activists could meet and conspire free from surveillance. Her use of political opportunity structure is unfortunately guilty of conceptual stretching as she essentially uses it to capture (a) events of the 'final straw' variety and (b) cultural traditions that activists relied on in encouraging general mobilisation. These factors are not necessarily political or structural while her other contextual factors may be better described as part of the political opportunity structure. As these conditions obtained in all six of her case studies she argued that these factors were probably necessary for mobilisation but could not explain the outcome of protests.

Nepstad tested the efficacy of six non-contextual factors, techniques of nonviolent action; refusal to acknowledge regime authority, refusal to cooperate or comply with laws, challenging of mentalities of obedience, withholding skills, withholding material resources, and undermining state's sanctioning power. These factors did not vary meaningfully either. The only conclusive variation she identified was that in all three cases of success the military defected to the challenger's side while in the three cases of failure the military remained loyal to

[45] Nepstadt, who is interested in revolutions rather than protest broadly, defined success as meaning "the removal of an existing regime or ruler" (Nepstadt, 2011: xiii). Some scholars would undoubtedly object to her definition as ignoring the long term consequences of activism and possibly even ignoring the opinions of the activists themselves. Nepstad, argues that this definition of success is reasonable because the process of removing a dictator is separate to the subsequent process of establishing a new society (Nepstad, 2011: xiv).

the regime. On that basis she concludes that nonviolent revolution can only succeed with the support of armed forces.[46] Yet she goes on to argue that the causes of military defection and loyalty are so complex the factor is on a borderline between structure and agency. Protestors can influence the military but the regime has more control (Nepstad, 2011: 128).

These two examples provide illustration of how researchers have operationalised the broad view of political opportunity structure. Both draw on a full array of contextual factors that could be said to offer opportunities to activists. In McAdam's study, international relations provided an opportunity for activists to frame their grievances in a way that manipulated the federal structure of the USA. In Nepstad's study the willingness of the army to support activists, or to move against the governing regime determined the availability of opportunities for activism. Neither of these studies structured their view of opportunities according to the six points identified from Tarrow and Tilly, yet they can be seen to be in the general spirit of the model.

This study works more closely within the framework of that six-point model. These two examples differ from the case in this study as the movements considered were bounded within one nation state. Recent theorising in social movement research as well as work on exiles suggests that transnational movements operate within cross border political opportunity structures. Tarrow defines the transnational political opportunity structure as "a dense, triangular structure of relations among states, nonstate actors, and international institutions, and the opportunities this produces for actors to engage in collective action at different levels of this system" (Tarrow, 2005: 25). This proposition is consistent with that of Sznajder and Roniger, (2007), that exiles operate within a three-tiered context consisting of sending state, receiving state and the transnational diaspora. Combining these views suggests that exiled activists operate within a political opportunity structure that consists of three structures; opportunities offered by the sending country, the receiving country and the transnational opportunity

[46] Other researchers have argued that the Egyptian revolution provides a corroboration for this hypothesis. Alimi and Mayer argue SPOT predicts that ruling elite unity is a cause of regime stability. In Egypt when the military refused to fire on protesters this changed the opportunities for contention (2011: 477).

structure. As will be demonstrated later, the evidence in this thesis did not bear out this proposition (see chapter four).

In the case studied here, of Egyptian exiles, activists traded those opportunities afforded by the Egyptian polity for those of the English polity (as a distinct sub-unit with the UK polity). As Tarrow argues transnational opportunities are generated by international institutions, NGOs and relations among states, but also include factors such as social media that provide a platform for networking and coordinating activism. While activists in England made full use of social media this rarely crossed borders and the story of NGOs cannot be accounted for in this way. Entire NGOs had been forced into exile, with Amnesty International moving their Egyptian operations to London, while British NGOs made strategic decisions not to operate in Egypt to avoid feeding the Egyptian regime's paranoid discourse of 'foreign intervention' jeopardising Egyptian activism (interviews 5, 7, 10, 14; discussed in Chapter 4).

In Egypt political opportunities are monopolised by the governing regime, that has outlawed protest and seized control of parliament, yet through their relations with activists in Egypt, the exiles still draw to some extent on the opportunities afforded for activism by institutions such as political parties and the press. In the UK where the exiles are now based, opportunities for activism are geographically bound and can be described as an English opportunity structure. Although the UK is not a federal state the range of political institutions and opportunities do vary regionally and even before the advent of devolution commentators had argued that constituent parts of the UK had distinctive political systems (Kellas, 1978). Although England does not have its own parliament, the range of actors involved in politics, such as political parties, are to a sufficient degree based in England and concerned with English politics. In addition to political parties there are a range of SMOs active in England who are allied to exiles and the exile cause.[47] These two national systems are taken in this study as the basis of a view of the relevant political opportunity structure that will be fully developed in the

[47] These SMOs are outlined in the discussion of case selection in chapter one, section 2.2.

case study. As will be argued in section five of this chapter this view derived from the literature is sufficient to be taken as a hypothesis to be tested or developed by the case study.

1.3.3 Mobilising Structures

It is not enough for opportunities to exist. For contention to occur, they must also be perceived and acted upon. Resource mobilisation theorists have found social networks to be key in relating opportunity and action. These networks are known in the literature as Mobilising Structures (McCarthy and Zald, 1976). Political process theorists have meanwhile studied the forms of action, contentious performances, that also vary with opportunities (McAdam *et al*, 2001; Lichbach, 1998: 407; Tarrow, 1994: 136).

Mobilising structures vary from case to case but from abstraction they can be seen to consist of networks of Social Movement Organisations (SMOs). Generally scholars use SMO as a shorthand to refer to relevant, mobilised, non-governmental organisations (NGO), pressure groups, think tanks and organised citizen journalists.[48] SMOs can move resources and mobilise activists but they also provide a platform for contentious claim making through public speeches, protests, marches and so forth and a political training ground in which 'actors' can ‘rehearse’ these contentious ‘performances’ (Marwell and Oliver, 1993). The range of these activities exhibited by a movement is a central component of its mobilising structures which is described by social movement theorists metaphorically as the contentious ‘repertoire’.

Research has confirmed the centrality of social networks to movement causation.[49] Recruitment has been shown in some cases to follow as a function of networks. In the Dutch peace movement recruitment happened primarily through friends (Kriesi 1988: 58). In the Dutch environmental movement 43% of activists reported personal links to other activists and 67% were linked to new activists (Kreisi, 1993: 186). However other researchers have brought evidence suggesting personal links alone are insufficient and that only sufficiently motivated

[48] It is possible to conceive of political parties as highly resourced and disciplined SMOs but for clarity generally parties are treated as a special category that may at certain points in history overlap with corresponding movements. E.g. Brand (1978) distinguishes the national movement in Scotland from the SNP although from the 1970s onward the two were largely synonymous.
[49] Putnam 1993, 1995; Somers 1993, 1994.

individuals can be recruited through networks. McAdam and Paulsen (1993) found that integration in activist networks did not predict recruitment to movements unless coupled with a relevant strong activist identity, i.e. unless the participant agreed with the movement claims.

Network analyses have also described the overlaps between SMOs.[50] Curtis and Zurcher (1973) argued that individuals ought to be viewed as inter-organisational links. Their suggestion is supported by evidence. Diani and Lodi (1988) measured the overlapping commitments of Italian environmentalists finding that 28% were active in several environmental and non-environmental SMOs. Which is all to say that the weight of evidence is with the assertion that networks and organisations have a place in the cause and effect relations of social movements. The efficacy of these pan-movement networks also depend to some extent on exogenous factors. For example research has found that the presence of external funders promoting a particular policy agenda can lead to antagonism and hostility between NGOs otherwise working towards similar outcomes (Ketola, 2011). The relationship between funders and SMOs is far from straightforward however as there are cases of external funding stimulating the formation of new NGOs (Ketola, 2012) while in some cases the withdrawal of external financial support has created new problems for micro— and meso— level organisations of activists (Braniff and Byrne, 2014).[51]

Networks and social ties do not only affect the movement as a whole but also impact on the individuals involved. McAdam (1988) has researched the effect that civil rights movement participation had on individual black Americans involved in a radical campaign called Freedom Summer. McAdam interviewed a sample of participants shortly after the campaign then again years later to track changes in biography. Based on the interviews McAdam argued that movement participation impacted on factors as varied as political views, employment and

[50] Singerman (2004) has argued that informal networks provide movements with additional resources and opportunities forbidden to officially-sanctioned movements. Islamist movements have been forced to network informally in order to evade repression which in turn has facilitated political violence.
[51] Further research complexities the relationship between funders and movements as NGOs have been shown to exhibit a range of strategies (translation, brokerage, navigation and agonism) by which they can in one way or another adapt funders' policy agenda to correspond to their own organisational objectives (Ketola, 2015).

marital relationships. Therefore social movement participation can be thought as significant a life event as a university education or military service.

Political process theorists contributed micro— level analyses that looked beyond networked individuals and treated their actions as units (Badran, 2014). Researchers have described actions on the ‘stage’ of contentious politics metaphorically as ‘performances’ which aggregate into ‘repertoires’. Contentious repertoires are an exhaustive list of the means of claims-making (i.e. performances) we can expect to see in a given place and time (Tilly, 1986: 2). It is not so much the case that social movement theorists think some people know more contentious performances than others. It is perfectly possible that people have perfect knowledge of protest means. Yet the forms claim-making take do vary with time and space (della Porta and Diani, 2006: 168; Tilly, 1999: 266).

For example, Parisian protesters have developed a tradition of building barricades which close off parts of the city to authorities. This performance was ‘learned’ in the heat of revolution in the 1780s but is still symbolically deployed by modern activists. (Tilly, 1986: 391–2). Yet in Cairo activists until recently refused to take such bold action. Despite sporadic riots over the years the silent, stationary protests against dictatorship by the activist network Kefaya! (Enough!) were actually shocking to onlookers (al-Sayyid, 2009). In France public protest is normal and ostentatious whereas in recent years in Egypt even reserved protests were unusual.

This is less to do with awareness and more to do with context and confidence. In democracies citizens can engage with the political system by voting in elections and through protest. Protest, generally thought of as an unorthodox means of expression, has evolved over time as a means of claim making accepted in western democracies within clearly specified

limits (Tilly, 2004). In non-democracies the efficacy of voting is questionable and protest is generally more restricted (apart from the performances organised by the regime).[52]

1.3.3 Framing Processes

From a certain perspective it is possible to conceive of the political opportunity structure and mobilizing structures as the 'objective' causes of contentious politics: both are beyond the control of any human action other than determined, sustained interaction. Yet they are far from strictly objective as opportunities, networks and repertoires rely on peoples' perceptions of them as much as their availability. If we nonetheless allow ourselves license enough to think of these factors as somehow objective then we can think of framing processes as the corresponding subjective bases of contention. Again these labels are tricky and this categorization cannot survive critique but for the purpose of summarizing the complicated causative processes of social movement activity it will do.[53]

In terms of the intellectual genealogy of the concept it was Ervine Goffman (1974) who brought the metaphor of a 'frame' to the parlance of social science. The analytical utility of the concept was then investigated by scholars interested in the sorts of things that had seen them excluded from traditionally positivist social movement theory, students of culture, language and above all social construction (e.g. Kane, 1997; Williams, 1995; Zald, 1996). Today the concept of a framing process comes as an essentially pre-packaged response to that constructivist critique. It is therefore unpalatable to more radical interpretivists such as poststructuralists who typically reject propositions that are not context-bound (see, for example, Howarth and Glynos, 2008).

SMOs as actors in contention are involved in making claims, but the objects of those claims (states and governments) are similarly involved. The content of claims can (and does)

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[52] Scott argues such performances are a universal characteristic of power relations; "More of the public life of subordinates than of the dominant is devoted to "command" performances. The change in the posture, demeanour, and apparent activity of an office work force when the supervisor suddenly appears is an obvious case. The supervisor, though she too is constrained, can typically be more relaxed about her manner, less on guard, for it is the supervisor, after all, who sets the tone of the encounter" (Scott, 1990: 29). But he goes on to argue these performances provide opportunities to reverse power hierarchies; "What may look from above like the extraction of a required performance can easily look from below like the artful manipulation of deference and flattery to achieve its own ends. The slaves who artfully reinforced their master's stereotyped view of them as shiftless and unproductive may well have thereby lowered the work norms expected of them" (Scott, 1990: 34).

[53] Elster, for example, makes this point in these terms (1989: 20).

vary over the history of contention. Principally however SMOs can either advocate for a goal or they can articulate grievances (della Porta, 1996: 66). Generally any statement can be framed as such, but it is usually the framing of these claims, ones made by SMOs for or against goals, that has the greatest relevance to social movement politics. To talk about framing these claims is generally taken, in the relevant literature, to mean a constant negotiation (or sometimes struggle) over what is included in the claim, what it means and what it implies (Poletta and Ho, 2006: 188).

Three processes, operating between individual and meso— levels, characterise the social construction of movement frames. These processes are "(a) public discourse, that is, the interface of media discourse and interpersonal interaction; (b) persuasive communication during mobilisation campaigns by movement organisations, their opponents and countermovement organisations; and (c) consciousness raising during episodes of collective action" (Klandermans, 1997: 45). Public discourse as it is manifested in media and debate has at least the potential to reach entire populations. However, persuasive communications and consciousness raising attempts by SMOs are targeted at specific audiences. Across these three processes of social construction collective action frames become articulated and mobilised in the service of SMO aims.

The role of negotiation and discussion between and within SMOs over the meanings contained in a frame is an indicator that 'framing' is a process. This negotiation can be between movement actors (and movement members and potential members), or between opponents (della Porta, 1996: 69). Understanding the consequences of framing is complicated by the fact that framing is a process. Frames can be 'fixed' momentarily but their properties are in effect subject to constant re-articulation by those who seek a voice through social movement.[54]

SMOs develop frames relevant to the content of their claims. Hence researchers have documented observations of rights frames (Valochi, 1996), choice frames (Davies, 1999),

[54] The concept mirrors that of 'discourse' found in other fields except that it is tied to describing social movement claims and their context. Its analytic units mirror well-known approaches to discourse. I.e. frames are aggregations of 'signifiers' and 'logic' tied together through a competitive process of 'articulation' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).

injustice frames (Carroll and Ratner, 1996), environmental justice frames (Cable and Shriver, 1995), culturally pluralist frames (Berbier, 1998), sexual terrorism frames (Jennes and Broad, 1994), oppositional frames (Blum-Kulka and Liebes, 1993) and hegemonic frames (Blum-Kulka and Liebes, 1993).

Beyond simply packaging social movement claims researchers have argued that framing processes can provide a causal link between movements and their actions. Movement claims that are framed as a narrative 'story of origin' can contribute to recruitment by winning public sympathy and promoting movement identity (Polletta, 1998: 427). A combination of diagnostic and prognostic frames (those are identifications of social ills and their solutions) coupled with 'motivational' frames have corresponded with episodes of political violence (Snow and Byrd, 2007: 128).

1.3.4 Mechanisms of Contention

Contentious politics is more than the static interaction of political opportunity structure, mobilising structures and framing processes. As it is experienced by activists contention is a dynamic series of overlapping interdependent processes. Analytically these processes can be disaggregated into casual mechanisms mediating the triangular relationship between political opportunity structure, mobilising structures and framing processes.[55] Table one is adapted from Tarrow and Tilly (2007) and lists the most commonly observed mechanisms of contention.[56] Most of these mechanisms occur within networks however at macro— levels of analysis some

[55] Theories of mechanisms are now commonplace in biology (e.g. Morgan et al. 1915; Darden 1991: Bechtel 2006; Craver 2007; Watson et al. 2007; Darden and Craver 2002), economics (e.g. Hoover 2001; Hedström, et al, 1998; Schelling 1998) and are increasingly utilised in sociology (Elster, 1998; Stinchcombe, 1998) and political science (McAdam et al, 2001). Identification of mechanisms provides the methodological pay-off control. As molecular biologist Lindley Darden put it;

"Biologists seek mechanisms for three reasons: explanation, prediction, and control. … within the mechanistic sciences, such as molecular biology and molecular medicine, the claim "C causes E" is impoverished compared to the claim that "this mechanism produces this phenomenon." Knowledge of a mechanism in the biological sciences is usually more useful for explanation, prediction, and control than merely being able to label something as a cause." (Darden, 2013: 20)

Political science is clearly different from biology. Yet the account given of the purpose of mechanisms in analysis is broadly similar, although in a political scientific analysis a much lower level of specificity can be expected.

[56] This list is a development of the mechanisms specified in *Dynamics of Contention*. It is based on McAdam et al's (2001) synthesis of the contentious politics literature. It is valuable for theorising and observations in research as a limiting tool. The turn to mechanisms has been criticised for potentially creating a situation where each case study contributes 'new' mechanisms and therefore prevents useful accumulation of knowledge on any one mechanism. McAdam et al contend that it is best for researchers to focus in the short term on deepening collective understanding of currently agreed sets of mechanisms.

of these mechanisms have resulted in political opportunity structure variations.[57] The main hypothesis in this study is that exile itself is a process consisting of a particular combination of three of these recurring mechanisms; decertification, brokerage and boundary formation.[58]

Mechanisms in contention can be subcategorised as either environmental, relational or cognitive. Environmental mechanisms, such as (de)certification or repression, connect actors with external factors. Relational mechanisms are the most common mechanisms in contention. These are interaction processes. Cognitive mechanisms, such as boundary formation, are individual level psychological processes. Due to the micro— level of observation these mechanisms all take place in domestic settings, often involving only one or two people. Yet the mechanisms aggregate to mid-range and even macro— processes that have been observed in transnational politics (Tarrow, 2005). The following subsections introduce, in a general sense, the three mechanisms I observed in my case study of Egyptian exiles.

[57] The example Tarrow and Tilly give is that revolutions, aggregations of most mid-level mechanisms, constitute meaningful changes in national political opportunity structure (Tarrow and Tilly, 2007: 214).
[58] Methodologically, the list of mechanisms in table one served as guide to inductive coding throughout the research presented in this thesis. I approached the research without any expectations of which mechanisms I would observe but was looking for mechanisms that had been observed in other cases. This list provided a checklist allowing me to eliminate competing explanations for the mobilisation I observed. This is discussed further in chapter 3.

TABLE TWO. MECHANISMS IN CONENTIOUS POLITICS. SOURCE: TARROW AND TILLY, 2007: 215

Attribution of similarity	identification of another political actor as falling within the same category as your own.
Boundary activation/deactivation	increase (decrease) in the salience of the us-them distinction separating two political actors.
Boundary formation	creation of an us-them distinction between two political actors.
Boundary shift	change in the persons or identities on one side or the other of an existing boundary.
Brokerage	production of a new connection between previously unconnected or weakly connected sites.
Certification	an external authority's signal of its readiness to recognise and support the existence and claims of a political actor. (Decertification: an external authority's signal that it is withdrawing recognition and support from a political actor.)
Co-optation	incorporation of a previously excluded political actor into some centre of power.
Defection	exit of a political actor from a previously effective coalition and/or coordinated action.
Emulation	spread of a contentious performance, issue, or interpretive frame from one site to another.
Repression	action by authorities that increases the cost—actual or potential—of an actor's claim making.

1.3.4.1 Decertification

Decertification is an environmental mechanism connecting activists with aspects of their political context. Unlike the other mechanisms in this study it has been observed functioning at both macro-historical and micro-sociological levels, both in this study and elsewhere. It has been defined "as an external authority's signal that it is withdrawing recognition and support from a political actor" (Tarrow and Tilly, 2012: 215). Tilly's research has found that certification and decertification are mechanisms that operate in a wide range of cases with variation in outcomes. In some cases where external authorities initiate the mechanism rather than domestic governments, this can lead to political violence, specifically violent rituals (Tilly, 2003: 85, 214). In other cases, more similar to the Egyptian case, where national governments initiate the process decertification can effectively shut down political challenge from social movements. Gentile's ethnographic and archival research has identified contractual blockages in

certification which have prevented European trade unions from coalition building (Gentile, 2016). In exile decertification appears to operate both at institutional and intersubjective levels. In chapter four I describe how the establishment and design of political institutions in Egyptian dictatorship decertified activism in a process of historical path dependency. In chapter five I go on to argue that within the exile communities this process carries a legacy effect indicated by the prevalence of rumours and fears within the movement.

1.3.4.2 Brokerage

A relational mechanism, brokerage is among the most widely studied mechanism of contention, having parallels in anthropology, economics and other fields (Tarrow and Tilly, 2012: 31). In contentious politics brokerage is commonly understood as the "production of a new connection between previously unconnected or weakly connected sites" (Tarrow and Tilly, 2012: 215). Brokerage is therefore a crucial mechanism in mobilisation in so far as it enlarges activism networks. The actors involved in brokerage are known in contentious politics literature metaphorically as 'political entrepreneurs' (Tilly, 2004: 30). Yet the explanatory power of brokerage is not limited to contentious politics and researchers in other fields refer to brokers simply as 'entrepreneurial agents' (Lewis and Mosse, 2006: 13).

Describing the work of brokers in the context of Turkish NGOs seeking European funding Ketola has argued:

> Broker does not refer to a new role generated purely out of the opportunities made available by project funding. Instead, they make use of the already existing entrepreneurial instincts that have been developed as a survival mechanism in a context where weak state and weak institutions leave actors unable to depend on formal processes (Ketola, 2013: 140).

In this sense brokerage can be seen to operate to a degree independently of context as an agent to agent relation by which those involved in contention can create their own opportunities rather than rely on those which are readily available (Bennet, 2009: 9-11).

Brokerage has been observed contributing to processes of activism diffusion in transnational politics (McAdam and Tarrow, 2005).[59] In historical cases SMOs were the only suitably resourced actors to function as brokers, but in the age of social media this role can be

[59] The process was composed of other mechanisms; attribution of similarity and emulation.

taken over by looser knit associations or even individuals (Bennet and Segerberg, 2012). Hence, in pre-exile Egyptian activism researchers have argued the mechanism brokerage, as part of a transnational diffusion process, was crucial in increasing the frequency and volume of contention in Egypt in the years preceding the Tahrir revolution. Local activists through their contacts with the transnational network the Global Justice Movement (GJM) established a new SMO, the Egyptian anti-globalisation group (AGEG), which inducted first time local activists. The AGEG was short lived but its activists regrouped in existing domestic SMOs including Kefaya and April 6 (Abdelrahman, 2011). In exile, it is in this sense of a micro-sociological agent-to-agent relation enlarging the scope of political opportunities that brokerage functions, as described in chapter five of this thesis.

1.3.4.3 Boundary Formation

In the schemata of contentious politics boundary formation is a cognitive mechanism that is manifest at the level of discourse but can have material consequences. The definition I work with is the "creation of an us-them distinction between two political actors" (Tarrow and Tilly, 2007: 215). This simple idea is well known in social science and presenting examples is necessarily non-systematic, yet even from such an ad-hoc review as presented here, it is clear that the consequences of the mechanism can be profound. Boundary formation, within the literature on social movements, has been observed to have notable effects in matters of race relations. Olzak and Shanahan (2003) found that the rate of attacks on African-Americans around the turn of the nineteenth century in US cities systematically rose when major court decisions increasingly rested upon the court's ability to draw distinctions between white versus black identities. Gullickson (2010) has also documented how occupational differences (and racial threats from declining differences) help to explain variation in the salience of the mulatto – black boundary lines during this same period. Group identities therefore can vary with perceptions resulting from the articulation in discourse of group boundaries. In chapter six I describe how group identities seem to survive the process of exile with some exceptions and on that basis to delineate the patterns of engagement with movement activism.

1.3.5 Summary

SPOT is a structural theory of social movement causation that has been developed from the most compelling trends in contentious politics research; resource mobilisation theory, political process theory and framing theory. SPOT aggregates the role of individual agency into three social variables; the political opportunity structure, mobilising structures and framing processes. SPOT predicts that contention is an outcome of particular conjunctures of these variables and that its form varies according to dynamic mechanisms interlinking the three variables. In the case studied in this thesis I argue that three mechanisms in particular explain the forms of activism observed, decertification, brokerage and boundary formation, each of which have been observed in other cases of activism.

The following section will examine the critique of SPOT by rational choice theorists. These scholars contend SPOT overstates the role of structures in explaining SPOT and misunderstands the role of individual agency. Then the chapter will conclude with a synthesis of the literature.

1.4. The Rational Choice Theory Critique

This section discusses the propositions of rational choice theory (RCT) within contentious politics. RCT is considered here not for its empirical contribution to the contentious politics literature, which although valuable has been limited, but for its explanation of collective action which provides a helpful counter argument to SPOT (Examples include; Lichbach, 1995; Almond et al, 1973; Laitin, 1986; 1992; Tsebelis, 1990; Keohane and Milner, 1996; Kalyvas, 2006; Stephan and Chenoweth, 2011, Tullock, 1971). Framing SPOT as in debate with RCT helps elucidate aspects of SPOT that would otherwise remain understated. These are, in decreasing order of abstraction, (1) the holistic view of causation, (2) the social explanatory focus and (3) the meso—/collective level of analysis. This study does not advocate, although it does not dispute, rationalist approaches to contentious politics but considers them in order to fully comprehend the propositions of SPOT and to preempt rationalist critiques.

Researchers working within the tradition of RCT root their studies within collective action theory attempting to understand how groups, or group leaders, mobilise activists in

pursuit of public goods. Just as SPOT theorists depart from Olson's collective action problem so do rationalists. Yet rationalists refrain (typically, though not always, as will be discussed) from abstracting to wider contextual variables in order to ground their solutions to the collective action problem in its own terms. That is they seek complete and logically consistent solutions to the dilemma (Lichbach, 1996: 27). Their principal disagreement with SPOT is that they criticise theorists of SPOT for deviating from the logic of the prisoner's dilemma in seeking solutions to the problem. Marwell and Oliver described this paradox of the limited, inconsistent, role of RCT in social movement studies:

> Despite near universal recognition by this decade's scholars of social movements of the importance of collective action theory, little systematic work has been done to link collective action theory to social movements theory. Most social movements scholars simply cite Olson concerning the problematic of collective action. Only a few have developed formal models for particular collective action situations and have discussed their implications for certain problems of mobilisation (Marwell and Oliver, 1984: 4).

The paradox of the cursory treatment of Olson by social movement theorists is a common shortcoming identified by rationalists. Similarly Opp (2009) has issued a call for more RCT scholars to research social movements. His call directly inverts McAdam et al's proposal in *Dynamics* arguing instead that the more promising route ahead is to synthesise the three categories of SPOT with existing RCT.

The authors of the most recent approach (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001) are dissatisfied with the existing state of the arts — although all three made important contributions to it. Their remedy is to give up theory entirely and instead focus on mechanisms. We will not further discuss this perspective because it does not contribute to the solution of the problems discussed so far. We further assume that giving up theory is not the right way to solve the existing theoretical problems (Opp, 2009: 312).

Given the dominance of SPOT in the field RCT has been framed by some researchers as a contender. Stephan and Chenoweth put it like this,

> "What we have found, however, is that the political opportunity approach fails to explain why some movements succeed in the direst of political circumstances where chances of success seem grim, whereas other campaigns fail in political circumstances that might seem more favourable" (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011: 67).

The counter argument Chenoweth and Stephan propose will be considered below as a compelling example of rational choice theorising. Their critique in fact extends the argument discussed above, that scholars of SPOT deviate from the terms of the prisoner's dilemma. Chenoweth and Stephan attempt to support the contention that this deviation from theory is unjustified as they contend that context cannot account for as much collective action as SPOT would suggest.

This point is arguable but is at least prevalent within the RCT literature. Other 'choice' scholars similarly find fault with the simplicity of the political opportunity structure hypotheses. In her study of the Plowshares movement Nepstad argued,

> [A]ctivists may not control the structural conditions in which they operate, but they do have a choice in how they will respond to these conditions. If the political climate is not favourable and the likelihood of repression is high, they can decide to wait until circumstances improve. Yet they may also choose to carry out their campaigns even though the impact of their actions might be minimal and the sanctions severe (Nepstad, 2008: 17,18).

The function of these arguments is to move the object of explanation away from intersubjective mechanisms to personal motivations for protest.

RCT posits the explanatory power of assumptions, techniques and findings that were developed by economists (Lichbach, 1998: 407–412). The central assumption and contention rationalists bring is the ontological opposite to the central claim of structuralism: that agency is causal. Rationalists assume people have preferences and will choose to act in accordance with those preferences (Lichbach, 1996: 13). The problem of collective action considered from this perspective is therefore the problem of why people do participate in collective action when free riding is a viable alternative, as Hirschman put it, "why free rides are spurned" (Hirschman, 1982: 82).

Broadly there are four categories of solutions that have been proposed to the prisoner's dilemma when operationalised in the case of social movements. Some groups adopt a market style solution, some choose a communitarian solution, some work with contracts and others rely on hierarchies (Lichbach, 1995; Lichbach, 1996). These solutions emphasise different forms of agency resulting in varying outcomes of cooperation or noncooperation. Each varies the set of

assumptions researchers rely upon in defining their prisoner's dilemma. For instance, 'market' style solutions assume that participants do not communicate and consequently arrive at equilibrium or disequilibrium by chance (or guided by the metaphorical invisible hand). 'Contract' solutions on the other hand make the opposite assumption, that participants do communicate and are able to bargain or negotiate in order to arrive at mutually beneficial outcomes (Lichbach, 1996: 19,20).

The theory heavy approach of RCT considered at this level of abstraction reveals many of its own shortcomings. As theory and observation are so far removed RCT relies on a great deal of assumptions which do not always hold true in empirical research and in some cases even seem unrealistically restrictive. The collective action problem conceived in its purest form assumes, for instance, one time, simultaneous decision making. In reality, participants in collective action can waver in their dedication to the cause and can be open to persuasion by their peers. It is worth bearing in mind that rationalists would argue that despite these limitations the prisoner's dilemma does have impressive explanatory power. Counterfactually they would argue that collective inaction is far more common than collective action and hence the main prediction of the prisoner's dilemma is persuasive. For instance, the prisoner's dilemma can explain international governmental inaction on climate change and underpins proposed solutions such as transferable carbon emissions quotas. More generally the logic of the prisoner's dilemma also underpins arguments in favour of taxation and adequately predicts problems in agreeing taxes.

The preceding discussion has outlined the theoretical explanations for contentious politics that arise from RCT and in so doing has hopefully highlighted aspects of SPOT that were previously under-articulated in this chapter. Where RCT views cause and effect as the aggregate of individual decision making, and therefore has a preference for cognitive explanations, SPOT views social variables (such as movements) as more than the sum of their parts and consequently prefers conceptions of causation as 'relational' products of social interaction (McAdam et al, 2001: 22-24). Less abstractly, although RCT and SPOT concur that the prisoner's dilemma identifies a key research puzzle, RCT treats individual participation in

the collective action as the object of explanation whereas SPOT shifts the focus entirely to situating the collective within wider cause and effect processes (McAdam et al, 2001: 24; Lichbach, 1998: 412, 413).

Despite what this chapter has described as theoretical shortcomings RCT has made substantive contributions to contentious politics research. Lichbach (2002) argued that organisers of the 'Battle of Seattle', significant anti-globalisation protests, were rational actors who had spent years constructing a system of selective incentives in order to bring together a rainbow coalition of unrelated, sometimes hostile, but nonetheless progressive activists each with competing interests. Rather than contributing new findings this study took the case as paradigmatic and corroborative of the main contentions of RCT. Opp and Kittel (2010) have found that collective action itself is an intervening variable that impacts on both the incentives for further protest but also changes the context of political discontent. They argue that participation in collective action promotes perceptions and feelings of individual political efficacy thus reinforcing future social movement activity. Yet simultaneously, particularly in non-democracies where the costs of protest are high, participation in protest that is repressed or unsuccessful or even sometimes successful can bring about a depression of general political discontent lessening the opportunities for further activism (Opp and Kittel, 2010: 107).

In *Why Civil Resistance Works* Stephan and Chenoweth wanted first to understand if nonviolence is or is not a strategically superior choice to violence in political conflict and second to explain why. This evidence was intended to support claims about the broader power of nonviolence, yet for expediency and in order to bolster confidence in the findings they restricted the scope of their cases to the sorts of conflicts people would intuitively consider to be the 'toughest' political conflicts; those over secession, occupation and regime change. What goes for these cases could reasonably be thought to go for all or most cases of nonviolence, so hoped the authors (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2011: 53).

In the study Stephan and Chenoweth constructed and compared a large-n data set of every nonviolent campaign between 1900 and 2006, successful or otherwise, with a comparable

number of armed campaigns. Counter-intuitively, they found that nonviolent resistance was actually more likely to cause regime collapse than armed insurrection. More than twice as many cases of nonviolence than violence succeeded (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2011: 37). The definition they proposed for success was similar to Nepstad's (see above) but contained a further clause that there must be a discernible link between the campaign and the outcome. This matters because often social movements are but one of a number of factors working against dictators (Stephan and Chenowth, 2011: 54).

Methodologically they advocated a mixed methods approach and developed an explanation for their finding, that nonviolence is twice as likely to succeed, through four qualitative case studies, two cases of nonviolent success, one of partial success and one of outright failure. The explanation they put forward for their finding relies on a mechanism they call the 'backfire' effect. In essence they are claiming that nonviolent resistance is un-repressible as when regimes attempt repression the atrocity will bring neutral forces out in support of the nonviolent party. 'Backfire' serves as an intervening variable in the explanation, for the true strength of nonviolence according to Stephan and Chenoweth lies in its popular character. They posit that nonviolence is powerful because it mobilises more people than violence does (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2011: 45–48).

1.4.1 Summary

Rationalists argue that SPOT overstates the role of context. They argue that as similar forms of contention can be observed across variations in context agency must play a greater causal role. There have been calls for a more rationalist account of contention yet these calls so far have not generated much research. The overarching RCT explanation for contention is that collective action in large groups requires structured, selective incentives although researchers do point out that activists can misperceive incentive structures.

1.5. Conclusion

Social movement theories explain salient campaigns of contentious performances and WUNC displays: social movements. This chapter has reviewed the state of the art. It has been argued that researchers have learned from past errors and knowledge has cumulated. Unlike other

reviews this chapter synthesised research around structure and agency categories. The intention in doing so was to extract the best lessons from both without searching for the red herring that is 'one correct theory'. The structuralist proposition adhered to in this thesis is therefore not that individual action does not matter to political outcomes but that the rationality of those actions are at best a secondary concern. The following lessons can be drawn from the literature.

1. *Social movements matter*. They are a democratic phenomena that occur in democracies and democratising states. If representative politics reduces grassroots participation to the act of voting social movement activities allow a means of participation outside of the electoral cycle. Social movements are good for democracy and an indicator of health in democracies.

2. *Movements are context sensitive.* Although rationalists rightly point to continuities in social movement forms across contexts it is still the case that movements are buffeted by and forced to respond to aspects of their environment. Therefore activists would do well to maintain as accurate an analysis of their contemporary political context as possible.

3. *Activists matter*. While structuralists are correct in arguing that there are real limits on action the evidence does not justify political apathy or inaction. Outcomes are not predetermined and people do have choices to make. Rationalists and structuralists are in agreement that people can make a difference, when they work together.

The main components of SPOT are the political opportunity structure, mobilising structures and framing processes. Depending on the case each can serve as either independent variable (IV) or dependent variable (DV) or, more often, both. The relationship between them is therefore dynamic and multidirectional. It would be an error to simply 'arrow diagram' any theories of contention which must at least represent this triangular structure. The relationship between these variables has been valuably theorised as 'mechanistic'. It follows comparable paths in varying contexts, sometimes with varying causes and consequences. These variables and mechanisms are the main analytical categories in this thesis.

This review accounts for a great deal of literature beyond what is strictly relevant to this thesis, although that is not a shortcoming of the work presented here as this thesis builds upon and contributes to social movement theory. Throughout this chapter there have been few examples from cases of exiled activism, a consequence of the way that exile has been studied so far. In the next chapter I review research on exile and suggest that social movement theory can make a meaningful contribution to scholarly understanding of the topic.

Chapter Two
The Social Science of Exile

2.1. Introduction

Exile here is thought of as a political process, not a legal category or personal identity. Those who are taken to be exiles in this study are groups of people, not individuals, who collectively cannot return to their home country at least until the political context changes. The actions they take based on their political views are what signal their status as exiles, for whether they or anyone else recognises the legitimacy of the label 'exile', such actions would and do make them enemies of the state at home. The factor that distinguishes their activism as that of an exile, rather than any non-exiled expatriate, is their subjective articulation of loyalty. Exiles oppose the government of their home country but remain loyal to their view of what constitutes their nation. I argue for this definition in this chapter and derive it from the literature.

This chapter describes the state of the art in social scientific research on political exiles. The chapter is an intermediary between a review of social movement theory (said to be among the more advanced theories explaining contentious politics) and a methodological chapter describing the means of evidencing 21st century Egyptian exile in England and the analytical means of drawing meaningful generalisations from that case for the field. This introduction foregrounds the chapter's key propositions and contributions, and links each to the thesis' research questions. The research questions attempt to describe and explain the role of activism by exiles in transnational contentious politics. The introduction concludes with a chapter plan.

2.1.1 Key Propositions

It is an act of interpretation to describe the varied literature on exiles as a coherent body. Despite a handful of focussed studies, the literature is more of a complex field of case studies into particular exiles or exile organisations from different disciplines 'talking past' one another to intra-disciplinary debates. Nonetheless it is possible to distinguish research in two traditions. One tradition views communities of exiles as actors in international relations, mediating transnational processes as diverse as diplomacy or state-building. The other tradition is focussed on the lived experience of the exile as an individual. Theoretically these approaches therefore echo the analytical distinction drawn in the previous chapter between research that attributes

greater causal significance to structure and that which attributes efficacy to agency. While the study of exiles is a separate field of inquiry from that of social movements it is instructive to retain this explanatory vignette while considering the lessons that can be drawn from both fields.

This chapter suggests that from a political science perspective the most fruitful treatments of exile are as a social variable. Following this logic to its conclusions it is argued that the importance of exile for contentious politics lies in its structural effects and processes. Furthermore viewing exile as a social phenomenon with structural causes permits the identification of cause and effect mechanisms distinct from those governing diaspora politics more broadly. It is hypothesised that these mechanisms are congruent with commonly recurring mechanisms in contentious politics. It is further hypothesised that exile activism can be explained by the main terms of contemporary social movement theory.

The collective view of exile follows logically from the principal hypothesis investigated in the study, that exile is a process that changes activism. In the terminology of contentious politics processes are aggregations of intersubjective causal mechanisms, a series of events involving many people working together in different ways. Therefore if exile is composed of numerous intersubjective mechanisms it follows that it can be treated socially. This chapter stops short of discussing that process which was discussed in part in the previous chapter in so far as the review of social movement theory incorporates research on mechanisms, and is fully elaborated in the case study. Yet it contributes to that discussion in section 2.1 by theorising a collective view of exile.

2.1.2 Contributions

The review makes a series of contributions both to the overall goals of the thesis and to the field. This chapter summarises the findings of relevant existing research therefore defining the literature on which the thesis builds and contributes to. In doing so it establishes a working definition of ‘exile’ that is viable in political science analyses. The definition of exile establishes the study’s scope conditions and determines the universe of cases to which findings are generalisable. The chapter also identifies a gap in previous studies to be filled by the research

described in this thesis. Finally a series of hypotheses are abstracted from the relationship between the gap, findings of previous study and social movement theory. Conceptually, the chapter contributes a political scientific account of exile and restates the importance of exile as an analytical category. Equally it identifies possible causal explanations that link the work of researchers on exile and diaspora with current trends in contentious politics research. To the thesis it contributes scope conditions, the justification for case selection and hypotheses guiding data generation and analytical techniques.

2.1.3 Plan of the Chapter

The chapter now begins by discussing alternative definitions of 'exile' as a subcategory of diaspora studies. The chapter proposes a definition apt for studies in political science. The review then goes on to critically discuss the findings of previous research. This review is divided into two sections, the first describing the international relations approach and the second describing the identity politics approach. The review concludes by identifying gaps and by abstracting from the literature hypotheses accounting for the role of exile in contentious politics.

2.2. Literature Review Methods

This discussion could easily have sat in either the previous or the next chapter. The next chapter is long enough on its own and deals more with the methods of the case study. The first chapter on social movement theory does begin with an account of the logic underpinning my presentation of the main debates in the literature, however, that body of literature is very well known already and is oriented around a number of authoritative texts. Hence this chapter which draws together disparate papers and books whose authors and readers may not be a common audience is an appropriate point in the thesis to consider the methods I used of systematising literature review.

Dickinson and May (2009) contrast two meta-approaches to review methodology, narrative (an interpretive approach) and positivistic (an aggregative approach). In the collaborative spirit of contentious politics this review is my attempt to draw on the best of both traditions. The goal is to present a complete picture of the findings of previous research in an accessible format but in a way that is reflexive, critical and acknowledges the active role of the

reviewer in interpreting the relevance of previous study for the present study. The review follows best practice in literature reviewing established by scholars who have codified methods of abstracting findings and future research avenues from large bodies of research (Dixon-Woods et al, 2006; Mackenzie et al, 2013; Mackenzie et al, 2015). The review consisted at the simplest level of searching, reading, reporting and finally interpreting. This methodological discussion has been written with a particular view to avoiding the main shortcoming Dickinson and May found in existing scholarly approaches. Namely researchers have previously discussed their methods of sourcing review materials but have given little discussion, and possibly little thought, to synthesising and interpreting methods.

2.2.1 Source Collection

Social movement theory is a coherent body of literature with established formats of reviews. The key texts are widely agreed and establishing the source material for this review was a case of incorporating the emerging literature on transnational activism. Exile on the other hand is not a coherent body of literature and presented unique reviewing challenges. The literature is disparate, constructing a narrative of 'the field' was an interpretive stretch as in place of a debate there are numerous case studies of exile, often from diverging disciplines entering into debates on topics other than about exile. Consequently exile and diaspora were deemed to be the relevant fields as exile itself is a subcategory of diaspora studies, all exiles are part of a diaspora. In the spirit of investigative inclusiveness studies of diaspora were read as widely and as closely as studies of exile. The inclusion of diaspora studies is based on the premise that many relevant lessons can be drawn. Yet an assumption underpinning the venture is that the role of exile is sufficiently independent to be treated separately. For this reason findings discussed largely conflate diaspora with exile for any findings in the diaspora literature that could only reasonably apply to non-exiled expatriates were excluded.

The books and articles reviewed were identified primarily by searching databases of scholarship and abstracts: Google scholar, USearch and JSTOR. The results returned were in turn reviewed for further references which included books, articles and chapters. Building on these searches google scholar author profile searches were conducted of leading and prolific

researchers in relevant fields. Over the period of research I established daily google scholar notifications for the following search terms: exile social movement, diaspora social movement, Egypt exile, Egypt social movement and Egypt diaspora.

Following Dixon Woods et al (2006) and MacKenzie et al (2013, 2015) this data collection method can be described as a purposive sample of the broader field. It is designed with inclusivity in mind intending to minimise the number of studies excluded but to focus the search to a manageable but reasonable volume within that broad literature. The method is appropriate for studies such as this which hope to both describe a specific aspect of one field, exile studies, within the field of diaspora studies, and to familiarise the researcher with the field.

2.2.2 Analysis of Sources

Then to make assessments and proscriptions for the field broadly I drew upon rules for structuring literary sources in qualitative research (Saldaña, 2009; Braun and Clarke, 2006) and the logic of comparative research in political science (Ragin, 1989). Studies were grouped firstly into descriptive categories according to their treatment of either exile or diaspora as social phenomena or individual experiences. Diaspora was universally described as a social variable. Exile was more commonly thought an individual experience but the researchers who viewed it as a collective were able to locate it within structural processes of international relations. Then, again following Mackenzie et al (2015), having established a guiding dichotomy the research was read for its generalisable findings. These were also given simple descriptive codes, one for the variables studied and another unique code for each causal argument proposed whether explicitly or implicitly relying on interpretation. The most common arguments pertained to the relations between exile and regime type on one hand and exile and identities on the other.

2.2.3 Summary

In sum the literature review methods can be said to have merits and flaws. Firstly the review method has been fully discussed therefore exhibiting reflexivity and ensuring replicability. Second, the focussed approach to selection ensures the relevance of the review to scholars of exile, diaspora and contentious politics. So on those grounds the review contains merit in itself

for the field. Third as the review extracts hypotheses from previous research it makes a theoretical contribution to both the study of exile and contentious politics. In so doing it expands the field of contention to account for a thus far under-researched form of contentious activity. This final strength also strengthens the argument of the thesis. As the hypotheses were drawn from previous research it means that the data analysed in the case study is employed entirely in the task of hypothesis testing, not hypothesis generation. This matters as hypotheses tested with the same data they are generated from cannot provide convincing tests. The principal shortcomings are the researcher's lack of familiarity with the field of exile, the inevitable exclusion of some studies in consequence and the conflation of findings necessitated by interpretation. These shortcomings are regrettable but entirely the result of practicalities. However the methodological strengths surpass these shortcomings.

2.3. Defining Exile

The goals in this section are twofold. Firstly to critically discuss definitions of exile proposed by previous researchers. Secondly to adapt from best practice in existing research a definition suited to the needs of this study. The purpose of defining concepts is to establish the empirical cases they apply to. All definitions necessarily exclude certain cases that may legitimately be encapsulated by the phrase in question. This exclusion is a necessary analytical procedure that specifies the scope of generalisations to be made from study (Gallie, 1955). This is all to say that while I am here discussing factors that do and do not contribute to the definition of exile, the purpose of the discussion is to establish what counts as exile in this study, not to close the debate on what exile means to either exiles or researchers. It is a discussion of definition used to establish grounds for case selection.

Shain (2009) has argued that because exile is a political term that has no agreed definition in international law it means different things to different people. Sociologists have regarded exiles as socially deviant; psychologists and legal scholars have both treated exiles as variants of refugees. He argues, a point with which I concur, that the activism of exiles is important enough to warrant a particular definition for political science analyses (Shain, 2009: 387, 388). This chapter extends Shain's definition, arguing that from the perspective of political

science the strongest definitions treat 'exile' as a social phenomenon that can be understood through the prism of social movement theory, however such studies have been few.

Exile exists at the fringes of political science. It falls outside domestic politics but is not quite a matter of international relations (Roemer, 2008: 4).[60] Nonetheless it has consequences for both. Exile has been practiced throughout history (Shaw, 2000: 4). It was a feature of ancient Greek (Forsdyke, 2005) and Roman politics (Shaw, 2000). In fact, the practice of exile has not been limited to human societies and has been observed in many non-human species of animals (Torres, 1999: 37). This study is focussed on human exile.[61]

'Exile' is therefore a modern way to describe an ancient practice. As a noun its close synonyms include refugee, expatriate and diaspora. As a verb it can be related to, and distinguished from banish and ostracise. The conceptual relationship between exile and its synonyms matters, as preamble to the following definitions, because meaning, in discourse, is relational. E.g. it is only by knowing who or what a 'mother' is that concepts of father, daughter, etc. make sense (Wittgenstein 1967: §67). Diaspora,

> can be understood as a people with a common national origin who regard themselves, or are regarded by others, as members or potential members of the national community of their home nation, a status held regardless of their geographical location and their citizenship status outside their national soil. (Shain 1989: 51–2)

All exiles are part of a diaspora but the diaspora also contains expatriates and other non-exiles.[62]

Many situations have been described as exile, yet the label is more appropriate in some cases than others. For example, a person may enjoy sudden financial success and be forced to migrate quickly or face a tax bill. Yet such cases fall short of the conditions required to

[60] Even still exile does not need to strictly mean banishment abroad. It can also mean banishment from the political community as in ancient Greece (Forsdyke, 2005) or banishment to a remote area as Siberia has traditionally been used in Russia (Gentes, 2008).

[61] This decision is not prejudiced by speciesism. Nor is it taken lightly. While there are similarities between exile in human and non-human societies the differences are sufficient to warrant separate fields of inquiry. Animal testing is known to produce unreliable generalisations to humans. E.g. Schellekensa et al found animal testing missed 81% of side effects serious to humans (2012: 346). These findings are not new or controversial. Wall and Shani argued "On average, the extrapolated results from studies using tens of millions of animals fail to accurately predict human responses" (2008: 2). There is no reason to think the same is not true in the opposite direction.

[62] In his discussion of diaspora Devine extends his definition to include not only movement of people but also movement of ideas, capital and goods, so that his description of diaspora takes a holistic view of these matters (Devine, 2011: 2). The focus in this study nonetheless remains on people as the movement of capital or goods are only relevant to the research questions if they are mobilised as resources in activism.

accurately categorise a case of exile. Compulsion, or the absence of choice, is a key aspect. Hence in their discussion of Latin American exile Sznajder and Roniger define exile as

> … a mechanism of institutional exclusion – not the only one – by which a person involved in politics and public life, or perceived by power holders as such, is forced or pressed to leave his or her home country or place of residence, unable to return until a change in political circumstances takes place (Sznajder and Roniger, 2009: 11).

Forsdyke similarly restricts exile to "those who were compelled by force or fear to leave their homelands, since these cases seem most bound up in the political development of the polis" (Forsdyke. 2005: 9). Griffin states "Exile is … always the effect of force exerted upon a person or a people, resulting in a condition which is not freely chosen but inflicted…" Kaminsky concurs with the necessity of coercion when she states that voluntary exile is an oxymoron (Kaminsky, 1999: 9). These definitions are interesting for a variety of reasons. For example, all leave the form of compulsion relatively vague, which no doubt follows from the subjective, politically loaded, nature of exile. Yet for the purposes of the current discussion, it is more important to note the argument that a voluntary migrant is qualitatively different from an exile, as an exile is somebody who cannot return to their home country, at least until the political context changes. Exiles may not accept their fate. They may work to overturn their punishment and use all of their resources to seek their return. Yet to enter the state of exile willingly is impossible. Migration through choice is an important, related, political phenomenon but an essentially different one requiring an altogether different analysis.

A common view of exile in research has focussed on exile as an individual experience. Hence Marrus considered exiles to be: "individuals who left their native country for political reasons, usually after having engaged in revolutionary activity." (Marrus, 1985: 9). Similarly Etcheson argued "an exile is one who is a refugee for political reasons, and is also in some sense a leader, or otherwise of high social status." (Etcheson, 1987: 187). Marrus and Etcheson both identify important aspects of exile treated elsewhere in the literature, particularly that exile's causes are invariably political and characteristically remain involved in activism while abroad (e.g. Forsdyke, 2005; Shain, 1989; Iwanska, 1981). Yet the definition they offer casts exile as a variable impacting on individual life courses, indeed their studies go on to describe these effects in Europe and Asia.

This view of exile as experienced by individuals is widespread in the field. Shain and Ahram argue "[w]hat distinguishes political exiles from other diaspora members is not only the exiles' continuous struggle to facilitate the conditions for their return, but also their determination not to establish life abroad as a comfortable option, even temporarily" (Shain and Ahram, 2003: 666). This view has predominated in psychological studies of the impact the isolation of exile has on the psyche and articulations of personal identity (Edinger, 1956; Kunz, 1973). It has also found expression in literary treatment of exile (Said, 2000). It is true that exile is a process experienced by individuals, the details of which will be discussed in section 3.2. Yet for analytical purposes such definitions have a key shortcoming, an inability to distinguish an exile from a non-exiled expatriate. This confusion arises in part from the ambiguous status of exile, which is not an agreed category in international law such as refugee or asylum seeker. Instead, the label 'exile' is one that is inherently politically charged (Shain, 2009: 387).

This shortcoming, the inability to distinguish exiles from non-exiled expatriates, arises from the level of analysis as the definitions are framed from the perspective of exiles. Some scholars do attempt to specify these distinctions. In the quote from Shain and Ahram the exiles are said to differ due to their subjective motivations which are resolutely political. Other scholars concur with this distinction (e.g. Roemer, 2008: 36; Miller, 1986; 6-8). Yet empirically the distinction is untenable. Beinin (1992) argues against such a concept of exile with reference to the case of Egyptian Jews exiled in Paris. They were forced to flee Egypt for their political beliefs after Nasser's revolution but continued to self-identify as primarily Egyptian, organised and continued their activism from exile. Yet in exile these activists found themselves increasingly isolated as they were considered Jewish, not Egyptian, by both their French hosts and the Egyptian compatriots. This example, while anecdotal, reveals the futility of constructing definitions of exile based on subjective criteria. The concept of identity further problematises individual focused accounts. Somebody who is by all intents and purposes in a state of exile may not self-define as an exile or may throughout the course of exile come to feel more at home in their new country of residence. Therefore to permit case selection it is necessary to abstract

from the level of the individual to a level at which the analyst's judgement can be employed to specify the status of exile.

From this perspective it is not the individual experience that matters but the structural role of exile in international relations. For instance Sznajder and Roniger describe exile not as something that happens to people but as "a mechanism of institutional exclusion – not the only one – by which a person involved in politics and public life, or perceived by power holders as such, is forced or pressed to leave his or her home country or place of residence, unable to return until a change in political circumstances takes place." (Sznajder and Roniger, 2009: 11).

That is, exiles in groups can be viewed as a collective actor on the international political scene. Sznajder and Roniger have made this argument in detail elsewhere in a study claiming the rise of exile organisations (NGOs and intergovernmental agencies) in the 1970s altered the context for transnational activism favourably for activists (Sznajder and Roniger, 2007). Shain and Ahran documented a similar process in the United States where organised exiles have had success in lobbying on foreign policy. To view exile groups as an actor on the political scene in this way is to shift the analytical focus away from the individuals forced abroad to their collective efforts at activism.

The collective character of exile has been further theorised by other observers. Caldwell argued that exile ought to be considered an institution of political science analysis that has previously gone unrecognised. "When a practice has been thus followed over so wide an area for a period of more than a hundred years, it is safe to assume that we have a veritable institution, meeting imperfectly a real need, having definite legal sanctions, and leaving significant results" (Caldwell, 1943: 40). Expanding on this theme Said wrote "…I speak of exile not as a privilege, but as an alternative to the mass institutions that dominate modern life" (Said, 2000: 146). Hinting at the centrality of the institution in certain political processes that will be discussed later Angell and Carstairs summarised the importance of collective exile in Chile. "Exile is not a capricious excess of authoritarian rulers in Chile: it is an intrinsic and indispensable part of the authoritarian system of rule" (Angell and Carstairs, 1983: 166).

That is all to say that if the focus of analysis is shifted from the individual experience to the collective action, exile can be treated as a social variable within political scientific research. Inspection of the literature on exile has suggested that the contours of individual exile are so fluid it is only by abstracting to the collective view that any specificity can be achieved.

2.3.1 Analytical Dimensions of the Definition

Based on the preceding discussion this study departs from a collective conception of an exile community. In operationalising a collective conception of an exile community several analytical dimensions require specification. These are the causes of exile and the loyalty of the exiles. The concept of exile is surrounded by so many anomalies. Do refugees count as exiles? Do economic migrants? Following the argument in the preceding section this section proposes that treating exiles collectively allows these anomalies be resolved in an analytical sense. It is argued in this section that in line with the arguments in other research on exiles, aggregating from individual level data to a collective conception of groups of exiles (in this study I will refer to SMOs), is the most appropriate way to asses the effects exile has on activism. This section proposes the concept of exile worked with in this thesis in strictly theoretical terms. The sampling criteria that make up the exact methodological characteristics of this definition are set out and discussed in chapter three, section four.

As Beinin's research documents, exiles may have trouble legitimising their own activism if their compatriots regard them as 'foreign' (Beinin, 1992). This research finding corresponds with the propositions Barth made in his essay on the social construction of ethnicities. Barth's argument can be summarised as hypothesising that ethnic groups do not host any fixed political or cultural identities. Rather cultural identities associated with ethnic groups are socially constructed by those groups and others they communicate with (Barth, 1969). This argument is broadly accepted in social science and reflected in other canonical works such as Anderson's (1983) *Imagined Communities* which makes a broadly similar argument. These anti-essentialist argument are supported by empirical research. For instance, Kalyvas (2006) found ethnicity to be the poorest predictor of violence in civil wars, an outcome he explained as the

consequence of more complicated endogenous motivations driving civil war violence, he cited the example of revenge.

This problematises the notion of ethnicity, but does not help distinguish cases of exile community from non-cases.[63] To make this distinction Shain proposes a civic conception of national identity based on the concept of 'loyalty'. The frontiers of loyalty, argues Shain, are not fixed but subjective, loyalty generally being the "manifestation of support for any claim to power within the national community" (Shain, 1989: 18). The crucial distinction however in identifying an exile community according to Shain is whether it can be described as nationally loyal, a "value laden concept that power seekers use to rally support and undermine opposing claims" (Shain, 1989: 22). While exiles may not consider themselves exiled as such their rhetoric may still give them away as exiles. This happens when they distinguish their loyalty to the nation from their loyalty to the regime. By this definition then communities of exile consist of those expatriates engaged in organised activism motivated by national loyalty.

This definition is consistent with that proposed in particular by Shain (2009). Shain argued that by departing from a conception of exiles as forced into migration by the political context of their home country, and focussing on the character of their activism, here said to be 'loyal' to their view of domestic politics, an account of exile relevant to political analysis is possible (Shain, 2009: 395). Through dialogue with the wider literature it is possible to argue that this definition can be broadened to make it relevant to social movement theory. According to the research of Sznajder and Roniger, (2007; 2009) Angell and Carstairs (1983) and others discussed above it is clear that when exiles work together they are both a product of their context and can to some degree influence their own political context. This theoretical suggestion resonates with the main analytical concept in social movement theory, the political opportunity structure, which is discussed fully in chapter one, section 3.2, but for now can be described as an idea specifying the aspects of political context relevant to activism. Social movement theory

[63] That is not to say these factors have no relevance to exile. In the novel *the Translator* about a Sudanese woman, Sammar, exiled to Aberdeen, Scotland the author described how these factors acted as a barrier between the exile and the host country, adding to a sense of isolation. "Sammar felt separate from him, exiled while he was in his homeland, fasting while he was eating turkey and drinking wine. They lived in worlds divided by simple facts—religion, country of origin, race—data that fills forms" Aboulela, 2006: 33).

therefore provides a lens through which to view the collective definition of exile. That fusion of theoretical insights would permit the following propositions. According to previous research reviewed here, it is legitimate to make 'exile' a category of political analysis by viewing activists forced into migration as exiles so long as they continue their activism from abroad and articulate a sense of loyalty to the sending country. However, to abstract from the individual it is possible to view exile as a process resulting from the aggregation of numerous intersubjective mechanisms, that changes the character of activism, partly by changing its context, its structures and its discourse.

The definition proposed by this chapter therefore has the strength of recognising a subjective sense of loyalty but retaining the analyst's judgement in categorising groups as exiled whether or not they would agree. The definition elevates the importance of 'nation' as a motivating concept which could be criticised for overlooking the importance of other ideological motives. Yet the assumption on which this argument rests is that the politics of nation states matter both in international relations and to the exiles themselves. The contours of this definition are blurred and allow for the possibility that many different migrants and expatriates may be described, at least for a period, as exiled. Yet it heightens the distinction between the exile community and the non-exiled diaspora. The diaspora remains the wider population from which exiles are a sample. All countries have diasporas but the exiles described in this study are more of an authoritarian phenomenon.

2.4. State of the Art

The literature on exile is structured around two main hypotheses. These are that exile is a contributing factor to the state-building projects of autocrats and that exile is a factor mediating identity changing processes. Some studies do contribute to both strands of theory, because the institutions of state-hood are bound up theoretically with conceptions of national identity. Although researchers have worked on similar causal processes across variation in cases there has been little debate or even recognition of one another's work beyond an almost cursory citation to the leading scholars in the field of exile studies. This section will describe the contributions that have been made to these explanations before going on to discuss the debate

critically. It will be argued in this section that if exile is viewed as a collective actor in contentious politics this will facilitate debates around the mechanisms that can be generalised from case studies, therefore refining hypotheses.

2.4.1 International Relations Approach

> While exile is most readily felt by those who leave their homeland, it also has an impact on those who stay. Massive emigration changes the landscape. It produces a loss. In a strange sort of way a community may in fact reinforce the borders of a nation state. (Torres, 1999: 38)

In more or less levels of detail scholars have noticed, described and explained the ways in which dictators use exile as a means of removing, temporarily at least, organised opposition to their rule so that they can complete state-building projects. This was the key argument in Sznajder and Roniger's (2009) comprehensive study of Latin American political exiles. In the transnational political culture of the South American continent rulers were able to use exile to 'project political pressures outward'. This enabled Latin American dictators to consolidate their power unfettered by domestic political debate (Sznajder and Roniger, 2009: 8). This process took hold throughout the twentieth century as the character of Latin American exile changed from one that was a selective process, dominated by economic elites who could literally 'afford' the relative luxury of holding proscribed views from exile, to a mass phenomenon in the twentieth century characterised by sizeable Latin American communities in countries around the world (Sznajder and Roniger, 2009: 321). This relationship between exile and regime-type correlates strongly with authoritarian regimes however the authors argued that every period of democracy in Latin America featured its own waves of exile although they were smaller in every case. Mostly, exile from Latin American democracies was individual or involved small cliques; the former dictator being the highest profile exile of the period (Sznajder and Roniger, 2009: 319).

Other scholars have also observed this mechanism in various guises. It would be a mistake to represent all exiles as pro-democracy activists, some are exiled for their criminality. Gentes has described how relocating Russian criminals to Siberia modified the development of social institutions in Russia, particularly prisons (Gentes, 2008: 12). In ancient Greece decisions on exile from the political community were taken collectively and generally meant that exiles were excluded from their city-state but not the country as a whole (Forsdyke, 2005).

The relationship between exile and state-building however is bi-directional. One of the major mechanisms by which exile organisations, and diasporas more broadly, maintain political relevance is through remittance sending. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) found that diasporas are among the leading causes of civil wars restarting after a period of peace. The second wave of war was six times more common in countries with large diasporas in the United States. This was due to the the diaspora's capacity to fund and arm paramilitary organisations. This process was also observed by Byman et al (2001), although their research provides some helpful context by comparing the capacity of exiles to influence foreign affairs directly with states. They argued that exile communities were limited to financing and resourcing domestic actors while states had a fuller choice of policies including providing safe haven, military training and diplomatic backing (Byman et al, 2001: 59,60).

Furthermore exiles do not contribute only to the domestic politics of their home countries. Through their transnational activism they can influence the foreign policy of their host country. Hindl (2013) documented this process with evidence from Jewish, Cuban and Irish exiles in the United States. Organised exiles have managed to influence policy with various activities including lobbying, remittances and violence. Finance and ideology have been the two main variables determining which activities an organisation employs. Well-funded organisations were more likely to pursue diplomatic routes while the most ideologically radical organisations were the most violent. Other researchers have argued that exiles have routes other than finance to influence government policy. Shain and Barth have argued that the experience of Armenia and Israel show that diasporas can use less material influence to persuade homeland governments to change policies. In both cases this was to do with the weaknesses of the state vis-a-vis a more established diaspora community abroad who were able to use their positions in public debates to bring about changes in homeland policy (2003).

In an important study Sznajder and Roniger (2007) conceptualised the relationship between exile communities and nation-states. They argued that variation in international relations has created a facilitative context for exile activism. The 1970s was a period of NGO and intergovernmental growth. This replaced a three-tiered context of sending country,

receiving country and diaspora. The fourth tier expansion facilitated exile activism by compensating for organisational deficiencies within diasporas.

2.4.2 Identity Politics Approach

Exile is a process that modifies individual and collective factors. It has been reported many times that exiles 'feel like a new person' after their experiences. "Exile becomes an essentially somatic experience for the displaced person," writes Everett and Wagstaff,

> in which the subject's own body or image, is appropriated by an external agency. Just as forced migration — mass or otherwise — threatens the autonomy of individuals by defining them in terms of economic value, so the commodification and expropriation of an individual's physical reality deprives him or her on the ability to live on her or his own terms (Everett and Wagstaff, 1987: x).

In this sense the most direct consequences of exile are individual and cognitive; exiles suffer most from exile. Torres observed Cubans in exile in Miami who found themselves the subject of competing foreign policies and initiatives. This sense of being buffeted by two nations, the US and Cuba, caused the exiles to band together and find new cultural points of reference and other markers of personal identity. In this way Torres observed the emergence of a unique 'exile identity' (Torres, 1999: 176). In his reflections on exile Said noticed something similar within his own community but that the development of a new identity extended beyond the individual to the collective and was a source of exile solidarity. As he articulated it he perceived the development of a group identity as one of the less pleasing aspects of exile: "an exaggerated sense of group solidarity, and a passionate hostility to outsiders, even those who may in fact be in the same predicament as you" (Said, 2000: 141).

Researchers have noted that the identities of nation states are tied up with the activism of exile communities. When the interests of states are at odds with the interests of organised exiles, usually when exiles agitate for democratic reforms, the two actors compete on the international stage to articulate different visions of national identity. The competition over national identity is not strictly limited to non-democracies however as evidence from Greece shows, where in the 21st century a Cypriot diaspora has established itself in Western Europe and has challenged Greek monopoly on national identity (Adamson and Demetriou, 2007). When exiles work together they can on occasion use their influence to alter the range of institutions that are taken at home to constitute the national identity. In this researchers have

again noted the power of financial flows as in the case of Israel whose state institutions have to a large degree depended on philanthropic gifts and loans from foreign governments. Shain and Sherman (2001) describe the case of Israel as paradigmatic of the power diaspora communities have to selectively fund institutions constituting a particular conception of national identity.

Other researchers take a broader view of national identity than just the institutions of state and therefore expand the repertoire of actions they take as exile's activism. Adams (2012) studied the use of culture broadly by Chilean exiles in activism. Culture has many roles mediating exiled activists and the regimes they challenge. It can be a form of communication. It can provide inspiration or emotional support. It can also have an organisational function as a source of funding. This was so with Chilean exiles who painted political images that were sold both as a source of funding and as a means of political communication (Adams, 2012).

2.4.3 Summary

Researchers have identified two structural outcomes of exile. From the perspective of the exiled person, the isolation of banishment can be a transformative process at a cognitive level. This process of transformation can expand to include communities of exiles who form tight, almost exclusionary, networks. Second, expelling persons who would have otherwise interacted with public life, become political activists or even criminals, can have a bearing on the form of institutions a society develops and ultimately on the levels of freedom the society enjoys. In its most simple expression, this argument suggests that exile allows rulers to rule unopposed to some degree, or at least lessons the opposition they would face otherwise. In the remainder of the chapter this body of research is discussed critically with an eye to specifying a gap for future studies.

2.5. Social Movement Theory and Exile

This body of literature has both strengths and weaknesses. This section is an attempt to hone in on the shortcomings of previous research in order to identify gaps for future research. Firstly much of the existing research fails to engage in theoretical debate. None of the earlier findings contradict one another and the several examples of complementary arguments all neglect to discuss their relevance for previous study. This chapter follows Lichbach in viewing the

absence of debate as suboptimal. Lichbach (2003) departs from the assumption that debate and disagreement are healthy for a field as they encourage theory testing and the specification of the terms of theories. Undoubtedly this situation follows in part from diverging definitions of exile discussed in the previous section. In that sense scholars consciously use definitions as a means of 'talking past' one another. Yet in a more fundamental sense the lack of debate is a consequence of the level of analysis and the researcher's goals of generalising to different fields.

Exile as a subcategory of diaspora has been studied within international relations, national and regional historiography, anthropology and political science. This disciplinary diversity could be a source of strength but has unfortunately limited the development of theories as scholars, instead of debating and testing hypotheses have done one of two other things. First, they have focussed on the micro— at the expense of theoretical generalisations, in doing so treating exile as a 'simple' empirical case drawing conclusions that are so obviously 'true' they require no debate. This has been characteristic of studies such as Collier and Hoeffler (2000) and Byman et al, (2001) or even Shain and Sherman (2001) who all argued that the power of exile communities to influence policy outcomes in their country of origin depends on their ability to move finance and resources internationally. Secondly, when scholars have made theoretical generalisations from studies of exile they do so in the terms of their own discipline therefore directing their evidence to debates about something other than exile. The most theoretically advanced study of exile has been by scholars of international relations who have variously documented the role of context in mediating exile activism (Sznajder and Roniger, 2007) the role of exiles in forming foreign policy (Adamson and Demeriou, 2007) and the relationship between exiles and national identity (Shain and Sherman, 2001). Even these advanced theoretical propositions could be refined if scholars would debate their terms and test their propositions.

Nor have scholars, on the whole, asked whether the activism they observe could be explained by existing theories. In consequence scholars have tended to draw their explanations from the data inductively rather than pursuing a formalised method of hypothesis testing. The

exception is Heindl (2013) who argued well that exile politics are a transnational form of contentious politics. Even still, Heindl's study failed to engage with the drive among scholars of contention to identify generalisable mechanisms and instead inductively inferred two unique explanatory variables from the data. The contentious politics framework is indeed an appropriate lens through which to view the politics of exile. Especially given that scholars have been mostly interested in the activism of exiles and their effects on the political process. This makes the absence of studies explicitly drawing on social movement theory all the more puzzling.

These tendencies among scholars have resulted in rather complete theoretical descriptions of two aspects of exile, state building processes and identity processes, but has left unaddressed other fundamental questions. Scholars have nothing to say on how effective exiles are as an actor in international politics relative to other actors. How much power do exiles have? The importance of this question for the field alludes to another shortcoming of the literature. Again, Heindl (2013) is the only scholar to have studied exile with quantitative methods. Even scholars who frame exile as a global phenomenon to be studied comparatively, Shain (1989) and Sznajder and Roniger (2009) have done so with comparative case studies. Addressing this shortcoming is beyond the scope of this study but it is a value of the review to identify the need for large-*n* study. As experience is highlighting the limits of exile activism global comparison identifying the areas of exile success would be particularly welcome. Yet it would be incorrect to label the tendency toward qualitative case study as bias. Rather the widespread preference for case studies among researchers surely confirms the method's aptness given the difficulties in categorising cases of exile, the centrality of subjective factors in identifying as an exile and the underground nature of much dissident activism.

A final shortcoming of the existing literature is on the geographical focus of case studies. Some cases have been described and analysed from various perspectives while other, equally important cases, have received little to no attention. The case of the Israeli diaspora has been treated as a paradigmatic case of the influence diasporas can have on the structure of nation states. Latin American exile has been studied more extensively than exile from any other

region. Without disparaging research on Latin American exile there are factors that may make the dynamic of exile in that region geographically bound: proximity to the United States and the history of authoritarianism and colonialism to name just two. Middle Eastern exile on the other hand has received next to no study and Egyptian exile less. Only Beinin (1992) has described one isolated case of exiled Egyptian Jews in the 1950s. Scholarship on exile will benefit tremendously from studies of Egyptian exiles.

2.6. Conclusion

Exile is a political institution of dictatorship. Exiles are forced from their homeland to a location where their government thinks they cannot pose a challenge. Exile is not a choice. Exile can have structural effects both for those who are exiled and for those who remain behind. The forced move from home to abroad can be traumatic and a life changing experience. Equally the removal of political opponents can have a profound impact of the course of political development in non-democracies or democratising states.

Whether collectively or individually exile has been linked in previous research to numerous other social variables. The strongest relations are with regime type, conceived as a roughly dichotomous variable composed of authoritarian regimes and democracies and with national identities. However intervening variables in these causal processes have also been highlighted; finance, foreign policy, ideology, civil war and most broadly context. These causal links have most commonly been taken as the grounds for hypothesising that exile communities are an actor involved in international relations between nation-states. Of all the social variables linked with exile only identity processes have correlated with an atomised view of the exile. Previous research therefore provides grounds for hypothesising that the causal processes of interest to political science arise from exile communities rather than individual exile activism. In short, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

While activism is strongly associated with exile and is a strong theme in both research and more literary treatments of the subject the insights of contemporary social movement theory have hardly been exploited in furnishing social scientific explanations for the exilic condition. It is a central contention of this thesis that social movement theory stands to gain from study of

exiled activists and that research on exile can benefit from the precision offered by explanations derived from contemporary social movement theory.

Having so far in the thesis argued for a structural, mechanistic view of social movement causation and, in this chapter a particular approach to analysing exile politics by viewing the group as a collective involved in activism the next chapter goes on to set out the methods by which I conducted field work and analysed the case study.

Chapter Three
Methods for Studying Exiled Activism

3.1. Introduction

The methods I use in this thesis are qualitative, not quantitative.[64] My goal with these methods is to evidence and generalise propositions about the causes, processes and effects of activism by exiles. I argue in this chapter that process tracing through a partly comparative case study based mostly on biographical interviews offers a valuable, though necessarily limited, method for answering the research question, how does exile change activism?

3.1.1 Plan of the Chapter

The chapter begins (section two) with an overview of the many strands of methodology discussed in this chapter. I use this account to preview my methodological argument for this research, that the process of exile as it relates to activism (an intersubjective political process that is best observed indirectly through aggregate data at a level that makes measurement complicated) is best explained by viewing relevant aspects of exiled activism, in context, through the prism of social movement theory. Then in section three I begin to articulate the details of how I did this. Section three makes the case for biographical interviewing as the main source of data generation, describes the process and also discusses sources of corroboration. In section four I argue that the use of thematic categorisation of observations (driven by social movement theory) in the data are the best means of drawing meaningful analytic conclusions. Finally, in section five I discuss the ethical considerations that were incorporated in every methodological choice.

3.2. Research Design

This thesis explains how exile changes activism. The thesis is therefore asking about a process more than its causes or effects. Among the methods of describing and explaining processes, I

[64] However, the study is premised on a pragmatic epistemological position, that quantitative and qualitative methods share one logic of inference (King *et al*, 1993). As far as possible I refrain from epistemological discussion as I hope my views will be clear from the theoretical framework I employ and will not seem unreasonable. The concepts central to social movement theory reconcile ideas from political economy and international relations with interpretivist, constructivist and post-modernist critiques while retaining a more positivist view of theory testing, explanation and causality. If pushed, I could simplify this view to the view that non-material factors such as discourses and identities do exist and matter to the causality of politics, but in ways that are at best open to interpretation. I do not think this view is particularly controversial in modern social science.

favour a qualitative, case-based approach which allows more direct observations than correlational, variable-based approaches that rely more on conjecture.

3.2.1 Process Tracing

Case study methods are suited to explanatory studies (Yin, 2003). Case studies are appropriate for studies of mechanisms such as this as their use of qualitative evidence and thick description permit 'process tracing' (Ragin, 1989). That is "the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses" (Collier, 2011: 823). In process tracing that diagnostic evidence is organised thematically and sequentially in a description of the history of political processes in narrative format (Bennet and George, 2005). This study takes Egyptian activists in England as a case of the process of activism in exile.

Case studies and process tracing can be used in conjunction to achieve a variety of research goals. The most important use of process tracing, based on thick descriptive case studies, is theory testing. Indeed, making this point, Mahoney has stated that process tracing is "arguably the most important tool of causal inference in qualitative and case study research" (Mahoney, 2012: 571). Yet the case study in this thesis is not used to test theories, intentionally at any rate.[65] In addition to theory testing there are several other equally respectable purposes to which these methods can be put. This sort of research can be used to propose theories, evaluate theories (or policy), or to explain cases (Van Evera, 1997: 89-92). The case study in this thesis is designed to explain the specific case of Egyptian exiles in England, and through dialogue with the literature to draw lessons from that case therefore proposing refinements to existing theories. The next section describes how I used the case study to evidence an interpretation of the interaction of causal mechanisms in the process of exile, i.e. how I did process tracing.

[65] It is possible to disaggregate theory tests into two categories; strong and weak tests. There is general consensus in methodology texts that strong tests are distinguished by two main criterion: they evaluate predictions that are *unique* and *certain*. Respectively, unique predictions cannot be accounted for by other theories and certain predictions only occur if the theory is valid (Eckstein, 1975: 113-131; Stinchcombe, 1968: 20-22; Van Evera, 1997: 31). Predictions that would follow from the theories I work with are neither, for a host of reasons to do with the scarcity of previous research, the quality of evidence in the thesis and the number of cases under investigation. Therefore I focus on other research goals to which I can make more meaningful contributions. That said this thesis does derive hypotheses from the literature on which it ultimately expands and refines. Readers may legitimately interpret this method as a weak (I would prefer to call it 'preliminary') theory test.

3.2.1.1 Single Case Study Design

This case study can be described as follows. Its aims are more specific than those of the thesis overall: to describe and explain the specific events of Egyptian activism in English exile. Its evidence comes mostly from biographical interviews with activists in exile. Yet in order to meet ethical concerns of anonymity and to facilitate the generalisable conclusions the case study does not follow a simple narrative of the respondents' life histories. Instead the study relies on a series of analytical devices that mask the participant's identity and facilitate making statements based on systematic observations from within the evidence.

The case study is set within a theoretical context and uses the main lessons of theory in analysis. The study takes as its point of departure the findings of research in social movements and exile politics. Using these findings from the field the case study is divided into three analytical categories that correspond to chapters of the thesis; political opportunity structure (chapter four); mobilising structures (chapter five) and framing processes (chapter six). These categories drawn from social movement theory account for the movement's context (or distant causes), networks and actions, and discourse (proximate causes and mechanisms).

In each of the three case study chapters I evaluate the evolution of these factors from the activists' early contention in Egypt to their later political engagement from exile. The accounts in each chapter are based firstly on interview data and corroborated with evidence from primary sources, in particular newspapers, however the historical aspects of the Egyptian political opportunity structure are evidenced with observations extracted systematically from secondary sources. The analysis therefore incorporates an element of comparison (before and after exile) and in a limited sense tests theories derived from the literature as it compares activism in Egypt with activism in England.

There are a number of strengths of these methods that are worth drawing attention to. Qualitative evidence offers the strongest possible basis for arguing about the functioning of causal mechanisms, as it is in the interactions between individuals that mechanisms occur. Indeed, the choice of a biographical style of interviewing only increases this strength as it maximises both the quality and the quantity of observations per interview. In this sense the

interview method is also efficient as it produces the maximum number of observations per data unit. As the study draws hypotheses from review of previous research there is good reason to take the findings of the study as well supported, as they have been tested with evidence other than that which was used to generate them. In this sense the study has an intrinsic generality. Incorporating an element of comparison furthers this generality. This permits some reasonable generalisation, meaning that lessons can be drawn from the case for other cases and for theory.

However, the costs of qualitative case studies are relatively high and forced concessions elsewhere in the design. The costs of the case study, generated particularly by the high quality of data, made comparison between cases impossible. Comparison matters because case studies are strongest when they permit theory testing as opposed to theory generation and theory testing requires comparison except under specific circumstances (Van Evera, 1997: 12; della Porta, 2008: 200).[66] Comparison is essential to theory testing as single observations provide no grounds for conjecture (King et al, 1994). The issue is logical, not numerical. Comparison facilitates understanding of causation by demonstrating the conditions under which theories do and do not obtain (Ragin, 1989: 34-68). Completing more than one case study with the time and resources available for the study was impossible.

The absence of a comparison case is a shortcoming limiting the generality of the study's findings. Yet design choices were made to limit the negative impact of the single case study model. Although the results were limited in their generality by the method, steps were taken to replicate the effects of comparison in producing confidence in the validity of the results. An element of comparison was introduced into the case study reflecting the methodological argument that comparisons are as valid within cases as they are between cases. To that end an analytical distinction was established between activism in Egypt and activism in England. Data was categorised accordingly and interviewees were, during the interviews, invited to reflect on this distinction.

[66] 'Deviant case' type case studies can be considered theory testing studies without comparison. However even this exception to the rule requires a caveat because the logic of the deviant case study implies a counterfactual comparison to ideal type, typical or well known cases.

Further to this partial comparison, an element of the comparative logic inspired the construction of hypotheses. Without a comparison case the study could not conclusively test any theories. Yet a semi-test was established by deriving the hypotheses not from the research but from literature review of existing research findings. This small corrective went a long way to establishing the methodological strength of the study. Drawing theories from existing research ensured a dialogue between this study and existing research (bringing two separate fields together; social movement studies and exile studies). This is one source of the study's relevance. Furthermore drawing hypotheses from previous research findings supported the study's internal validity. It enabled a limited, inconclusive test (as the theories were tested with data other than that from which they were generated), better than no test. It also ensured that the theories tested merited the test, they started from a strong position within the literature.

3.2.2 Definition of the Case and Sources of Evidence

The case of Egyptian activists in English exile implies a comparison between two discrete political units: Egypt and England. I will return to the overall justification for this choice soon, first it bears considering the arguments for and against conceptualising the case in this way. It remains uncommon, in political science, to treat 'England' as a national unit in comparative analysis. In 1976 the political scientist James Kellas wrote that political scientists "are beginning to realise that the British political system fits rather uneasily into the conventional categories by which it is usually described" (Kellas, 1976: 1). By this he was alluding to what at the time was the common view of Great Britain as a centralised, unitary nation-state. Kellas' counter-argument was that in practice Britain, more precisely the UK, is a unique case of a state that is partially centralised and partially federal. Yet there are arguments against viewing England as a unit in international comparison. England is not a nation-state that enters into international contracts, could declare war or do many of the other things nation-states do, as Egypt does. I argue that England is a nation without the trappings of statehood, and crucially, contains a unique structure of political opportunities. In these terms it is the unit directly comparable with Egypt.

The institutional composition of the UK has changed since 1976, rendering Kellas' argument self-evident. Scotland and Wales (and Northern Ireland) have national parliaments and within the period this study was completed the UK government has adopted standing orders providing for the so-called English votes for English laws (EVEL) procedure, which creates a distinctive legislative process for bills that concern only England (or England and Wales). In other academic disciplines, and in non-academic discourse, this fact of institutional variance across the UK has become accepted.[67] For example, it is unimaginable that a historian might author an account of British political history that did not discuss politics in the peripheral nations and regions of the UK. That book would rightly be categorised as an English history. The data informing this study is entirely drawn from activists in England and describes activism in England. Consequently I will describe the data as English, pertaining to the case of England.

More generally, case studies can either build, test or modify theories (Rohling, 2012: 9). Variants range from the 'deviant case' sometimes taken as an exception that somehow confirms the rule, to 'extreme cases' that provide tough tests for theories or 'typical cases' that are in someway representative (Yin, 2003: 40,41). The rationale for each type depends on how much is known about the research subject (Rohling, 2012: 10). The case for this study relies in part on gaps for studies of exiles' activism, studies of Middle Eastern exiles and studies of exiles in the UK.[68] Crucially the case of Egyptians exiled in the UK has revelatory value as the case holds the promise of developing previously under-specified theory (that of how exile changes and interacts with activism) as well as providing a detailed account of the ongoing activism itself, a worthy venture in any case. The activism is notable for numerous characteristics including its novelty, innovation and resilience. As argued in the introduction to this thesis within the framework of the typological theory the case of Egyptians in English exiles is a typical case as

[67] Crucially, regional institutional variance entails regional variance in political opportunity structure. England is governed directly by representatives of English constituencies in the UK parliament, at the executive level by the Prime Minister, cabinet and UK government ministries. Parliament legislates on specifically English domestic issues such as health and policing over which convention dictates English MPs are responsible for, although at current non-English MPs can and do vote on these matters. This legislation is administered by local government and enforced by English police forces. England also has direct representation in the EU parliament in which members are elected to represent one of nine English regions. In domestic matters there is a clear structure to the political process that is self contained within England, it is no stretch to describe this as a 'political system'.

[68] Discussed in chapters 3 and 4.

it involves activists exiled following a military takeover, the most common antecedent of exiled activism. This makes the case and ideal example from which to develop an explanation. The following paragraphs provide an overview of this sample of activists in order to flesh out the argument that the case has an intrinsic value. The section begins from a general view of Egyptian exiles before focussing in on exiles in England.

3.2.2.1. The Egyptian Diaspora

The Egyptian diaspora in England is the population of potential informants for this study. Evidence of migration comes mainly from two sources, the 'sending' country or the 'receiving' country, as well as some interested intermediaries. Neither country has the means to keep perfect records due to undocumented migration. Start with research on the Egyptian diaspora. Morsi's (2000) ethnography focussed on the relationship between Egyptian migrants in Gulf states and their embassies, finding the relationship characterised by lack of trust. Morsi attributed the finding to Egyptian mistrust of authority based on experience of dictatorship. Baraulina *et al* (2007) studied the Egyptian diaspora in Germany finding the migrants to be a well-integrated, highly educated and more or less prosperous community. Lewis (1994) makes a similar comment regarding the London Egyptian community: "The large number of Arabs who have congregated in and around London are residents rather than part of a cohesive community… [t]he exceptions are communities of Egyptians (doctors, teachers and academics)" (Lewis, 1994: 14). Zohry and Debnath (2010) compared diaspora in Kuwait, USA and UK thereby providing a transnational view. Their findings corroborated Morsi's suggesting that there does exist a mistrust of authority among Egyptians. Yet their survey also reported a politically engaged population who remained abreast of Egyptian politics and regarded their disbarment, as non-Egyptian residents, from Egyptian elections as an injustice.

Egyptians have migrated in discrete historical phases, some governed by structural 'push' factors, others by 'pull' factors. After Nasser's ostensibly socialist coup, many of the opponents of his regime had the means to leave and chose to do so rather than face dispossession (however modest). In the 1970s as the government struggled to meet its commitments to full employment it encouraged workers to migrate in search of work. This

coincided with a boom in oil prices in 1974 attracting Egyptian economic migrants to the oil producing Gulf states (Halliday, 2010: 43; Zohry and Debnath, 2010: 16,17). Then in the 1980's after Sadat's succession some of Egypt's copts, those who were able, chose to exit fearing the rise of Islamic extremism as much of Sadat's populist rhetoric was geared toward Islamists (Karmi, 1997: 12). Wealthy Egyptians sought to take advantage of Sadat's liberal 'open door' economic policy and moved to western countries, including the UK to invest (Giliat-Ray, 2010: 50).[69]

Most Egyptian migrants travel to Arab countries, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia being the number one destination. Almost half of all Egyptian migrants reside in Saudi Arabia. Egyptians who move to Saudi Arabia are largely economic migrants, unskilled or semi-skilled workers seeking employment in the oil industry. Other factors make Saudi a desirable destination for Egyptians including proximity, language and culture. Despite the numerical strength of the Saudi Egyptian diaspora the population is unsuitable for inclusion in this study as economic migrants are different from political exiles.

Of the Egyptians who leave the Arab countries altogether most, 39%, travel to the USA. The European diaspora is not much smaller at 31% yet within Europe Egyptians are spread wide and evenly. Many Egyptians in Europe are in Italy, 11% as Italy is the first stop on many migrant routes from North Africa to Europe. England, independently of the UK, has only 4% of Europe's Egyptians (Zohry and Debnath, 2010). According to the latest UK census in 2011 there are 33,000 Egyptians resident in the UK with 31,000 living in England. The Scottish and Welsh populations of Egyptians are small at 1,000 each. The census reports no Egyptians in Northern Ireland. Egyptians are concentrated in London (10,000) and the South East (6,000) of England with a smaller population (4,000) in the North West. It therefore makes sense in this

[69] It is probable that two further critical junctures have significantly altered migration trends; the September 11th 2001 attacks on the USA and the 2011 onward 'Arab Spring'. The decade after 2001 saw western countries impose tighter regulations on international travel while the latter half of this period has seen a (re)emergence of anti-immigration parties in western Europe. Unfortunately the most recent studies on Egyptian westward migration predates the Arab Spring (Talani, 2009; Zohry and Debnath, 2010). What is key here is that Western countries have sought to limit migration. Similarly the recent 2016 onwards influx of refugees from the Middle East has not involved large numbers of Egyptians.

study to focus on the case of England in isolation from the other nations and regions of the UK, with a particular focus on London.

3.2.2.2 Egyptian Activism in England

The population of exiled Egyptians, active in contentious politics, form the sample of participants this study investigates. Egyptians in exile have formed a series of new SMOs while activists from existing SMOs have relocated to England. Egyptian organisations Kefaya, April 6 youth movement and Revolutionary Socialists all have activists in English exile yet these activists do not continue to associate with these Egyptian organisations. In their place activists affiliate with new organisations that have no counterpart in Egypt with the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood who have an organised presence in England. Amnesty International, a more formal NGO than the loose affiliations of SMOs, forms an important part of the exile activism ecosystem as their entire Egyptian office is now based in London following the military regime's decision to outlaw foreign funded NGOs.[70]

The Muslim Brotherhood in England do have an official headquarters and in theory have an official hierarchy. In practice however their presence on the streets and in activist circles is unofficial and unstructured consisting instead of supporters, affiliates and proxy organisations. These proxy organisations consist of 'British Egyptians 4 Democracy', 'Egyptians Abroad for Democracy' and chiefly 'R4BIA' which has come to replace the previous two disbanded outfits. British Egyptians 4 Democracy was a strictly secular organisation that has mobilised street protests outside the Egyptian consulate in London and has coordinated a campaign of writing letters to Members of the UK parliament. Egyptians Abroad for Democracy is an entirely transnational organisation founded in Egypt in the aftermath of the coup which authored a newsletter reporting on transnational SMO activities. These have both been amalgamated in R4BIA, in an informal association of Muslim Brotherhood supporters active on the London scene (Interview 10).

[70] Amnesty's Egyptian organisation, while headed by a non-Egyptian, in this limited sense has the best claim to describe themselves as Egyptian exiles given that their organisation has been formally outlawed by the military regime.

The Egypt Solidarity Initiative (ESI) is a pressure group established by UK academics that works closely with UK Egyptians to coordinate contentious performances in London, petition decision makers, organise pro-Egypt conferences among other activities. ESI was founded by Professors Philip Marfleet and Anne Alexander and is supported by many well known Egypt (and Egyptian) scholars including Prof Joel Beinin and Dr Maha Abdel-Rahman as well as prominent English activists such as the late Bob Crow. They list their core demands as:

- immediate and unconditional release of those imprisoned for exercising rights to freedom of expression and of assembly;
- repeal of Law 107 of 2013, restricting rights to public assembly;
- independent investigation into state violence and criminality, including assaults on those exercising any of the rights and freedoms above;
- an immediate end to trials of civilians in military and State Security courts. (ESI, 2014)

Although the Egyptian population of England is small relative both to global and European diaspora, it has some strengths. Primarily it must be noted that the minority of Egyptians who have migrated to the UK in the aftermath of the coup are something of an elite. They generally have professions or come as full-time students. This gives the population some sociologically interesting characteristics. As exiles they come to England with the motivation for activism, they are particularly well equipped for activism in terms of resources and time relative to, e.g. economic migrants who must work long hours. Through collaborations between Egyptian activists and empathetic UK individuals and organisations, activists have constructed a viable social movement apparatus. This ‘movement in exile’ consists of overlapping pressure groups, radical coalitions, online activists and sympathetic members of the host community. The movement has exhibited a relatively traditional contentious repertoire including street demonstrations, marches and petitioning. This suggests that the activists have brought experience of contentious performances from Egypt. This case, handled properly, offers both the promise of new insights for social movement theory and an informative account of modern, transnational activism in its own right.

TABLE THREE: GENDER AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF PARTICIPANTS

	Muslim Brotherhood	Revolutionary Socialists	Egypt Solidarity Initiative	Amnesty International	Unaffiliated Activists	Observers/ Allies	Total
Male	3	2			10	4	19
Female	1		2	1	3	2	9
Total	4	2	2	1	13	6	28

I will return in section 3.3 to the methods of purposive sampling I used, for now it is enough to note that I interviewed the key individuals in each of these organisations. In all I interviewed twenty-eight individuals, six I classified as observers rather than direct participants. A breakdown of this sample by affiliation and gender is provided in table three. Starting with gatekeepers within the activist community I made contact with the leaders of MB affiliates, Amnesty, ESI and RS. From there I snowballed according to various means. I asked interviewees to put me in contact with other activists. I approached activists on social media and at protest events to arrange interviews. Attending protests and events was the most productive means of recruitment to the study as activists were mistrustful of unsolicited correspondence, a theme I pick up on in the research. In this way I was able to document the network of exiled activism in its entirety, the cohort is small and well connected, everybody knows each other. I supplemented the interviews with participants with interviews with allies and observers including politicians, trade union leaders, journalists and academics.

3.2.3 Interpretive Validity

At this point I am forced to step back from the details of the research design to situate the study in its epistemological context. Although I am consciously trying to refrain from epistemological discussion in this thesis it is necessary to make a case for the validity of the findings. As Bosk put it "[a]ll field work done by a single field-worker invites the question, Why should we believe it?" (Bosk, 1979: 193). The claims made in this study are interpretations, no more, no less, but certain quality controls were used to guarantee, as best as possible, the validity of findings. Methodologists commonly distinguish between internal and external validity meaning roughly the coherence of the data or account and the generality of the findings (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). Generality poses the greater challenge to this study but it will be argued that the research design is set up to ensure the best selection of reasonable lessons for other cases and

for theory. This section begins with a brief discussion of controversy over interpretation and concludes with a systematic account of quality controls in the study.

The issue of interpretation and its validity matters for both the main sections of this thesis, the literature reviews and the case study. The two are inseparable, interdependent in terms of the study's argument and subject to the same logic of interpretation. The act of abstracting findings (as well as the preceding acts of searching and categorisation) is necessarily one of interpretation (Wolcott, 1994). In the literature reviews this is more obvious with research that did not explicitly frame its findings as causal but could be legitimately interpreted as such. In the field research the relation between evidence and argument is also one of interpretation.

On interpretation Dworkin asks "Is there truth to be had in interpretation?" … or … "must we say that there are no true or false or even most or least accurate interpretations [of an object] but only different interpretations of [it]?" (Dworkin 2011: 124). Taylor noted this philosophical question poses a methodological challenge to researchers. "What makes sense is a function of one's readings; and these in turn are based on the kind of sense one understands" (Taylor 1971: xx). There are no satisfactory answers to these questions. Nonetheless the methodological choices taken in this study were made with a view to ensuring the plausibility of the interpretation.

Overall, interpreting written sources and qualitative data with rigour requires avoiding on one hand over-interpretation and, on the other, purely descriptive under-analysing of sources. In more precise terms this is a matter of internal validity, which entails procedures for controlling propositions regarding description, interpretation and theory (Maxwell, 2002; 48-52). The best, if imperfect check, on descriptive validity (in other words, getting the facts right) is corroboration. It has become common in social science to describe this process of comparing sources as triangulation. Triangulation in this context is a metaphor as it is borrowed from trigonometry as used in navigation. Sailors triangulate when they take bearings from two known landmarks to calculate their own position on a map (Hammersley, 2008). The meaning of this

metaphor does not directly describe the purpose of comparing multiple sources in this study and hence the term common in the study of history, corroboration, is used instead. In this study the second source (or the second measurement in the metaphor) is used not to calculate a third unknown but to support the first source (or measurement in the metaphor). Corroboration is not a guarantee of accuracy. Two sources can be as wrong as one. Nonetheless it is a worthy gauge of quality in the research and interpretation.

Another way of getting the facts right, and also of testing the plausibility of interpretations is to check with participants. As Borland (2004) has argued this check is particularly important for interview research as respondents must be satisfied that their input has not been distorted. Borland argues that ensuring descriptive and interpretive validity is a matter of checking interpretations with participants (Borland, 2004: 531,532). This argument raises the question of the role of the analyst; it is quite legitimate to argue that analysts ought to add something novel to the interpretation that respondents had not noticed. In order therefore to chart a reasonable centre ground between simply reproducing the account given in interviews and wildly over interpreting this study incorporated interpretation checks into the interview questionnaire by returning to key topics either at the end of interviews or in follow up interviews and correspondence.

However, the most fundamental check on the validity of findings lies in the handling of data. The main shortcoming, and reason generalisation is so difficult from qualitative data, is that it is generated in a non-systematic way that consequently cannot be construed as ‘representative’ (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 263,264). In order to compensate for the non-systematic character of the data I made use of consistent coding criteria within the framework of a multi-level thematic analysis (Clarke and Braun, 2006). Elaborating the themes, categories and codes the studies were analytically grouped into do not support the claim that the argument in this thesis is essentially ‘correct’. What it does do is connect the argument with the evidence and the theory systematically therefore bolstering its internal validity generally and its interpretive and theoretical validity in particular, and also renders the research replicable

(Ritchie and Lewis 2003). The coding methods are described fully in section 5.2 on data analysis.

3.2.4 Summary

The study is a single case study that incorporates elements of a comparative design. The case is of Egyptian activists exiled in England who are taken as exemplary of the processes that activism undergoes in exile. The single case is deemed important enough of its own accord to warrant investigation as the Egyptian struggle is intrinsically important. Not only are the Egyptian exiles studied here veterans of Tahrir square, arguably the most iconic moment in the 21st century struggle for democracy so far, their methods are innovative having brought the experience of revolt against dictatorship (in the era of social media) to the streets of a peaceful democratic capital city. Yet even still the case is used to test and refine propositions about the theory of activism and exile. Theories are derived from existing research. Therefore they can be tested in a limited sense by maintaining a comparison within the study, asking whether activism changed after exile. This variation is investigated within the three main categories of social movement theory, political opportunity structure, mobilising structures and framing processes. These three topics structure the three chapters of analysis.

3.3. Interview Methods

While there is no 'correct' method, some methods are better suited to certain projects than others. The primary data collection method chosen in this thesis has been variously called 'oral history', 'life history', even 'the long interview' (Ritchie, 2003; Cavan, 2003; McCracken, 1988). This thesis uses the term 'biographical interview'. These labels refer to roughly the same method but each label adds connotations. The argument in this section is that biographical interviews are best suited to generating accounts of activism throughout exile.

'Oral history' and 'life history' both rightly identify the method as within the range of methods of historical enquiry. This study does indeed investigate the history of activism at individual and collective levels and so these names capture something of the spirit of the investigation. Yet beyond describing historical and ongoing activism the study seeks to explain the causes, processes and outcomes of that activism and therefore is properly classified as a

study in political science. So in order to expand the disciplinary audience of the study beyond history the terms ‘oral history’ and ‘life history’ are not employed in describing the method. On the other hand, ‘the long interview’ is appealing in its simplicity yet implies little about the purpose of the interviews. ‘Biographical interviewing’ is the most appropriate label for this study as it is as relevant to political science as it is to history yet it still, despite its breadth, manages to convey the subject of the interview.

This section (section three) aims overall at describing the use of biographical interviews in this study. It begins by setting biographical interviews in the wider context of available methods. This discussion is intended to make the case for the use of biographical interviews. Following this discussion the method is described as it was employed in generating data. This discussion includes preparation for interviews, identifying and selecting participants and the interview process. The section ends by describing the shortcomings of biographical interviews.

3.3.1 Alternative Methods

Various methods could be used to show how exile changes activism. These include semi-structured interviews, biographical interviews and surveys. There are others, such as participant observation, yet for the sake of brevity this chapter focusses on the three just mentioned as the most practical. This section argues that of these three, biographical interviews are best suited to the present study’s research question.

Semi-structured interviews, biographical interviews and surveys are all, in this context, methods of asking activists to describe their own history of activism. They vary primarily in terms of the level of input respondents are asked to contribute. Surveys require the least participant input while biographical interviews are the most intensive with semi-structured offering an intermediate position. Staggenborg has argued correctly that the methodological ‘family’ of interviewing is a particularly apt approach to researching social movements (Staggenborg, 2002: 93). This is because often the history of activism is either too subversive or, at the level of detail required for social science, too mundane to have been documented in

newspapers or other written sources (such as movement publications).[71] These methods provide a means for researchers to learn the private histories of organised social movements and individual activists' engagement with them.

Surveys ask respondents a number of pre-scripted, theory driven questions and can be completed manually or digitally (Fowler, 2009: 4-8). Methodologically, it could be argued that surveys are optimal for studies such as this as they tend to provide data that is easily conceivable as nomothetic. Indeed there is a strong tradition of survey use in social movement research (Kriesi et al, 1995; McAdam, 1982). Although survey response rates are typically low they allow a comparatively cheap way of maximising the number of participants and therefore can be taken as fairly reliable. Surveys also have the built in advantage of posing identical questions to multiple respondents therefore facilitating easy comparisons. Yet relative to other methods surveys do have shortcomings. Principally, as they ask fixed, pre-scripted questions they may overlook certain important aspects of the topic. Surveys cannot be modified in order to allow an individual respondent to elaborate on important points.

Semi-structured interviews offer a more promising alternative yet still fall short for the purposes of this study. Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to pose a number of pre-scripted questions to participants yet to improvise new questions as required. Berg has described this interviewing style as "conversation with a purpose" (Berg, 2000: 69-70). That purpose is to construct, rather than to collect, answers to research questions (Mason, 2011: 62-63). Semi-structured interviews are short relative to biographical interviews therefore allowing the researcher to maximise the sample size. This allows advocates of semi-structured interviews to argue that the method provides a centre ground between nomothetic and idiographic research. Yet despite the greater number of participants, the relative concision of the interviews compared to biographical interviewing means they are a poor fit for this particular study for this study

[71] In section 3.3 I discuss sources of corroboration. This characteristic of interviews being able to unearth events too banal for headline news led me to continue with newspaper based research after I had completed the interviews. The interviews served as a guide for searching newspaper databases for specific events.

which aims to describe and explain in great detail causal mechanisms mediating processes of change in activism.

3.2 The Biographical Interview

It will be argued in this section that biographical interviews surpass the shortcomings of other methods discussed above for this study. Biographical interviews are designed to elicit first-hand accounts of a respondent's life history. Describing the benefits of biographical interviews, perhaps with some hyperbole, Thomas and Znaniecki wrote:

> [E]ven when we are searching for abstract laws, life records, as complete as possible, constitute the perfect type of sociological material, and that if social science has to use other materials at all it is only because of the practical difficulty of obtaining at the moment a sufficient number of such records to cover the totality of sociological problems, and of the enormous amount of work demanded for an adequate analysis of all the personal materials necessary to characterise the life of a social group (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1918: 1832-1833).

This is an overstatement, but nonetheless biographical interviews are a good data source that provide unique possibilities for argument and analysis. Be that as it may, I would contend that the quality of testimonies authored through this type of interview depend very much on the tact and strategy of the researcher. Narrating a life-history is a uniquely challenging activity that few people ever consciously attempt other than celebrities, statesmen or (possibly more often) ghost-writers. The interviewee in this case may be the most salient threat to the quality of the data as asked to narrate their own life story they may adopt the role of their own harshest critic and judgement may come to cloud presentation of the facts in a way that surpasses the challenges of memory common to all interview techniques. They may equally engage in self-hagiography. The counter-argument to Thomas and Znaniecki was put most forcibly by Shakespeare (into the mouth of Macbeth) who disparaged biographers: "life is but a walking shadow, a poor player, that struts and frets his hour upon the stage, and then is heard no more. It is a tale, told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." To be clear, my view is that both of these views are hyperbolic (although both the benefits and dangers are real) and that a skilful researcher can, through careful questioning, help an interviewee to provide an honest account that focusses on the most relevant aspects of a life-history.

In fact, the method has something of a pedigree in the study of exile and previous researchers have argued that it is at least particularly apt, if not the best method for investigating

exile (Cornejo, 2008; Shahidian, 2001). This has to do with a variety of factors ranging from the personal intimacy of the exile experience to the protracted character of the process of exile. Certainly, both of these factors influenced my choice to rely on biographical interviews which is well supported by existing research. Biographical interviewing allowed me to gain a unique insight into the many ways that relocating impacted the participants activism in ways they did not themselves appreciate.

Biographical interviews have been called 'the long interview' for a reason. In fact, Ritchie (2003) argues that it should be routine practice for researchers employing this method to interview each participant several times. Returning to an interviewee is key to establishing rapport and trust and to clarify and confirm important details. Sometimes the first interview can do no more than initiate the conversation. In the course of this research multiple interviews were employed on varying occasions depending on the particularities of each interviewee and the availability of time. For example, some life histories were so long and detailed they had to be divided over two interviews. Other life histories were covered well in one interview but a second interview was required in order to develop analysis and draw out the participant's self-interpretation of variations between activism in Egypt and in England. McCracken (1988) argues that interviews should last ideally between four to six hours (perhaps over several occasions) but that he has known of interviews to last as long as eight hours. Elsewhere, Ritchie advises that when planning researchers should account for at least ten hours of labour per interview. These ten hours include the interview, travel time and transcription. It was the experience of this researcher that ten hours is a conservative estimate.

Varying advice on how to conduct the interviews is available in the literature. McCracken advises commencing the interview with simple biographical questions (age, place of birth etc) that can be used to help the interviewer follow the narrative of the interview (McCracken, 1988: 34). Ritchie, on the other hand, recommends saving these questions for the end of the first interview (Ritchie, 2003). According to Ritchie it is in error to start with these questions as they run the risk of establishing a format of one word answers. Better to begin the interview with open ended questions, even if they are non-consequential preparation questions,

in order to establish a format of longer, reflective answers. The literature agrees that however the interview begins, a detailed questionnaire is essential. This does not have to set a rigid format for the discussion. It can be taken as a guide rather than a survey, but nonetheless over such a long period of time the guide is essential for making sure no topics are forgotten and that conversation flows. Following Ritchie's advice I prepared for authoring the questionnaire by listening to earlier oral histories as a source of inspiration. In particular the audio files archived at the American University in Cairo's curated collection on the 2012 revolution were inspiring.[72]

As I was well acquainted with the literature on interview methods my approach was well defined by the time I began field work.[73] My process went like this. Work began even before the first meeting. Participants were briefed in advance on the topic of the interview and its purpose. They were provided documents to this effect and were asked to indicate their consent (however signing the documents was saved until the end of the interview, in the spirit of fully informed consent). They were asked to bring any supporting evidence they have and are willing to share copies of. Examples include photographs of protest events (these artefacts in turn could be used to stimulate conversation during the interview).[74] At the first meeting, but before the interview and recording began, I attempted to establish trust and respect between the interviewer and interviewee. I used my interest in activism to signal common interests and even common sympathies, although without jeopardising the researcher's commitment to neutrality.[75]

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[72] These interviews were also used as a source for my account of the revolution in chapter 4 and as the basis for the word cloud in chapter 6.

[73] That is not to say my method did not change in the field. Several unexpected findings, in addition to my developing analysis throughout the research, caused me to edit the questionnaire throughout the research. Particularly I was surprised to encounter fear and rumour within the movement. This led me to incorporate questions probing for these factors, without putting words into participants mouths. I found the best way to get at these factors was to pose counterfactual questions about reasons for non-participation, although they would also emerge in discussions about 'rival' SMOs. After realising the significance of these factors, which I took as indications that the mechanism decertification continued to function in exile, I was able to revisit (or correspond with) earlier interviewees and incorporate these questions.

[74] Some of these artefacts were incorporated into the analysis used as illustrations or corroborations. Others were excluded on ethical grounds if the participant did not want them published or if I thought participants would be identifiable in them.

[75] This issue is problematic. It is best dealt with in the footnotes as no satisfactory answer to the problem of researcher neutrality is possible. The question of whether it is best to conceive of research as a 'neutral', or even 'objective' enterprise is unresolvable. Some have even argued that for various reasons non-neutrality is preferable. Methodologically this has certainly been the case for some social movement researchers who were only granted access to movements because of their open affiliation. The position adopted in this study is pragmatic. It is best to

The interviews began from open ended questions (e.g. "Tell me about growing up in Cairo"). The answers to these questions may not have direct relevance for the study, although there may be some relevant information. Rather they use a universal human experience, in this case childhood, to establish a connection between interviewer and interviewee to encourage the participant to relax and converse freely. The interviews more or less started with the participants' childhood and proceeded chronologically. Despite this, the questioning was inspired by the propositions of social movement theory in that it probed for certain analytical and cultural categories theoretically relevant to activism.

However, although the interviews were arranged around the concepts of 'political opportunity structure', 'mobilising structures' and 'framing processes' (discussed in chapter one), these phrases were absent from the interview guide. This was so for a number of reasons. It would be methodologically unsound to ask questions that could be perceived as leading. Following McCracken's advice in avoiding this trap the questions were formulated so as to exclude the terms anticipated in response (McCracken, 1988: 34). More importantly these concepts are too abstract to appear in an interview extract without an act of interpretation. Therefore as the interview is intended to evidence these categories it would be in error to ask about them directly. The more appropriate method is to ask more culturally sensitive questions about the context dependent processes, institutions and events of the case under investigation.

Therefore after opening with questions about early childhood the interviews proceeded chronologically covering a range of topics perhaps tangentially related to the main analytic categories. The questioning sought to elucidate the events, protagonists and self-interpretations of the participant's biography. Questions covered early childhood, schooling and education, religion, profession, recreation, politics, and broadly activism. As the interview followed a

take as 'critical' a view as possible and attempt to identify shortcomings and successes of all actors involved in order to draw the most meaningful conclusions. This position is reasonable in any study, particularly so in a study such as this describing and explaining contentious interactions between pro-democracy and effectively pro-dictatorship factions. That the story of contention described is further complicated only reinforces the importance of this critically reflexive position. The analytical framework of political opportunity structure, mobilising structures and framing processes is designed to facilitate such an analysis. The issue of neutrality affects not only analysis but also data generation as the researcher's neutrality can affect the willingness of participants to cooperate. It is hoped that by maintaining a professional approach to the research while remaining open with participants cooperation can be achieved.

narrative structure it naturally covered the participants' account of the move from Egypt to England and the impact that had.

The cumulation of all this information is a detailed account, from an individual's perspective, of involvement in and interaction with the causal mechanisms of protest. In line with this explanatory goal it was necessary to ensure that the information gleaned from questioning surpassed simple description and touched upon subjective perceptions of motivations. Therefore 'why' and 'how' questions were relied upon frequently. Accounts of events were followed up with questions about how or where the participant learned of the event, why they chose to participate. Counterfactuals were also helpful in guiding participants to specific answers about the reasons for participation (e.g. what specific dangers would it have taken to convince you to stay home, away from the protest?).

3.3.3 Purposive Sampling Criteria

As discussed in the previous section a small sample was used for practical purposes. This choice, as with all methodological choices, was also influenced by ethical concerns. The small sample is an ethical necessity as it would be unethical to include anybody other than those whose accounts are indispensable within the sample (Mason, 2011: 143). The method of identifying participants was not properly a sampling method as with biographical interviewing being an idiographic rather than nomothetic method no presumption can be made that the interviewees fully reflect a wider population (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). However, certain sampling methods were used as a guide and for that reason the term 'sample' is used as a shorthand throughout the thesis. The sample selection was purposive, targeted at the best informants and was widened using snowball sampling where interviewees nominated further participants. These methods are appropriate given that exile is theorised in this study as a specialised community or network in which the activists know one another and cooperate in contentious activity (Mason, 2011: 123). This section states the selection criteria for the sample. The selection criteria require prefacing with a remark on the concept of exile, discussed fully in chapter two, section two. Exile in this thesis is thought of as a social process, not a legal category or personal identity. This is problematic for the purposes of sampling, who to include

if not exiles? The question matters because some of those interviewed consider themselves exiled while some do not. My solution, is to treat individuals not as exiles, but as activists. Activism is the condition for membership in the sample, yet the character and context of that collective activism is what signals the status of the group as exiled.

The first inclusion criteria is nationality. The concept of exile assumes that individuals must consider themselves of the nation which has expelled them, of the nation but not in it. However any attempt at incorporating an ethnic aspect into this criteria would be intellectually misplaced and may be construed as unethical by excluding potential participants unfairly. Participants in this study must therefore be Egyptian as they cannot be an Egyptian exile otherwise. Articulating a sense of Egyptian nationality without ethnic criteria relies on Shain's concept of 'loyalty' (discussed fully in chapter two). Nationality is a matter of loyalty as the borders of nations and membership of a nation are subjective notions distinct from citizenship or residence (Shain, 1989: 18). Borders change, within the period surveyed in this study Syria and Egypt have for a while been united in one nation, the United Arab Republic, and have coexisted subsequently as neighbouring independent states. Similarly membership of the nation is fluid, subjective and ultimately personal. For these reasons the first inclusion criteria is that participants must consider themselves Egyptians.

The second inclusion criteria is residence. This criteria is two fold. Participants must have been previously resident in Egypt but now resident in England. The earlier residence in Egypt is tied to the first criteria of nationality. Residence is not the same as nationality, but only a special kind of exile can claim to have been born and lived in exile, that category being beyond the scope of this study as it is suitably different from somebody who experienced first hand the trauma of exile. Remember that this study enquires what effect exile has on activism, so it is legitimate to restrict the sample to those who have experienced exile rather than grew up living with it. The criteria of residence in England is intentionally defined loosely. Those on short term visas such as students are included in the sample.

The third selection criteria is age. This criteria is based mainly on ethical considerations as evidence does not support restricting inclusion on this criteria methodologically. The study excludes individuals under the age of eighteen. The experience of the Scottish independence referendum in which the franchise was extended to sixteen and seventeen year olds demonstrated that age is no barrier to mature, informed political participation such as is the subject of this study. However I do not have training on working with minors and their inclusion would therefore be unethical. Furthermore it may be unethical to ask under eighteen year olds to reflect on the sensitive topics essential to the interviews. I err on the side of caution.

The fourth and fifth criterion vary from the others in that they specify characteristics I actively sought out rather than attempted to control. These criterion are established in order to ensure that the sample reflects the overall identity of the exile community. The fourth selection criteria is religion. Excluding participants based on their religion is unethical. It is also methodologically unsound as it fails to recognise the diversity of those within the movement. This study therefore aims to include at a minimum a representative of each main religious group in Egypt. The majority religion in Egypt is Islam and indeed the Muslim Brothers are among the largest groups to experience exile. This study seeks explicitly to identify Muslim exiles of each sect, Shia, Sunni and Sufi. Egypt also has a sizeable Coptic Christian community and a Jewish community. Efforts were made to incorporate these groups and others in the sample to maximise religious diversity.

Similar to the criteria of religion is the criteria of political ideology/affiliation. This criteria seeks to maximise reflection of the diversity of political views prevalent within the movement. Just as pro-democracy activists in Egypt formed a broad coalition of various anti-dictatorship groups so too do many of these views find representation within the exile community. In particular this sample sought to represent, or to avoid excluding, feminists, socialists (of various denominations), Islamists and liberals. These categories form a minimum of acceptable standards but it was hoped other views could be reflected.

These five criteria, nationality, residence, age, religion and ideology, form a strong sampling strategy that was used to identify the informants for the study. The strategy contains both methodological and ethical considerations. It is designed in the full knowledge that it does not represent in any probabilistic sense the range of views encapsulated by the movement. However by combining exclusion and inclusion criteria it is hoped that the sample managed to avoid excluding any viewpoints, or at least minimised the chance of exclusion.

3.3.4 Corroborating Data

It is an error to base any research on only one data source. This study relies heavily on insights from biographical interviews. This reliance is in large part determined by resources. On one hand the task of biographical interviewing is costly in terms of time and labour therefore reducing opportunities for working with other data sources. On the other hand much of the observations this study relies on can only come from first hand accounts. Imperfections with the logic of corroboration were mentioned above in section 2.3 on validity checks. It bears repeating that corroboration is at best an approximate quality control. The well known example is that 99 observations of white swans are insufficient to support the theory that swans are white while just one observation of a black swan will refute that theory (Popper, 1974 :1). Corroboration is not proof but it remains a necessary quality check that has been used in this study where possible. This section outlines the sources of corroborating data used in the study. There are six sources of qualitative data case studies generally rely on. These are documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation and physical artefacts (Yin, 2003: 85,86). The sources of corroboration this study uses are documentation and to a limited extent physical artefacts. Direct observation, participant observation and archival studies are too costly to employ as a secondary data source (Mason, 2011: 55). Each of these three sources require more resources than are available for this research. Furthermore the results they could produce may not be desirable. Archival research for instance is insufficient to document ongoing activism. Instead the study uses as many written and visual sources as possible in an attempt to corroborate evidence from the interviews.

Documentation is a common source of evidence for social movement studies however, it has been shown to be a limited source. Usually researchers rely on newspapers for evidence of contentious performances (Tarrow and Tilly, 2012: 42). Within the last two decades such research has become increasingly easy due to digital archives of international, national and regional newspapers such as Nexis. Indeed this is a source this study relies on. The study searched the Times and the New York Times (as two English language, international newspapers of record) for stories of protest in Egypt as well as Al-Ahram, the Egyptian newspaper of record. While these sources are good for corroboration purposes it must be stressed that newspapers are an inherently limited source of information on contentious politics. Researchers compared the number of protests Washington, USA (possibly the world capital of protest), reported in local newspapers with police records and found the newspapers covered less than 10% of those recorded by the police (McCarthy et al, 1996). The dynamic is likely to vary in Egypt but it is unlikely that newspapers would provide a much better account there. It should be mentioned however that secondary sources are particularly useful in describing the history of contention in Egypt. There has been a great deal of scholarly research into Egyptian contentious politics.[76]

For English activism I had to rely more on primary sources as very little has been written. In fact so far only one study mentions the activists I worked with (Underhill, 2013). For sources of documentation I was able to widen the range of news sources my searches included as there is much less news. I extended my search to all national UK broadsheets and the London Evening Standard.[77] In addition to newspapers England based SMOs themselves provide rich sources of documentation. I was able to construct a timeline of events from the social media pages of SMOs, particularly the calendar function of Facebook was useful for this. Each of the

[76] While my account of historical Egyptian contention relied for the most part on history books I did introduce one primary source published recently, diplomatic papers published by Wikileaks. My use of these sources is no more than a source of corroboration and an added layer of detail. Using these documents is not to condone their release, merely to add another layer to existing historical records.

[77] London has many more local papers which I did consult but most either did not report on relevant events or reproduced the same ‘news wire’ stories that I read in the Evening Standard.

SMOs discussed in this thesis provide their own account of events on their social media which was invaluable in writing up the research and corroborating observations from interviews.[78]

The more abstract category of 'artefacts' is more useful in corroborating contemporary activism in England and Egypt. This category includes visual sources such as photographs and film (much is available on youtube). Some of this documentation has been provided by participants, others have been gleaned through searches. Where helpful visual evidence has been featured in the case study however no photographs that reveal the identity of sources have been used for ethical reasons.

3.3.5 Summary

This study seeks to describe and explain changes in activism caused by exile. Two methods of evidencing this change are surveys and semi-structured interviews. Both are strong candidates. Surveys allow the most certainty and guarantee a high level of comparability between respondents. Semi-structured interviews allow activists to some extent to tell their own story and to have some control over their input to the study. Yet critically, surveys have little exploratory value and limit the diversity of possible findings and semi-structured interviews cannot provide the level of detail required for this study. Biographical interviews have been proposed as a method surpassing these shortcomings. This method has exploratory worth and therefore contributes to the study's revelatory or descriptive aims. It also provides detail essential for describing causal mechanisms absent from semi-structured interviews. The main shortcoming of the biographic interview, from a methodological perspective, is its idiographic character. However attempts were made in the research design stage (section two) and analysis (section five) to use comparative methods and systematic data handling to overcome this shortcoming. The next section describes the analysis.

[78] After attending several Muslim Brotherhood events in London a Muslim Brotherhood organiser asked me to contribute an account for their social media. This created a unique ethical dilemma for me as I did not want to be seen to break my researchers' neutrality (had I done so the Muslim Brother may have regretted asking me) yet did not want to jeopardise further data collection. In the end I did offer a small comment for the activist which I framed as the view of a social movement scholar that commented on the efficacy of activism (abstractly) and celebrated peaceful means of political participation.

3.4. Analysis

This section describes how conclusions were drawn from the biographical interviews and other data sources. In doing so it considers analytical challenges and suggests analytical methods. This analysis brings together two analytical methods that have been used elsewhere. Braun and Clarke (2006) have argued correctly that labelling these methods, which to some extent are intuitive, is valuable as it allows readers to critically engage with the thesis. This analysis therefore brings together elements of thematic analysis in its approach to the qualitative data, and process tracing in case study design. The following section describes the analytical process of coding by which observations from the interview data were matched to and tested against theory. The discussion departs from justification of the unit of analysis before outlining the coding process which enabled abstraction from individual level data to observations of social variables and mechanisms.

3.4.1 Selection of 'Performance' as Unit of Analysis

At the data collection stage the study has a clear focus on individuals. Yet the individual falls short as an analytical unit for theoretical reasons. Both the question posed in this thesis and the propositions that can be drawn from the existing research (discussed in chapters one and two) suggest that analytically salient units are not individuals but their actions (which for the sake of simplicity will be assumed to include their words).[79] The study's research question presupposes this analytical focus on action. It does not ask about the activists themselves but about their activism, it is therefore not a study of identities or self-interpretations except for in the ways these impact on activism.

The theories that can be drawn from existing research also support this methodological choice. This is more true of SPOT than of RCT, described as a theoretical counterpoint, which would be more methodologically suited to individual level investigation. The main categories of SPOT are themselves social variables encompassing in the most general terms context (political

[79] In fact there are good theoretical reasons for this. Recent research, based on some longer standing ideas, in discourse theory has begun to problematise the distinction between speech and action. In linguistics 'speech acts' have been long recognised as a unique category of action. Examples include the words "I do" spoken at a wedding, or "I christen this ship" which are both actions the efficacy of which lies in speech (Austin, 1962: 5). Norval (1988) and Butler (1988) have suggested ways in which aggregate speech acts may have political efficacy. It seems to me that this research sits well with literature on framing processes.

opportunity structure), action (mobilising structures) and discourse (framing processes). Similarly the definition of exile discussed in chapter two favours for theoretical and methodological reasons a social conception of an 'exile community' as an actor in contentious politics. Theoretically collective action is thought to be both a puzzling object of research and probably an effective means of engaging in contention. Methodologically the social conception of exile allows the researcher room for interpretation in categorising participants in the study as exiled, at least for a time, even if this interpretation is at odds with the participants' own critical self-interpretation.

What is paramount analytically therefore is not the experiences and recollections described by participants in their biographical interviews but their actions at various times and places. However the experiences, recollections and other statements that could be described as 'critical self-reflection' remain important observations at a later analytical stage when it comes to explaining the outcomes observed. For these reasons the smallest unit of analysis constructed in this study is the 'contentious performance'. Its deployment is in line with the logic of the analytical argument, that the purpose of the unit is to construct from the data a record of the phenomena to be explained. Therefore the notion of a 'unit of analysis' matters methodologically in meeting the first aim of the thesis: description of exiled activism. By collecting from the interviews observations of performances a history of activism can be constructed that can at the next stage in analytical abstraction be explained through a combination of subjective factors arising in the interviews and theoretical considerations.

The contentious performance is discussed theoretically in chapter one (section 3.3). This notion is widened to include both the actions and words of activists. It relies on a dramaturgical metaphor for describing contention. Contention is said to be like a show for which actors rehearse, improvise and perform in front of intended audiences. Analytically 'performances' can be grouped into 'repertoires', kinds of catalogues of performances activists have rehearsed and agreed are worthwhile. Knowledge of contentious repertoires, while heavily theoretical categories, provides some basis, in conjunction with context, for conjecture as it informs speculation about what sort of action activists might deploy. For example, anti-nuclear

activists in a western democracy might be expected to stage a sit-in while guerrilla fighters in a non-democracy might be expected to detonate a car bomb, based on knowledge of their repertoire. These theoretical arguments are made in full in chapter one. This chapter deals with the methodological rules governing observation of performances and upscaling observations to repertoires.

3.4.2 Coding Performances and Repertoires

Isolating and interpreting observations of performances from the interview data is a matter of coding though several stages employing a combination of inductive and deductive logic.[80] In essence the coding procedure in this thesis starts with a descriptive cycle of coding which forms the basis of an account of activism in Egypt and in England. A second cycle of coding follows in two stages which flesh out the account of how exile changes activism. The first of the second cycle codes is the simultaneous code which groups events together with their causes and effects. The second of the second cycle codes is an axial code which organises the events into causal processes connecting cause and effect.

As the smallest unit of analysis in this study is the 'performance' the coding process begins from observations of performances operationalised as events and then proceeds to abstract through identifiable stages to theoretical propositions grounded at each stage in identifiable degrees of observation and interpretation. The coding process is designed to connect first of all observations of performances with theoretical explanations for collective action and then to the details of mechanisms connecting cause and effect. The methodological benefit of this coding procedure (and its discussion in this section) is that within the caveat of the 'hermeneutic circle' the analysis contains a traceable link between argument and evidence and is in principle replicable (Mason, 2011: 154).[81]

[80] Terminology needs clarified. This study follows best practice in qualitative research exemplified by Braun and Clarke (2006) and Saldaña (2009) considered here as best practice because they make subjective researcher decisions explicit rather than implicit. This study relies on the following definitions and distinctions from these guides; a 'code' is a label used to categorise observations in a data unit. A 'theme' is a pattern or group of codes. A 'theme' and a 'code' both therefore add consecutive layers of interpretation to the data.

[81] The hermeneutic circle traps all interpretive research. Interpretations can only compel to the extent that they accord with the reader's existing knowledge and previous reading. Asking readers to accept an interpretation is therefore an ongoing dialogue that could resemble a vicious circle (Taylor, 1971).

Performance is a metaphor and when it has been described in the contentious politics literature this metaphor is used to elaborate its meaning.[82] In order to establish strict coding criteria it is best to make the meaning of the concept 'performance' explicit. In this study, staying true to the dramatic metaphor, performances are considered to be bounded events of public claim making in which one state, governmental or civic 'actor' (group consisting of more than one person) makes claims affecting the interests of a state or governmental 'actor'. What distinguishes the 'performance' from miscellaneous contentious claim-making is that the event has an intended wider 'audience'. The definition therefore excludes routine lobbying of governments, conducted in private. It does include a range of contentious activities, the public protest, march and rally being quintessential examples of claim making in democracies.

This definition provides a checklist of criteria on which to judge whether events should be categorised as performances. To count, events should feature: (1) Two or more actors making claims on another's interests (at least one should be a state or government); (2) The event should be 'coordinated'. Not necessarily pre-arranged as some performances are spontaneous and/or improvised but at least involve those making claims working together; (3) The event must be public, not private; there must be an identifiable audience beyond the target of claim making. Events meeting these minimum conditions described by interviewees were categorised according to a descriptive code. This code formed the first layer of analysis. Unique descriptive codes were applied for each form of performance observed. This produced a catalogue of performances categorised by type (Saldaña, 2009: 70). This catalogue was the basis of description in the thesis. It established what happened and what was to be explained. This study follows Saldaña in distinguishing first and second cycle coding. This stage of descriptive coding is the first cycle in which the characteristics of description are established. The second

[82] E.g. "We borrow a theatrical metaphor – repertoire – to convey the idea that participants in public claim-making adopt scripts they have performed, or at least observed, before. They do not simply invent an efficient new action or express whatever impulses they feel, but rework known routines in response to current circumstances" (McAdam et al, 2001: 138).

cycle progresses from description to analysis and explanation and in this study contained two levels of coding, a 'simultaneous code' and eventually an 'axial code'.[83]

Deepening the analysis meant drawing on other insights from the data (those that helped explain outcomes) and reorganising the first layer of codes into theory-laden themes. This involved two further layers of coding. First a 'simultaneous coding scheme' was utilised to group observations according to the main theoretical categories salient in the study (Saldaña, 2009: 62). Each performance event identified through the first layer of coding (descriptive coding) was allocated to one or more of the following code groups (or themes); Political Opportunity Structure, Mobilising Structure, Framing Process.[84] In this sense this cycle of coding provided the analysis with a level of deductive logic as these codes were drawn from theory rather than data. The simultaneous coding scheme was relevant for this layer of analysis as it is conceivable that many performances may have implications for several of these analytical categories. In fact, the view of causation hypothesised by SPOT implies that the distinction between causative variables is blurred in interactions and overlaps. This stage in the coding process was an important step in the analysis. This stage was used to decide what explanations arose from the data regarding each protest event. That is, each performance event was allocated to as many of the analytical categories (political opportunity structure, mobilising structures and/or framing processes) as the data would substantiate a link. The connection

[83] In fact, another analytical procedure preceded coding but does not require much discussion here. Transcription of the data was the first properly analytical act in which the researcher became familiar with the content of the data and began forming analytical ideas (Saldaña, 2009). McCracken has argued conversely that transcription ought to be delegated so that the analysis can proceed without preconceptions (McCracken, 1988: 41,42). That is not possible for this study. Broadly, another stage in analysis not discussed in depth in this chapter is writing. Becker has argued that while researchers may conceive writing to be an uncritical action in which the results of study are simply reported, in fact researchers actually form and refine their ideas through writing.

[84] Political opportunity structure, mobilising structures and framing processes were in fact themes grouping together sub-codes that aggregated to each theme. political opportunity structure had six codes corresponding to the six properties of a political opportunity structure. Mobilising structures had four codes, two for variants of activist network and two variants of repertoire, which were in turn pure aggregations of first level coding. framing processes consisted of a further four codes; signifier, argument, style and audience. At face value the framing processes codes seem to depart from the standard in social movement research (as established by Benford and Snow, 2000). However, my approach is in line with theirs. I borrow more from the language of post-structural discourse theory (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) in order to furnish an accurate description of the discourse itself. This is achieved primarily by basing the account of discourse on signifiers, key words and phrases employed by activists. Research in social movement theory accounting for framing often skips this step to categorise the discourse as a whole as prognostic or diagnostic. These factors are included in my 'style' code, but the inclusion of the 'signifier' code ensures my description is rigorous and is also able to distinguish between the discourse 'in practice' and the ideology of its opponents, which are not always in alignment.

between performance and category at this stage could be either cause or effect, no relations were assumed.

This second stage of coding therefore served both a descriptive and an explanatory/analytical purpose. In terms of description, the simultaneous code established the narrative structure of the thesis chapters and argument. It achieved this aim by incorporating activist self-interpretations and researcher interpretation with the descriptive codes identified in the first round. Applying two layers of interpretation in this layer of coding therefore started to transform the quality of the description from 'simple' to 'thick'. In terms of explanation and analysis the simultaneous code began to establish relations between observation and theory and therefore to establish the main analytical arguments substantiated by the data.

Finally a third layer of coding, within the second cycle discussed above, was developed in order to fully articulate the steps of the argument in the thesis. This was what Saldaña calls an 'axial code' meaning that the code grouped together numerous observations along a continuum of intermediate 'sub-codes'. In this way evidence was assembled of decertification, brokerage and boundary formation, the mechanisms at work in exiled contention. The list of mechanisms in chapter one, table one was used as a guide when searching for processes in the data.[85] This code combined deductive and inductive logic as although it is possible to compile a list of mechanisms other researchers have discovered, there is no comparable list of indicators for these. Therefore I had to code for these inductively from the data. The complete codebook for the thesis is included in the appendix and includes definitions and indicators for each code.

3.4.3 Summary

The case study presents a multi-layered analysis of biographical interview data. The data is analysed through three layers of coding in two cycles. The first cycle is descriptive, involving descriptive codes of inductively observed contentious performances. The second cycle is an analytical/explanatory cycle that firstly deductively coded performance events according to the

[85] It was also used as a checklist for eliminating competing explanations.

cause or effect incorporating two layers of interpretation and a layer of theory. Finally an axial code was developed to draw out the stages of mechanisms known in contentious politics.

3.5. Ethics

This section describes the ethics of this research and states the steps I took to comply with principles of ethics. Each stage in the research design, from sampling to analysis, was subjected to ethical consideration. No unnecessary choices were made in the design of this study. Participants in this study faced greater risks in relation to their participation than did the researcher. The study was therefore designed to maximise their comfort and safety and to prevent any harm that could follow in consequence (Bulmer, 1982; Homan, 1991). I chose to follow the ethics codes of the American Sociological Association and American Political Science Association in conducting this research. While this decision was partly motivated by personal intellectual affiliation, - I completed my postgraduate studies in an American accredited university, - the choice to conform to these regulations was determined mostly by the depth and detail of guidance on professional and ethical conduct they set out.

The first ethical question the design of this study posed presupposed even data collection, that is the morality of the study's aims, is the goal of the study (investigating how exile changes activism, moral in itself, or does it at least not pose any ethical problems. Oliver (2003) invites researchers to begin their work by questioning whether or not the intended findings of the study can be supported ethically. This question is more complicated than it first appears, particularly in the field of contentious politics, researchers have long worried about the uses their work can be put to. For example, Gurr prefaced his classic *Why Men Rebel* by noting that the answers he proposes to his research question will be at least as useful to dictators as to rebels. Of course, Gurr concluded the study was still worthwhile. He therefore suggested that the benefit of the research to scholarship, or to activists, outweighs its benefit to dictators. Oliver suggests that even if research can be put to unethical uses it may still contain an intrinsic value if it can contribute to a moral good (Oliver, 2003 :12). That is the case for this research.

Participation in the study presented a major ethical dilemma. The potential interviewees are a vulnerable group in one sense as they face persecution in their home country for their

political beliefs. Oliver defines 'vulnerable' in the sense of research ethics as meaning individuals who may not appreciate the full implications of participation, this notion therefore captures the participants in this study who cannot anticipate every outcome of their activism (Oliver, 2003: 35,36). Therefore it was ethically imperative that the sample only included those persons whose contribution was essential to the study (Mason, 2011: 143). This consideration guided the research in specifying the form of interviews as biographical interviews, as this method of producing detailed, high quality data is a method that operates optimally with a very small sample. That is, rather than interview a large number of individuals on the speculation that they may have something important to contribute, I chose to select carefully my participants and developed the method to target those individuals whose contribution was essential.

For those who did participate every effort was taken to safe guard their identity. The right to confidentiality for participants is one that both ASA and APSA insist on. As the participants faced persecution for their political beliefs it was imperative this study did not publicise their identity. This process of anonymising the data involved several practical steps. The interviews were arranged over the phone or in person rather than by correspondence in order to avoid creating a paper trail. The interviews were recorded digitally but filenames in no way suggested the identity of the participant. The process of coding and analysis ensured that participants could not easily be identified from the case study as if their life history had been described in narrative format. Instead the process of coding for performances abstracted systematic observations from the interviews rather than anecdotes that could be used to identify a participant.

The sampling procedure has been discussed above but in order to stress the ethical considerations central to those decisions aspects of it bear repeating here. As has just been mentioned the sample was kept to a minimum to avoid implicating vulnerable people in the research needlessly. Informed consent was sought as a minimum criterion for commencing the interview. This was used as a first check that participants were fit to take part. Participants were aware entering the interview what would be discussed and had time to prepare. Some basic

precautions were established as selection criteria. Participants had to be above the age of eighteen as children are a specially vulnerable group (Mason, 2011: 800).

The principle of informed consent itself requires further specification. This is a central concept in the ethics of research involving human participation but is also a concept with clear limits. Following the guidance offered by the ASA (code of ethics, section 12) informed consent is understood as an agreement entered into, signified by a contract, between the researcher and the participant. In order that consent be meaningfully informed numerous actions were taken. Participants were given in advance a summary of the research written in accessible language, free of jargon. Before and during the interview participants were given several opportunities to ask questions about the research. Crucially, in order that participants have an accurate understanding of what they are consenting to, the contract on informed consent is not signed until after the interview is complete.

Yet, as alluded to above, informed consent is a concept with limits. The limits on informed consent concern the withdrawal of consent and interactions between researcher and participant. To be clear, participants are free at any stage, even after the interview is complete, to withdraw their consent. They are also free at any stage to contact the researcher to update or amend their contribution. Yet the researcher makes no commitment to provide the participant with transcripts of the interview, or after the interview is over, to discuss or debate the interpretations drawn from the interview. I described in section 2.3 of this chapter, how participants will be asked in the course of the interview to comment on the accuracy of interpretations drawn from the interview throughout the course of the interview. This is both a methodological strategy contributing to the interpretative validity of the study and an ethical strategy ensuring that participants words' are not twisted, their meaning misrepresented or taken out of context. It is itself a matter of interpretation, or a 'democratic' process, as the outcome is intended to represent a convergence of the views of the researcher and the participant. Yet, importantly, this check on interpretation is limited to the duration of the interview. To do otherwise would be to allow participants undue influence over the research.

The interview itself posed potential ethical dilemmas as the content of the discussion covered sensitive topics that may be emotionally distressing for the interviewee (Finch, 1984). Several steps were taken to prevent and control any harm memory could cause during the interview. Throughout the interview the research was sensitive to the needs of the participants. The interview proceeded at the pace set by the interviewee and the interviewee had as much say in which topics were discussed as the researcher. Beyond explicit protests that certain topics were too sensitive the researcher was listening and looking for audio and visual clues of discomfort.

Finally, writing up the research and presenting the results is a major part of the thesis process that also ought to be subjected to ethical scrutiny. The ASA code of ethics makes it clear that professional conduct, largely, is ethical conduct. To that extent the research is presented in a manner that conforms to standards of scientific accuracy, does not misrepresent work and does not plagiarise. Where research or writing by other scholars has been referred to in the text of this thesis it has been cited in a consistent manner conforming to the Chicago style of citations, as is common in Political Science.

3.5.1 Summary

Each stage of the research process presented ethical challenges. Yet these problems, rather than being viewed negatively, were taken by the researcher as opportunities to ensure the research process was intrinsically ethical and each decision taken contained an identifiable ethical consideration in addition to purely methodological considerations. The sample of participants was intentionally kept small. This was partly guided by practicalities as biographical interviews are so extensive (discussed in section 3.3). The American Sociological Association code of ethics establishes five general ethical principles sociologists adhere to, principles that govern political scientific research equally well. These are 1. professional competence, 2. integrity, 3. professional and scientific responsibility, 4. respect for people's rights, dignity and diversity and 5. social responsibility. I hope that the holistic view of research ethics taken in this study corresponds to the spirit of these principles.

3.6. Conclusion

This thesis is an investigation based on qualitative data into the processes by which activism changes when activists are sent into exile. It is based on a purposive sample of biographical interviews with Egyptian pro-democracy activists who have been sent into exile in England. There are not many of these activists but those who have made the journey to England have been innovative and dedicated in continuing to work for democracy in Egypt. The research was rigorous both methodologically and ethically. Every effort was taken to safeguard the activists and to facilitate their account. A partial comparison was engineered into a single case study that enabled an analysis of how exile changed activism, in the words of activists who had been forced to leave their home country for their political views. The selection of candidates for interview was managed to account for the diversity of views that have found a voice in exile; Islamists, socialists and feminists, as well as the various minorities that have found it better to continue activism from exile. The data was coded through two cycles and three layers to extract from activists account a theoretically coherent account of the processes, causes and effects of activism in a changing context. Analytically concepts from social movement theory were relied on in order to structure the evidence into an argument that reflects how individual choices and actions, whether rational or not, aggregated in ways that both changed and were changed by the political context they operated within.

Part Two: Case Study

[E]xile is strangely compelling to think about but terrible to experience. It is the unhealable rift forced between a human being and a native place, between the self and its true home: its essential sadness can never be surmounted. And while it is true that literature and history contain heroic, romantic, glorious, even triumphant episodes in an exile's life, these are no more than efforts meant to overcome the crippling sorrow of estrangement. — Edward Said, *Reflections on Exile and Other Articles*

Chapter Four
Closed and Open Structures of Opportunity: Activism in Context

4.1. Introduction

The root causes of contemporary Egyptian exile are to be found not in the recent coup d'etat, but in another one, more than half a century earlier. Nasser's coup in 1952 closed off political opportunities for activists and initiated the process of decertification that pushed activists seeking to create their own opportunities to the margins, to the ultimate extent of exile in the modern era. It is worth framing this argument within the wider context established in an extended quote from *Egypt: Contested Revolution* by Philip Marfleet (2016). Marfleet presents evidence masterfully demonstrating that the ideology underpinning decertification was brought to Egypt by British colonisers. He goes on to argue this was opportunistically appropriated later by secular Egyptian autocrats (Marfleet, 2016: 21-23).

> In Egypt, occupied by British forces in 1882, the colonial administration combined suspicion of the mass of people with a conviction that they lacked capacities to modify both their material circumstances and their subordinate political status. According to the British administrator Alfred (later Viscount) Milner, the people of Egypt were 'docile and good tempered'; they were 'a nation of submissive slaves, not only bereft of any vestige of liberal institutions but devoid of any spark of the spirit of liberty; (Milner, 2002 [1892]: 178). At the same time they were 'in the grip of a religion the most intolerant and fanatical' (Milner, 2002 [1892]:2). Egyptians required European rule and reform: British military occupation, Milner suggested, had succeeded in bringing a 'revolution' to their lives in the form of new institutions of administration and justice (Milner, 2002 [1982]: 5). (Marleet, 2016: 18).

This chapter gathers together information, largely from historical sources, suggesting the ways that this ideology became institutionalised throughout the years of native Egyptian dictatorship. My aim with doing so is to furnish an account of the Egyptian political opportunity structure, to contrast with an account of the English political opportunity structure. As discussed in chapter one, political opportunity structure is a concept that allows researchers to specify the aspects of context relevant to the process under investigation. That is not to say the account in this chapter should be considered 'background'. Rather, context is part of how exile works. The same mechanism can operate in different contexts with variation in consequences (Falleti and Lynch, 2009: 1143). In this case, when activists are exiled, this is the consequence of a mechanism with historical roots, *decertification*, whereby their authoritarian context has increasingly diminished their access to political legitimacy. Faced with a choice between obedience or repression some

choose exile. Exile is, therefore, in an important sense the conclusion of that process, a fact (dependent on context) that in turn has major implications for the context of activism.

The chapter overall is an account of the exile political opportunity structure, yet describing this structure is implicitly analytical and therefore partly explanatory. My account covers the structure of opportunities available to activists in Egypt and in England, and compares the two. Due to the complexities of political causation the matter of deciding the historical moment from which to begin description is always tricky. As the quote above from Marfleet illustrates, it would be possible to trace the process of decertification back to the colonial period. I choose to start, perhaps counterintuitively for a study of contemporary activism, in 1952 with the military coup d'état that brought Nasser to power. This critical juncture in Egyptian history institutionalised the decertification that closed down the range of political opportunities in Egypt. It established institutional traditions of petty corruption, and widespread surveillance and repression which all endure to this day, despite the promises of the eighteen day revolution. Yet it is important to bear in mind that this is not a study of exiles' individual motives. This repressive context gave rise to particular forms of activism, for the most part various kinds of industrial action. These collective performances are as much structures of Egyptian politics as the contextual factors that give rise to them. The point of describing this context is to begin an explanation of why activism took the form it did in Egypt, and then to compare it to the forms it took in exile.

4.1.1 Aims of the Chapter

As with the thesis overall, the aims of this chapter are partly descriptive and partly explanatory.

Descriptive aims:

- The chapter aims at an account of the structure of opportunities available to exiled activists. This is a necessarily theoretical description and therefore rests on the holistic view of political opportunity structure I take (discussed in chapter one, section 3.2). In accordance with that view the description is focussed on centres of power, political actors, stability, alignments and alliances and repression or participation.

- As the operationalisation of political opportunity structure relevant here rests on a historic view this chapter is written in such a way as to document the establishment and change in these factors over time. Therefore the chapter aims at a thematic description of the historical development of Egypt's, and the exile's, political opportunity structure.
- Progressing from simple description, i.e. stating the facts, I aim in this chapter (through reliance on interview data) to bring some interpretation to bear on the meaning structures have for activists. In doing so I hope to offer an account that is thick descriptive. Structures can have a range of historical, cultural or economic meanings, but the interpretation that is of interest here is in how political opportunities were perceived and valued by activists.

Explanatory aims:

- The principal explanatory aim in this chapter is to demonstrate how context, in particular political structures, enabled and shaped activism by modifying the functioning of political mechanisms. In this sense I aim to link the thematic account of available opportunities with causal process observations.
- In order that the evidence in this thesis can contribute not only to the argument of the thesis but also to the wider literature on contentious politics, my final aim in this chapter is to draw meaningful explanatory generalisations. I fulfil this aim by, after evidencing the functioning of causal mechanisms, through comparison between activism in Egypt and in England demonstrating the reliance of the mechanisms on context.

4.1.2 Plan of the Chapter

Consequently this chapter covers a lot of ground, some of which may seem tangential but in fact all contributes to a full and accurate understanding of the operation of exile in this case. In order to structure this volume of data the chapter deals with the Egyptian and English political opportunity structures in turn before comparing and analysing the two. Chapter four begins (section two) with an account of Egyptian governance from the 1950s onward. Section four contains an account of contemporary English governance. I refrain from further discussion of the English political set-up as an overview, supported with treatment in previous research, is more than sufficient to make the point that political opportunity structure in the England can be categorised as 'open'. Section five discusses the mechanism *decertification* and how it has

functioned within the Egyptian activist community across the two contexts. In section six I provide an analytical view of the differences between the two political systems and propose a classification on which to base conjecture. Section seven concludes the chapter drawing lessons and summarising generalisations.

4.2. Political Power in Egypt

Egypt lies at the north of the African continent along the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. To the west Egypt shares a perfectly straight border with Libya and to the south an equally straight border with North Sudan. The precision of these lines in the sand are reminders of decisions taken by imperialist occupiers in the not-so-distant past (Atiyah, 1955). To the east Egypt borders the Gaza Strip, Israel, Palestine and the more troubled parts of the region. Most of Egypt's land remains unpopulated, covered with inhospitable, un-arable desert; terrain favourable only to banditry. The hostility of this terrain accounts for the relative overpopulation of Egyptian cities, as more than 43% of Egyptians are urban dwellers. There were, at the start of 2011 (the year of revolution), 80,471,869 people residing in Egypt. They were overwhelmingly Arabic, 99.6% of the population. Most of those 99% (90%) were Sunni Muslims with the next major group being Coptic Christians, 9% of the total. In its highly depoliticised culture religion served as the main indicator of cleavage within the society. The population at this time was overwhelmingly young, 62.7% between the ages of 15-64. This is partly explained by high death rates and low birth rates. The most densely populated city in Egypt is its capital and the seat of power: Cairo (CIA, 2011).

The political history of Egypt in the 20th century is one of the consolidation of political opportunities in the hands of a select elite. Military control of the government, guaranteed through emergency legislation effectively outlawing political opposition, combined with a series of unique 'participative' bodies effectively designed to control and depoliticise political participation first, and later to distribute the spoils of dictatorship to potential challengers (Human Rights Watch, 2010). An institutional path-dependence is discernible in modern political institutions which were shaped by, and retain some characteristics of, Nasser's early experiments in popular mobilisation (Blaydes, 2010).

4.2.1 The Free Officers

Midnight July 22 1952, the Free Officers (FO) decided their wait was over. About three thousand troops plus two hundred officers took control of Army Headquarter Barracks in Abbasiyya. The army chief of staff was arrested. Meanwhile the government was in Alexandria. FO troops occupied the army headquarters, all airports, the broadcasting and telecommunications facilities and all major roads and bridges in Cairo (Vatikiotis, 1980: 375). At seven am on July 23 Anwar Sadat read the FO announcement of takeover on Egyptian radio (Malek, 1964: 40). According to the (Egyptian government approved) movie *Days of Sadat* he was chosen to read the message because he had a nice voice.

By 4am on July 23rd the FO were in control of the armed forces. (Vatikiotis, 1978: 129) They formed a core executive, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) who worked in secret with sympathetic lawyers to force the abdication of the king. There was dispute among the officers over whether the king should be executed or exiled, the majority favoured exile in order to buy time for decision making. These activities were kept hidden from the public in order to avoid stoking opposition (Vatikiotis, 1978: 129-130). Three days after taking power they sent the king into exile in Italy while they deliberated over what to do with him (Cook, 2012: 40; Vatikiotis, 1980: 376). What followed was a period of dual power.

One source of power was centralised in the FO as the officers controlled public administration through the RCC. The RCC originally consisted of fourteen men in addition to their leader Naguib: Nasser, Saddat, Amer, Salah and Gamal Salem, Boghdadi, Khalid Mohieddin, Hasan Ibrahim, Abdel Moneim Abdel Rauf, Zakariyya Mohieddin, Hussein Shafei, Yusuf Siddiq and Abdel Moneim Amin (Vatikiotis, 1978: 119). They were young men, between 28 and 35. None were wealthy or had parents from the ruling class other than Naguib, their leader. They were, however, successful military bureaucrats with service in Palestine, which enabled them to project an image of nationalist legitimacy to the Egyptians[86] (Cook, 2012: 40; Vatikiotis, 1978: 108,109; Vatikiotis, 1980: 374).

[86] As the largest Arab nation, ideological nationalism in Egypt has always been fluidly interpreted by political actors as Egyptian or Arab nationalism.

They were allowed to take control of the army by other officers who stood aside. Other senior military men were of similar background to the FO. None were working class or peasants. Equally none or few were from the ruling elite. Rather the army formed its own class of upwardly mobile governors originally of petite bourgeois stock. Therefore Vatikiotis argues it was in the interests of nobody in the military to either oppose the officers or defend the regime (Vatikiotis, 1978: 110).

Competing for power in the earliest days of the FO revolution was the traditional political class. Parties and politicians in Egypt's quasi-colonial system continued to occupy their elected posts (Abdalla, 2008: 1-18; Beinin and Lockman, 1988; Lacouture, 1973: 4). A civilian prime minister was appointed soon after their coup as a signal of the officers' ostensible patriotic, democratic intentions (Vatikiotis, 1980: 377). Yet he was replaced at the earliest opportunity (September 7th, 1952) by the most senior of the officers, Naguib, thereby consolidating executive power within the RCC.

The appointment of Naguib as prime minister was an early exercise in what observers might today describe as 'P.R.' or 'spin', as it brought dual power to a close, consolidating executive and legislative power in the RCC, but in a way acceptable to the Egyptian population. The officers used a contentious political issue, land reform, to present the civilian government as an 'ancien régime', unable to deliver the radical change they said Egypt required.

Land reform was to be the officers' first major act in government, and it was an astute choice. To modern city dwelling readers agrarian politics may seem hard to fathom but its political significance for Egyptians mid-twentieth century was obvious. More than 80% of Egyptians at this time lived in the country side (Amin, 2000: 60). Although land ownership economically affects urbanites through tenancy conditions, house prices and taxes the issue is more apparent in the country where people literally live off the land, provided they have access to it. The injustice diagnosed by the officers was that 0.5% of all landowners owned 35% of all land. The situation was essentially feudal. The majority of remaining landowners owned less

than five feddans each.[87] This reform was opposed by all of the Wafd, including the civilian prime minister[88] (Cook, 2012: 45). The officers argued that land ownership needed to be limited to two hundred feddans per person regardless of inheritance or title. The only exceptions were to be parents for whom allowances were made in order that land could be used to feed families. The act also fixed wages, established co-ops and unions, limited rents and improved tenancy regulations. (Cook, 2012, 47; Vatikiotis, 1980: 399).

In addition to passing the relevant legislation the officers established two bodies, land and credit cooperatives, to facilitate and enforce the new patterns of ownership. Membership of the new land cooperative was made mandatory to peasants. These provided expropriated lands to peasants but required the lands to be worked according to the demands of central government. Credit cooperatives were voluntary. They provided additional government supplied inputs in exchange for additional production, to order. This dualism had two functions. It gave government control of food supply. Simultaneously it empowered peasants to a limited degree by ensuring competition between the two institutions prevented centralisation of policy decisions (Bianchi, 1989: 78). However, as will be discussed in section 2.4, this organisation of workers allowed the new regime a degree of political control as these cooperatives were aggregated into the regime's new participative institutions.

While these actions had material impact on the way Egyptians lived day to day they also sent out less tangible signals to interested observers about who the officers were and what they intended. The Muslim Brotherhood were already too well established to be threatened when the FO appeared on the Egyptian scene, but nonetheless they cautiously welcomed the officers (Harris, 1964: 177). The transport workers union issued a statement of support for the new regime based on its claims about social justice (Beinin and Lockman, 1988: 420).

4.2.2 The Egyptian Military

> My parliament is the army. Do you think the army led a revolution simply in order to make me ruler?... The army rather expects me to achieve the aims for which it launched the revolution.
> Nasser, quoted in (Vatikiotis, 1978: 164).

[87] A feddan is a non-metric unit of measurement used in Arabic countries equivalent to 4200 square metres.
[88] The Wafd were a liberal party who had held power, under the monarch and British administration, until the FO revolution.

Other than the brief revolutionary years 2011-2013 the Egyptian military have managed to retain executive control of government since. As will be discussed in the next section various institutions of popular participation in politics came and went in Egyptian history. In all these years the military provided every Egyptian president and the majority of decision makers. Due to political manoeuvring, and his own consolidation of power, Nasser was eventually able to dissolve the RCC after having eliminated his rivals. Nonetheless, excepting the all too brief experiment in democracy post-revolution the only route to presidential power in Egypt has been progression through the military hierarchy. The first two Egyptian presidents, post coup, had both been members of the RCC. Nasser had been an officer and Sadat had been a colonel. His successor, Hosni Mubarak who was president at the time of the 2012 revolution, had been chief marshal of the air force prior to assuming political office. Finally, in 2013 Sisi, a former field marshall, deposed the democratically elected president Morsi.

In politics and economics the Egyptian military has a unique degree of autonomy. By 2011 the armed forces were earning revenue from investments and economic activities as diverse as arms production, electronics, consumer goods, infrastructure development and even tourism (Hashim, 2011). In other words, the Egyptian military is not dependant on the state for funding and consequently can, and does, act independently. The military do not publish their accounts yet military researcher Derek Lutterbeck estimates their earnings account for something between 10 and 40 per cent of Egyptian GDP (Lutterbeck, 2013: 26). That is a considerable range but even at the lower percentile the Egyptian army constitute a sizeable economic actor.

The modern Egyptian army is staffed mainly by conscripts (Hashim, 2011: 107). Males between the ages of 16 and 30 are subject to anything between 12-36 months service and 9 years reserve service (CIA, 2011). A total of 468,500 Egyptians are on the payroll of the army at a cost of $3.9 billion (US) to the tax payer (Lutterbeck, 2013: 25). The army were, as discussed above, by no stretch of the imagination dependent on state funds. Conscription is a useful tool of authoritarianism for several reasons. Conscripts on fixed term contracts have little incentive to challenge for leadership positions within the hierarchy. Unwilling conscripts also

have little incentive to challenge orders and are unlikely to develop the skills necessary to be effective in mutinous actions. There can be positive outcomes of conscription from the regime's perspective which has certainly been true of the Egyptian case. Where such a large proportion of the society has direct links with the army, patriotism and popular support of the armed forces can be strong. While this soft power has aided the military in retaining political control unchallenged it has also meant that in times of crisis, such as the 2011 revolution, the population have looked at the military as an ally and have been willing to work with military leaders.

4.2.3 Summary: The Military Consolidation of Power

Institutionally speaking the first year of the FO revolution began a process of path dependence whereby political participation was limited for those outside of the military. In a matter of months, through political manoeuvring the officers began to restrict the multiplicity of centres of power in the Egyptian political system. First they established their decision making cabal, the RCC, with only fourteen self-appointed men. At the first chance they used land reform, a bread and butter issue with clear import to Egypt's largely rural population (that was also incidentally anathema to Egypt's political class who were also economically invested in the land), to exclude civilians from government.

The reforms of 1952 also therefore provide the first evidence of the FO's moves to restrict the availability of allies for challengers. The next section will describe this process in more detail. While the establishment of national co-ops may appear either benign or vaguely socialist it was in fact the beginning of a naked (and spectacularly successful) attempt by Egypt's new elite to control and de-politicise political organisation.

4.2.4 Three Institutions: the Liberation Rally, the National Union and the Arab Socialist Union

> [T]hey [the RCC] were not opposed to parties as such, only to their corrupt leaders. Thus the Liberation Rally was designed not as a party, but as an instrument for the reorganisation of popular forces. Nasser quoted in (Vatikiotis, 1978: 134).

The geo-political and historical context of Egypt in the 1950s allowed the FO freedom in determining means of retaining and centralising their hold on political opportunities. Although Egypt had operated as a constitutional monarchy on a British inspired model for roughly two

decades prior to their coup, the institutions of democracy were not strong or popular enough to present any particular obstacle to their coup. In the international arena the context of the cold war presented the FO with powerful non-democratic allies in the Soviet Union. By the time that Nasser consolidated executive power in 1954 he had begun to develop alternative institutions to political parties that would allow citizens to express their political demands and resolve disputes in a way that did not challenge the military's political hegemony (Alexander, 2005: 62; Vatikiotis, 1978; 147).

The RCC, with particular oversight by Nasser from the beginning, fashioned three unique political units; the Liberation Rally (LR) (1953 - 1958), the National Union (NU) (1958 - 1961) and the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) (1962 - 1978). These organisations were never called political parties, purposely by the regime which had disbanded the existing parties. So for instance Major Salah Salem, of the RCC, announced at the inauguration of the LR, "We did not come to you for votes, because we do not aspire to rule or to become members of parliament. We came to seek your co-operation and unity" (Major Salah Salem quoted in Vatikiotis, 1978: 174). Yet political scientists have tended to agree that the LR, NU and ASU all came to serve much the same participative functions as parties do in other political systems (Binder, 1978: 36 Blaydes, 2010: 30).

The three institutions were broadly similar with only slight differences in operational procedure. They were corporatist bodies that amalgamated existing and newly created trade unions, agricultural cooperatives and other professional bodies into a hierarchical structure (Wickham, 2002: 29). Membership of the original LR was based on affiliation to such pre-existing professional associations. Then the second iteration of the mass party, the NU expanded membership giving the regime greater control (Waterbury, 1983: 313). All Egyptian adults were automatically members (Blaydes, 2008: 31). In addition to universal membership, suffrage (including women) was universal and voting mandatory. Despite universal

membership, membership was not free -- it cost £E50.[89] Anwar Sadat was its secretary general (Vatikiotis, 1978: 179). Senior Free Officers were appointed, rather than elected, to the key roles in all three institutions (Vatikiotis, 1980: 380). These institutions were not designed to be independent or self-governing. Rather Nasser wanted the people willingly controlled by the army (Cook, 2012: 50; Vatikiotis, 1978: 168; Vatikiotis, 1980: 379).

The LR was used to channel student and worker activism (Abdalla, 1985: 127; Erlich, 1989: 181). LR members were encouraged to participate in pro-regime demos such as that of 12 January 1954 (Abdalla, 1985: 122). The LR allowed the RCC to determine who participated in politics and control the terms of debate. It also had a symbolic function by harnessing the concept of a popular will in support of RCC (Vatikiotis, 1978: 134). In addition to facilitating demonstrations these institutions also provided forums for members, as workers, to seek redress in professional disputes (Binder, 1969: 401; Wickham, 2002: 29).

4.2.3 Multi-Party Elections

Following Nasser's death in 1970 one of his closest colleagues Anwar Sadat began his own attempt to consolidate political power. The geo-political context in 1970 was different to that of 1952 when the officers first staged their coup because the Soviet Union was losing the cold war and ceding much of its soft power on the global stage. In this context some commentators have argued that Sadat strategically understood he would have a stronger ally in western countries and consequently tried to frame his power grab in ways that would be acceptable to a western audience. For instance, McDermott argued that "Sadat had in mind a European and Western audience in this particular exercise… he was conscious of wanting to show the world that Israel did not have the monopoly of multiparty systems" (McDermott, 1988: 109).[90] From the time of Nasser's death Sadat began to implement his political vision, characterised by his 'open door' policy that aimed to liberalise markets, and politics.

[89] By 1962 Nasser had found that the universal automatic membership of the LR and NU made surveillance of the population difficult. He founded the ASU as a replacement with voluntary membership in order to be able to distinguish enthusiastic regime supporters (Blaydes, 2010: 31).

[90] Beattie echoed this argument, that "much of Sadat's motivation came from wishing to please the West" (Beattie: 2000, 223).

Other commentators argue the new direction of Egyptian politics was driven more by domestic concerns, or by a convergence between domestic and international matters (Blaydes, 2010: 36). Springborg put it like this: "…it [liberalisation] was in the interest of the class upon which his power was based" (Springborg: 1988, 138). In other words, Nasser had used institutional resources to control the working classes, while Sadat wagered that a more effective way to retain power would be to lean on the support of elites who favour liberal market conditions. Regardless of the motivation Sadat introduced a two-party system in which elections were held giving Egyptians the chance to vote for the existing ASU or a new left-wing faction (Blaydes, 2010: 36,37). Under Mubarak the number of parties allowed to compete expanded with the Wafd party returning to political life and on occasion the Muslim Brotherhood standing candidates (Blaydes, 2010: 38; Goldschmidt and Johnston 2004: 415).

Understanding why a military dictatorship would hold parliamentary elections is also key to accurately describing how the elections operated. While it is true that vote-buying is common in Egypt it is an oversimplification to suggest the regime simply manipulates the outcome of elections.[91] Such an argument would reflect the assumption that the dictatorship holds fraudulent elections in order to confer a sense of legitimacy on the regime. In the case of Egypt this argument is simplistic and inaccurate. The costs of vote-buying on a national scale are prohibitive, especially for a low-resource developing economy.[92] In Egypt the cost of vote-buying is externalised by the regime onto the candidates who are incentivised by the legitimate and illegitimate benefits of access to elected office (Blaydes, 2010).

[91] Polling stations in Egypt are open vote markets. Votes are bought in ways common in non-democracies or democratising countries. In some cases the voter takes a photograph, on a cell phone, of the ballot paper as proof for payment. In other cases the 'revolving door' technique is employed whereby the candidate (or an agent) enters the polling station, ostensibly to vote, but leaves with the marked ballot paper. This ballot is then given to the first vote seller who submits the ballot and exchanges a fresh blank ballot in return for payment (Blaydes, 2010: 105,106; Wikileaks 05CAIRO8615; 05CAIRO8555).

[92] Outright election rigging was the exception rather than the rule in parliamentary elections. But it did happen once in 2005. Following street battles between NDP supporters (who had strangely been released from prison, armed with swords and were high on drugs) and Muslim Brotherhood supporters, the election of one seat in the Nile Delta was falsified in favour of the NDP candidate. Following the obvious falsification Muslim Brotherhood youth were angry and wanted to riot but were constrained by the Muslim Brotherhood's organisational hierarchy's instructions (Wikileaks 05CAIRO8822).

The regime uses institutional mechanisms to retain control over candidate selection. It has since the 1980s set strict limits on which organisations can be considered a political party, and within parties which individuals have the right to stand for election. The regime allows eligible individuals to stand for election to parliament but retains a majority in parliament therefore ensuring indefinite control of government.[93] In extreme cases the regime has invoked emergency legislation to arrest candidates it views as a threat, usually from the MB (Human Rights Watch, 2010; 7).[94] Elections to the parliament are by a system of proportional representation, however, if parties fail to reach an 8% threshold nationally they are barred from parliament and their votes transfer to the NDP.[95] In this context successful candidates are the ones who can literally afford to buy the most votes. Candidates are incentivised to take part in this process because access to elected office, while it does not secure influence over government policy, does allow the holder to have influence over matters such as the award of government contracts, in addition to prestige.[96]

4.3. Contention in Egypt

When the military seized power in 1952 they declared martial law, formalised in a series of legislative acts Egyptians know as the emergency laws (Human Rights Watch, 2010: 4). These were in place from the time of the coup until the 2011 revolution making public gathering illegal and giving police sweeping powers to repress protests. Nonetheless throughout the years of dictatorship Egyptians found ways to make their political claims known. Before his time as president Sadat recognised this impossibility of eliminating protest when he commented "[h]e

[93] Diplomatic dispatches from the US embassy confirm the US government were aware that candidate selections in the NDP were the result of backroom deals (Wikileaks 05CAIRO8112). This process was in fact widely understood by observers of Egyptian politics as is evidenced by the fictional account of such a deal given in the novel the *Yacoubian Building*. It has been suggested that Mubarak's relaxed attitude towards such literary criticism contributed to the permissive political context that eventually led to his downfall.

[94] The Egyptian government resisted attempts to introduce independent international observation of parliamentary elections. They argued, as did sympathetic columnists, that international observers would be interpreted by the Egyptian public as foreign interference in domestic sovereignty (Human Rights Watch, 2010: 13; Wikileaks 05CAIRO6508; 05CAIRO6137).

[95] This rule was challenged in courts in the late 1980s but was preemptively tweaked to ensure the outcome remained similar.

[96] This economic motive for seeking election is consistent with the composition of Egyptian governments. For example, Mubarak's final government before the 2011 revolution was headed by prime minister Ahmed Nazif. Nazif's government had two wings, one half were monopoly capitalists, the other half were neo-liberal intellectuals. The minister for transport, Mohamed Mansour, was also Egypt's best known car salesman. Similarly the minister for tourism, Zoheir Garraneh, was a tycoon in the tourist trade. On the other wing of the government were Mahmoud Mohieddin, the minister of investment and also one time managing director of the World Bank, and Youssef Boutros-Ghaly, the minister for finance and a senior IMF executive (Kandeel, 2011: 18; Marfleet, 2013).

TABLE FOUR. CHRONOLOGY OF EGYPTIAN CONTENTION (1952 - 2011)

Year	Location	Event
1952	Kafr Al-Dawr	Industrial action
1954	Cairo University	Suez Commemoration
1968	Hellwan Aircraft Base (also Cairo and Alexandria)	Protest at Helwan Aircraft base
1968	Cairo, Alexandria, Mansura	1968 'Uprising'
1968	Cairo University	Sit in at Cairo University
1968	Mansura	Anti-Israeli Protests
1971		Sit in at Vetinary Medicine facility over graduate wages.
1972	Cairo Polytechnic	Sit in at Cairo Polytechnic
1972		Student anti-capitalism 'movements'
1976	Cairo	Public sector workers riot
2000	Cairo	Pro-Intifadah activism
2003	Cairo (Tahrir Square)	Anti US Iraq invasion protests
2005	Cairo (and other major cities)	Kefaya
2006	Mahalla al-Kubra	Textile Workers Strike
2006	Cairo (and other major cities)	Government Sanctioned Protests
2006	Cairo	Protest over closure of NGO
2007	Cairo, Mahalla al-Kubra	Textile Workers Strike (2)
2011	Cairo (and other major cities)	Revolution

who wants to inflame the political situation in Egypt will find the incendiary device in the students or the workers" (Sadat, quoted in Abdalla, 1985: 120). Sadat's insight was prescient in more ways than one as the story of contention in his time was dominated by workers and students and in subsequent years by attempts by more politically minded activists to mobilise those demographics.

Sometimes activists appropriated the institutions of dictatorship to mobilise their claims while at other times they took the risks of acting independently. In both cases the state

responded in largely the same way, with repression and using their resources to delegitimise activists and their claims. This process can be seen as one of *decertification* whereby activism lost its political recognition in official Egyptian politics.

This section describes the reasons activism occurred when it did in Egypt. Table four lists the most salient episodes of contention in Egypt since the FO coup. The table is a snapshot, sufficient for our purposes here. In the next chapter I describe in detail the processes and outcomes of activism but in this chapter the discussion is restricted to understanding how much of this activism was enabled by structural opportunities and how much was a result of activists' independent action. These episodes are the tip of the iceberg of Egyptian contention for a host of reasons.[97] Nonetheless, as these are the events that have made it onto the pages of history they are the ones that give the best indication of the overall character of the activism that was efficacious in Egypt as they are the ones the regime could not manage to conceal.

4.3.1 Causes of Egyptian Activism: Political Instability

In section two I argued that the Egyptian military had monopolised structures of political opportunity and developed institutional means of redistributing the spoils of dictatorship to landed and business elites. The record of activism described in the previous section suggests that while a static view of the Egyptian political opportunity structure can be easily categorised as 'closed', a more dynamic qualitative account reveals the slight openings that exist in that structure. Opportunities for activism arose in particular from the instability of current political alignments, whereas the lack of availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers and the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim making were effective in shutting down activism.

[97] Research has found that only a tiny fraction of protest events are reported in mainstream newspapers and that police keep only marginally more detailed records. This research was conducted in a democratic context, in Egypt where regime control of the press (or journalistic fear of the regime) is greater, it is likely that even less of the day to day contentious politics has been recorded. This section is based largely on secondary sources, in particular history books, as these texts identify the most salient episodes of contention and provide reasonable interpretations of their causality. Corroborations were sought in the press and in several databases of nonviolent action, the GNAD and xxx. For the account of the revolution numerous sources were used including transcripts of eyewitness interviews by researchers at AUC.

While I claimed in section two that there were many institutional factors working to close off political opportunities, the first observation to be made by looking at the record of activism that did occur is that the threat of repression was real and disproportionate. The RCC acted decisively to put down unrest where it occurred and this discouraged the spread of activism. Widespread arrests and executions became rarer under Sadat and Mubarak. Yet when activism began to look like a serious challenge to the status quo the regime did resort to mass arrests, as with the student activism of the 1980s, or violent repression by police and hired thugs as with the 2011 revolution.

Researchers on nonviolent activism have noted the operation of a mechanism in repressive contexts whereby violent policing of protests can actually diffuse the protest rather than contain it as police brutality can persuade non-aligned, undecided or scared observers to join a protest in solidarity. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) call the mechanism 'backfire' and Sharp (1973) calls it 'political jiu-jitsu', labels that respectively emphasise how the regime's mistakes can be fatal and how activists can take advantage of the regime's weaknesses. This mechanism does not seem to have functioned in Egypt, with the possible exception of during the 2011 revolution.[98] Contrary, long periods of Egyptian political history contain no reference to any popular engagement. It seems safe to say that the threat of repression further reduced the opportunities for activism in Egypt.

When activism did occur it was almost always in a context of relative political instability. The FO coup itself inspired activism as workers in Kafr Al-Dawr took advantage of the political instability in a (failed) attempt to enlist the support of the new regime.[99] Following that event protest remained uncommon, partly due to the channelling of political opportunities

[98] Furthermore I am reluctant to base an argument on such a 'more or less' style observation regarding attendance at protests. While political scientists do make these arguments, and journalists and historians frequently do claim to know the attendance figures at protests (they are usually suspiciously round numbers), it is impossible to measure attendance at protests of any significance. We know a lot about these events, but there was nobody with a clipboard counting heads at any of these events. It is therefore unfounded conjecture to argue that protests grew after repression.

[99] Vatikiotis described the context of the FO coup as such: "In short, the conditions associated with rebellion, if not revolution, were propitious: rapid change, a demographic explosion and the movement of masses of people from the country to the towns, all of them suffering the hardships of economic privation. All of this was grist to the conspirators' mill" (Vatikiotis, 1978: 115).

through institutions such as the LR and NU and partly due to the threat of repression, until 1968 when Egypt, along with a coalition of Arab allies, suffered defeat in war against Israel.[100] This defeat was a set back for the military regime and led to a period of intense activism, by Egyptian standards. Vatikiotis described the reasoning of protesters as "'We accept the regime did not do much for us, but being a military one, it could at least have given a good account of itself in the war against Israel.'" (Vatikiotis, 1978: 185). Wickham concurs with this analysis noting that the military character of the regime made it particularly susceptible to challenge at this juncture. "The reappearance of opposition activism thus occurred during a serious political crisis, in which not only the officers but in a sense, the regime itself was on trial" (Wickham, 2002: 33). War defeat is often perceived by activists as an opportunity for direct action, as the regime has spent many of its resources and is demoralised (Skocpol, 1978). It is possible that the Egyptian government as a military regime was particularly weakened at this juncture. Nonetheless opportunities were so tightly restricted that activism did not challenge the regime, the only concessions activists managed to win in this period being narrow professional ones.

In the first decade of the 21st century activism did spread during a period of political stability. It seems in hindsight that this was a period in which activists negotiated space and norms for activism with political authorities. Using the activists' demands as a benchmark it is possible to argue that activism in this period was actually ineffective. Commentators often argue that campaigns such as Kefaya were ineffective because they failed to achieve their goals; democratisation, preventing political succession. Relative to earlier periods of activism it is true that the activism of the early 21st century was more openly political but in consequence it was unable to extract meaningful concessions from the regime as students and workers managed in earlier periods.

Clearly the most salient episode of contention in this period was the 2011 revolution which by any measure must be considered efficacious activism. It is true that the revolution has

[100] In fact, the only major protest event recorded between 1952 and 1968 was in 1954, this being the year that Nasser managed to outmanoeuvre his main rival Naguib who had been prime minister. It is therefore legitimate to categorise this event as within a context of political instability. However, the protest at Cairo university was unrelated to that power struggle, correlation is not causation.

been set back by counter-revolution but that is not the protesters' fault. Protestors in 2011 secured the resignation of the president, this is nothing if not a spectacular example of the power of protest. But importantly for the sake of the argument put forward here, this most efficacious protest event of the 21st century took place in a period of heightened political instability as the Arab Spring unfolded. Mubarak's resignation came months after similar protests had forced the president of neighbouring Tunisia to flee to Saudi Arabia.

4.3.4 Summary: Political Opportunity Structure in Egypt

Although this section has demonstrated that Egypt does have a history of activism it would be in error to mistake this as proof that the Egyptian political opportunity structure is open for activism. In 1952 the Egyptian military seized control of government and effectively consolidated executive control within two years. Since then Egypt has had five presidents only one of whom was not a military man (who was, incidentally, deposed within a year of taking office by the military). In practice the military has monopolised political opportunities in Egypt for more than a half of a century leaving progression through the military hierarchy as the only route to political success.

Throughout their tenure the military created a number of structures to facilitate political participation. Nasser experimented with three institutions for enabling political claim making. The LR, NU and ASU were mass membership political parties that organised demonstrations and allowed members a forum for seeking political redress. Yet even these institutions could not be considered meaningful power centres within the Egyptian political system for two reasons. The first is that the military retained the top positions within the institutions and full control over setting the policy agenda. The second is that when activists managed to appropriate these institutions as a means for making their political claims heard in a way the regime was forced to respond to, as happened in 1954, the regime responded by reconfiguring the structure of the institutions to prevent future contention.

From the 1980s onward the political system underwent something of a transformation as these mass parties were replaced with multi-party elections to parliament. Again, the functioning of these new ostensibly democratic institutions in the Egyptian context did nothing

to expand access to political opportunities. By restricting and vetting potential candidates, petty corruption manifested in vote-buying and ultimately in rigging elections the military ensured that elections could not pose any challenge to their rule. In fact, as Blaydes (2010) has argued, the institution of elections actually secured the regime's position by distributing the spoils of dictatorship to business elites, thereby giving them a stake in the regime and removing any incentive they may have had to support democratic reforms. In short, the Egyptian political opportunity structure is and has been closed to activists for a very long time. This system stands in stark contrast to the political context Egyptian activists moving to England found.

4.4. The English Political System

In this section I describe the structure of political opportunities available to exiled activists in England. I argue that England is a nation without the trappings of statehood, and crucially, contains a unique structure of political opportunities.

4.4.1 England within the UK

England is the largest country of the United Kingdom (UK). The UK is a political and monetary union of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, four jurisdictions with a central parliament and common currency. Two of these countries, Wales and Scotland, and the one region, Northern Ireland, are governed by devolved parliaments with powers over domestic legislation and some fiscal policy. England has no parliament and is instead governed directly by the UK parliament at Westminster.

The three peripheral jurisdictions of the UK are represented within UK government at the executive level by national secretaries of state who commonly attend cabinet meetings (Torrance, 2006). It is possible to describe these offices as anachronisms as they pre-date devolution and to some extent overlap in responsibilities with contemporary devolved executives. Historically their role has been as the highest elected office in the relevant region, sometimes described as 'local prime ministers' (Kellas, 1979). Since the New Labour government of the 1990s Wales and Scotland have had devolved parliaments controlled by proportionally elected governments. Northern Ireland has had a separately elected parliament at Stormont since 1920 (apart from 1973-2000). In all three devolved parliaments the highest

elected office is that of First Minister (or in Northern Ireland, First Minister and Deputy First Minister) who is the leader of the regional government (Lynch, 2009).[101] Voters in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland vote in general elections to their national parliaments and to the UK parliament.

There has been no government of England since the 1707 Act of Union pooled English and Scottish parliamentary sovereignty in the UK parliament. In England the highest political office is that of the UK Prime Minister. No equivalent for either secretary of state or First Minister exist at the present time, although some cities have Mayors. Despite differences in the functioning of parliaments, party and electoral systems (discussed below) the offices of Prime Minister and First Minister have remarkably similar functions and remits. Each are appointed from within parliament by the Queen, are responsible for appointing their own ministers and governments and for developing legislation (Lynch, 2009) (Northern Ireland's power-sharing arrangement has a slightly different structure.).

The devolved parliaments operate varying systems of proportional representation. The outlier is the Northern Irish system of power sharing that guarantees coalition government as a condition of the Good Friday Agreement that ended conflict in the region. The Welsh and Scottish parliaments operate a twin balloted additional member system whereby some seats are allocated according to regional majorities, and deficiencies in the proportionality of this outcome are rectified by a second vote that allocates seats to parties according to their overall vote share in electoral districts. The UK parliament is elected by the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system in which seats are allocated by simple majorities, and the government is formed by the party with most seats. Proportional representation in the peripheral parliaments has allowed greater representation for smaller parties in every case, however the diversity of the peripheral

[101] These organisations were known initially as 'executives' rather than 'governments'. When the Nationalist party won control of the Scottish parliament in 2007 they effectively enforced the change in title *de facto*, for reasons of prestige, by altering the wording of letterheads, official signs and other symbols. Although this change was initially met with hostility in Westminster and in UK press it gradually passed into political discourse. The new title of 'Scottish Government' passed into official use when it was used to sign the Edinburgh Agreement in 2012 between the Scottish and UK governments, the legislation that transferred authority to hold an independence referendum to the Scottish parliament. Subsequently the Welsh executive is increasingly described as a government.

party systems is also partly due to the presence of regional parties such as the SNP in Scotland and Plaid Cymru in Wales. Northern Ireland has a unique party system with no representation from the major UK parties (Labour and Conservative) although a fringe UK party, UKIP, did have one seat in Stormont.[102]

The UK parliament is generally considered a classic case of a two party system (Sartori, 1976). FPTP tends to produce government by majority by excluding smaller parties, making coalition governments extremely rare. More or less government alternates between two major parties representing opposing mainstream ideologies. The left wing of UK politics is represented by the Labour Party. Labour were traditionally a socialist party with close links to trade unions however since the 1990s their ideology is more commonly described as social democratic. Of the two main Westminster parties Labour has the best claim to represent the UK as a whole. It has held government in both the Scottish and Welsh parliaments and has tended to build governments in Westminster on seats outside of England more than the Conservatives.[103] The right wing of UK politics is represented by the Conservative Party. It is possible to characterise the ideology of the Conservative Party in many ways, but in strict political science terms they are centre-right, moral conservatives and economic liberals.[104] Unlike the Labour Party, although the Conservatives position themselves as the party of the Union, in electoral terms it is legitimate to characterise the Conservatives as an English party. Since the 1950s they have not depended on votes from outside of England to form a government and have never formed a government in any of the devolved parliaments.

[102] Two other parties represented at Stormont are affiliated to UK parties, SDLP (with the Labour party) and the Green party (with the UK Green party).

[103] It has been alleged that in Westminster Labour have been 'dependent' on constituencies from outside of England to form governments. This is untrue. There have been twenty general elections since the second world war, nine of which produced a Labour government (counting the 1974 government twice due to the vote of no confidence and dissolution of parliament that year). In only three of those elections (1964, the second 1974 election and 2010) did Labour fail to gain enough votes in England alone to form a government. That means that most of the time, 6 elections out of 9, Labour could have formed the government with only English votes.

[104] Many readers would debate my characterisation of both Labour and Conservative ideology. Ideologies are difficult to distill to a label that is meaningful. There are many points of consensus between the two parties. Both are constitutional unionists and in economics support the expansion of the free market. Another valid way of characterising the cleavage in UK politics is with the Labour party advocating collectivist values and the Conservatives advocating individualist values, however both are close to the centre and in practice often share policies as they compete for a small number of voters they identify as 'swing voters'.



FIGURE ONE. NATIONAL IDENTITY IN ENGLAND. SOURCE: ONS.

4.4.2 National Identity

England has a distinct set of institutions, political traditions and cultural makers. For too long, in everyday discourse, England, the UK and Britain have been used as essentially synonymous. This has led to the existence of UK institutions with the word 'England' in the title. For example the Bank of England is in name an English institution but in practice the UK central bank. Nonetheless there are institutions with remit in England.

Perhaps most importantly, from an activist's perspective, England has its own courts and a corresponding tradition of legislation and criminal justice. Consequently policing in England is independent of policing elsewhere in the UK, although England has regional police forces rather than a centralised national force. These factors are particularly salient in the context of political opportunities as della Porta (2008) has argued that police and justice systems are often the first, and sometimes last, point of contact between activists and the state. Generally police in England maintain good relations with activists although there have been controversies in recent years regarding covert surveillance of the environmentalist movement and the use of crowd control methods such as 'kettling' whereby police cordon off protests, a tactic that could inadvertently cause casualties (Bonino and Kaoullas, 2015).

Cultural markers of England as a national unit include the Church of England and the English national football team. In administrative terms other institutions function as essentially

English. The fluidity of the signifier 'national' (in British political discourse) is clear in the name of the National Health Service (NHS). In England and Scotland the public health service has the same name, but is in fact two independent organisations that cooperate across the border.

Census data and subsequent opinion polling overwhelmingly support the argument that England is a country with a strong sense of self, which is perhaps counter-intuitive given that 'England' as a signifier is largely absent from official discourse. At the last census in 2011 67.1% of the population of England stated that they define their national identity as primary English, not British.[105] When broken down by region this finding is replicated across the country without exception as demonstrated in figure one.

[105] If anything the salience of the national question in the UK has only increased since 2011 as in 2014 Scotland held a referendum on independence forcing the entire UK to reflect. This makes polling data, less reliable than census data, pertinent. IPSOS MORI in 2012 found that 72% of people living in England feel strongly attached to England. This observation is relevant but not directly comparable as the question is about attachment rather than identity and also the data is not disaggregated to allow comparison within England (IPSOS MORI, 2012).

TABLE FIVE. CHRONOLOGY OF CONTENTION IN EXILE

Date	Location	Description	Participating SMOs
August 2013	Downing Street, London	Protest at Sisi's visit	ESI, RSE, MB, E4D, R4B1A
circa 2014 (ongoing)	Egyptian Embassy, London	Muslim Brotherhood March and Rally	MB, R4B1A, MAB
February 2014	SOAS, London	Conference: The Arab Uprisings Four Years On	ESI, RSE, AI
March 2014	London	"The Square" to be screened at London's Human Rights Watch Film Festival	ESI, AI
May 2014	SOAS, London	Resistance, revolution, repression – a workshop organised by Egypt Solidarity	ESI, RSE
June 2014	BBC, Manchester	Demonstration in support of detained journalists	NUJ
July 2014	SOAS, London	Egypt under military rule: Resisting the generals' crackdown: How international solidarity makes a difference	ESI
August 2014	London	Hunger Strikes	ESI
November 2014	Embankment, London	Protest rally – 22nd November make your voice heard against repression in Egypt	ESI
	SOAS, London	MB protest at SOAS	MB
June 2015	London	Day of Solidarity	ESI
August 2015	Trafalgar Square, London	#RememberRabaa	MB, E4D, R4B1A
February 2016	London, Cambridge	Justice for Giulio	ESI, AI

4.4.3 Conditions for Activism in England: Availability of Allies within Political Stability

Table five is a parallel to Table four describing activism by Egyptian exiles in England in the years following the military takeover. The observations in this table are derived from systematic newspaper searches and corroborated and augmented by interviews. As with in the first part of this chapter, the discussion here is limited to the causes of this activism, which will be described

fully in the next chapter. Whereas in Egypt activism was high-risk in character and was born of political instability the situation in England is quite the opposite. The most frequent form of contention observed were the MB organised rallies starting with a march from Marble Arch to the Egyptian embassy where activists chant and give speeches through megaphones to each other and to the closed windows of the Embassy. The regularity of these events, more or less once a month, is a part of routine contention that is only possible in politically stable polities.[106]

Unlike in Egypt repression is not a part of the English political opportunity structure. Of the protest events observed only the protests surrounding Sisi's state visit resulted in any arrests. Yet despite the lack of objective obstacles in the form of closed opportunities there are just as many events led by domestic English actors sympathetic to the Egyptian cause as by exiles themselves. This suggests that the crucial aspect of the English political opportunity structure is the availability of influential allies. In the following chapter I will describe examples of this linked to the discussion of the mechanism brokerage; groups including the Socialist Workers Party and British Communist Party step in to mobilise Egyptians, or on their behalf, while members of parliament liaise with Amnesty International and others to represent the claims of Egyptian constituents. The significance of this cannot be understated. This structural role of allies to the movement carries a causal force suggestive that opportunities for activism are not simply *available* in England but are in a sense structurally *encouraged*. The English political opportunity structure has a 'push' factor in the availability of allies that motivates political participation; in this sense it is meaningful to describe the English system as democratic.

4.4.4 Summary: Political Opportunity Structure in England

This section has considered the structure of political opportunities in England relative to those elsewhere in the UK. I have argued that England is a nation without the trappings of statehood. I have tried to demonstrate this by describing the political system that operates in England in all but name. I will suggest in this summary that this structure can be interpreted as a unique

[106] That these events pass off regularly without animosity or violence is an indication of a process well known in macro-historical accounts of activism. In democracies activists and authorities have over long stretches of history found ways and motives to work together to establish safe spaces for contention (Tilly, 2004). From informal discussions with police officers on site at the Egyptian embassy I know that protesters and police are on good terms, often on first name terms, and police are well aware of the protesters' schedules. Throughout my fieldwork police officers stationed at the embassy were able to help me locate activists I'd heard of by reputation.

English political opportunity structure, although I have hinted at this in the preceding paragraphs. I will fully elucidate this argument through systematic comparison with Egyptian opportunities in section 6 below.

England is governed directly by representatives in the UK parliament, at the executive level by the Prime Minister, cabinet and UK government ministries.[107] Parliament legislates on specifically English domestic issues such as health and policing. This legislation is administered by local government and enforced by English police forces. England also has direct representation in the EU parliament in which members are elected to represent one of nine English regions.

In domestic matters there is a clear structure to the political process that is self contained within England; it is no stretch to describe this as a 'political system'. While the system has shortcomings, i.e. no national parliament, disproportionate election outcomes, it is nonetheless basically democratic, particularly so when compared to Egypt. England has universal suffrage amongst law abiding adult citizens, and regardless of citizenship, all legal residents have a representative in parliament they can seek out for redress if needed. The translation of these factors into structured opportunities for activism will be discussed further in section 6. Nonetheless it is clear the structure can be characterised as 'open' as it is democratic.

4.5. Decertification (Part One): A Mechanism Linking Context and Exile

Before going on to delineate the structures of opportunity observed, which I will do in section 6, consider first the variation in activism within Egypt. I argue in this section that this information constitutes data evidencing the operation of the mechanism *decertification* which begins the process of exile. In contentious politics decertification has been defined "as an external authority's signal that it is withdrawing recognition and support from a political actor*"* (McAdam et al, 2011: 121).[108]

[107] Henceforth I will use the phrase 'English MPs' by which I hope to convey the above civic meaning rather than any ethnic interpretation which would be inaccurate.

[108] Tilly's research has found that *certification* and *decertification* are mechanisms that operate in a wide range of cases with variation in outcomes. In some cases where external authorities initiate the mechanism rather than domestic governments this can lead to political violence. In other cases, more similar to the Egyptian case, where

It is, by definition, related to a set of political variables. As the mechanism is commenced by the decision of authorities it therefore relies on institutional factors as independent variable. Its intermediate effects involve both discursive and non-discursive aspects of activism. Symbolically its altering of political status for actors implies it affects identities. Simultaneously, depending on context, this can have implications for material factors such as mobilisation structures as we have already seen in varying activism repertoires. I will argue that in the long-term *decertification* set in motion the process of exile.

In Egypt *decertification* of activism began in the 1950s when the new regime was first confronted with political claim making. When striking workers at Kafr Al-Dawr chose to frame their claims as political rather than as a straightforward workplace dispute they drew the government into contention. The government's response of 549 arrests plus executions was wholly disproportionate and sent out the clearest signal about how it viewed direct action. This repression demonstrated that the regime had decided not to view activism as a legitimate means of engaging with the political system. What little activism did occur in the aftermath of Kafr Al-Dawr was met with equally disproportionate repression.

However, whether motivated by sincere political vision or by the desire to contain political competition the RCC worked on developing less contentious means for Egyptian citizens to seek political redress. Under Nasser's government a succession of three institutions, effectively mass political parties, were created with slight differences in their operational procedures. These institutions, the LR, NU and ASU all reflected a corporatist view of political engagement. They amalgamated trade unions, agricultural cooperatives and other professional associations as a means of restricting popular political participation to bread and butter issues, all under the close supervision of the Egyptian military who retained the senior positions within these organisations. The Egyptian political scientist Binder captured the extent to which these institutions depoliticised engagement when he noted:

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national governments initiate the process *decertification* can effectively shut down political challenge from social movements. Gentile's ethnographic and archival research has identified contractual blockages in *certification* which have prevented European trade unions from coalition building (Gentile, 2016).

> Withal, it must be remembered that the major basis for political life in Egypt today may be characterised as being administrative or bureaucratic in nature. In place of the political news of yesteryear, the newspapers are now full of new directives, new reports, new announcements, new public relations presentations made by the various ministries, organizations, and economic agencies of the government. According to the press nothing really significant goes on in Egypt which is not the result of government action. The only other kind of news carried may be an occasional human interest story or the report of a sensational crime or murder (Binder, 1969: 401).

However, the one party model was a poor fit for Egypt as factions representing different interests developed within these institutions, despite army oversight. In Sadat's term as president, as part of a broader 'liberalisation' characterised by his 'open door' policy Sadat permitted the establishment of competing political parties, one on the left, and one on the right. Despite his predecessor's socialism Sadat, in the context of the end of the cold war, appropriated the ASU to be the economically liberal party of government which would under Mubarak be renamed as the NDP, the National Democratic Party.

The electoral system developed to an impressive degree of sophistication over this period. Although parties did compete for votes, the ASU first, and later the NDP, used a number of methods to retain control of the parliament. Restrictions, including a *de facto* income threshold (the cost of vote buying), were placed on the right to stand for office. These restrictions ensured that elected offices were monopolised in the hands of the wealthy business and agricultural elite. Elections were open vote-buying markets where candidates and their staff competed outside polling stations to purchase votes, in return for cash, favours or goods rather than for policies. As a safeguard however opposition party candidates regularly defected to the NDP on the day after the election in order that the military retained control of parliament.

The regime's willingness to repress activism combined with the institutional pathways they opened for seeking political redress to massively dampen the frequency of Egyptian activism throughout the twentieth century. These factors coalesced to modify the identities of activists in Egypt as illegitimate actors on the political scene. Wickham put it like this:

> A close examination of the Nasser era reveals that through a preemptive strategy combining repression, redistribution, and resocialization, authoritarian leaders can diminish the prospects for mobilization to the point that it hardly occurs at all. (Wickham, 2002: 21).

This identity modification was mostly successful in containing activism to within the limits acceptable to the government as marches and demonstrations were effectively unknown under

Nasser and under Sadat only took place under the auspices of the NU or ASU. When Mubarak took office the deterrent effects of repression were so effective that the only protests for many years were either pro-government or were waged against external injustices such as the US invasion of Iraq or Danish publications that were offensive to Islam. I argue that these factors demonstrate that the coup of 1952 was a critical juncture in Egyptian history that began a process of *decertification* whereby the Egyptian authorities starved Egyptian activists of access to political legitimacy.

4.6. Political Opportunity Structures in Egypt and England

I have so far suggested that the structure of political opportunities in Egypt is monopolised by the military who have used institutions to prevent episodes of contentious politics and to create alliances with economic elites. I have also suggested that the structure of political opportunities in England is more open to activism. In order to better understand how the various political opportunity structures explain the absence of activism in Egypt and beginnings of more sustained campaigns of activism in England it is helpful to compare the two structures analytically.

In chapter one on social movement theory I discussed della Porta's method of measuring activist-police interactions as a gauge of the receptiveness of political opportunity structure to challengers. Repression has been used by the Egyptian regime as random, unpredictable but in every case excessive (or thorough depending on your point of view). This has been true of every period of Egyptian dictatorship. In 1952 at one event in Kafr al-Dawr 549 were arrested (Cook, 2012: 49; *Townsville Daily Bulletin*, 16 August 1952: 1; *The Advertiser*, 16 August, 1952: 1; Beinin and Lockman, 1988: 421-423; Vatikiotis, 1978: 134; Vatikiotis, 1980: 134,188 Bianchi, 1989: 78). In 1968 during student protests in Cairo 635 were arrested and 223 injured.[109] At another student protest in 1972 a further 224 arrests were made, 61 protesters injured and even 77 officially confirmed deaths.[110] Repression does not vary with performance type, the likelihood of arrest by Egyptian authorities has little to do with an

[109] (Middle East Record, (vol. 4) p. 786 Abdalla, 1985: 150, 154)
[110] (Abdalla, 1985: 179 - 183; Waterbury, p. 355)

activist's actual involvement in contention.[111] It is deployed indiscriminately to terrorise and deter activism. The situation in England is the opposite, only in one case were there any arrests and there have never been casualties or deaths related to activism within the exile community. On the simple measure of repression it is a straightforward matter to categorise the Egyptian political opportunity structure as 'closed' and the English as 'open'.

Another useful vignette through which to compare the two is regime type. In this I am uninterested in hyphenating adjectives in order to describe the regimes in all their specificity, interesting a task though that is. Equally I cannot categorise the regimes within a definitive typology as the possibilities are too expansive. The evidence compiled so far in the chapter is sufficient to categorise the two regimes along two continuums in a way that helps describe the causality of activism. The first is 'level of democracy' and the second is 'governmental capacity'. Governmental capacity in this sense refers to the government's ability to interfere within society, in manners such as raising taxes, distributing wealth and benefits, controlling movements of population and traffic, and see a result. Democracy here is meant in its broadest sense encapsulating, but not limited to, levels and forms of equality, popular influence direct and otherwise over governmental decisions and outcomes, rights and freedoms including to expression and organisation. The resulting regime types are crude and there is great variation within type.

It is helpful to locate regimes within such broad categories which reveal coincidences between regimes and particular forms of contention. Low-capacity undemocratic regimes hold a near monopoly on civil war (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Kalyvas, 2006). Low-capacity democracies are host to a notable proportion of the world's coups and linguistic, religious and ethnic struggles (Tarrow and Tilly, 2012). Social movement forms grew up in and are at home in high-capacity democracies (Tilly, 2008).

In Egypt the highly stratified polity is fairly lucrative for some of its members. Power is asymmetrically aligned in favour of those insiders, employees, supporters and friends of the

[111] Although not detailed here the current Egyptian military regime has returned to this form of repression.

regime. Those few challengers are forced to mount their opposition as outsiders or at least to operate clandestinely. The Egyptian regime can be roughly located within the upper left hand corner of the hypothetical regime types quadrant: High-capacity undemocratic. The government has not changed hands since the 1950s with the brief exception of the period after the 2011 revolution. It has faced little challenge at home or abroad. Moreover, if that challenge ever did arise the regime has demonstrated repeatedly it has no issue repressing challengers. These regimes are the least favourable to contention. Whether resistance is clandestine or overt it is rarely met with anything other than repression.

On all six of the properties of political opportunity structure discussed in the first chapter Egypt can be categorised as a closed system. There is only one power centre in Egypt, the military, and due to the military's financial independence it is not bound either by law or by any sense of duty to anything other than its own corporate aims. It is possible to argue that the Egyptian political system in the Mubarak years has shown some openness to new actors as it tolerated the reformation of the Wafd and the MB as political parties, however the regime strictly monitored their application for political party status and made sure that even within parliament they never had any access to decision making powers. While there have been moments of political instability that protesters did take advantage of it is unrealistic to argue that a 70 year old military dictatorship is in anyway 'unstable'. Again, as the events of 1954 demonstrate, there were occasions in which activists managed to appropriate the institutions of dictatorship as allies for their contention, however, as with most contention the regime responded with wildly disproportionate repression and in consequence reformed the LR to prevent further contentious politics. Crucially this degree of repression reveals how the political opportunity structure in Egypt is firmly closed to activists. The record of contention described in this chapter is testament to Egyptian activists' ability to construct their own opportunities, rather than to take advantage of any that were structurally available.

The English political opportunity structure is in most respects the exact opposite of the Egyptian structure. However, returning to the vignette of regime type it is clear that there is one important similarity between the two and one crucial difference. Whereas it was fairly

straightforward to classify Egypt as high-capacity undemocratic, England is clearly high-capacity democratic. So the two regimes share, if nothing else, an advanced state apparatus. More important than that, from the activists' perspective, is that where as Egypt is a military dictatorship, England is democracy that permits its citizens and residents freedom to participate in the political process. As noted earlier, high-capacity democracies are the regime type that historically has hosted more social movement activity than any other.[112]

In England, the division of executive and legislative power between government, parliament and the courts ensures that at any time there are several competing centres of political power. Observers argue over whether cabinet or the Prime Minister holds greater power and in fact the answer may vary historically. There are a number of ways to conceptualise the range of actors in the English political scene, but regardless of which way it is viewed, it is hard to argue that the system is in any way closed to new actors. As one of the oldest democracies in the world the English political system is inherently stable and if the UK as a unit were to be considered as a whole it could be described as resilient because it has survived recent challenges such as Irish nationalism, the Scottish independence referendum, the rise of the far-right and has witnessed a third party enter coalition government and more recently the decision by referendum to exit the European Union thoroughly transforming the legal, economic and political context of the state. In England there is a well established procedure for engaging with the political system, every resident has access to an elected representative who can be sought out for redress. It would be inaccurate to suggest that protest is systematically repressed in England especially by comparison to genuine dictatorships such as the Egyptian model.

4.7. Conclusion

The evidence here suggests that activism in Egypt in the last half century has two main historical causes, political instability and the availability of influential allies. Both of these are

[112] In fact most of what researchers know about social movements comes from studies of activism in democracies. This correlation between democracy and social movements led Tilly to speculate that either social movements are a cause of democratisation, or that democracy causes activism, or that social movements may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the operation of democracies (Tilly, 2008).

factors of a political opportunity structure and both are structural in character, they are beyond the direct control of the government. However, as in 1954 when activists did appropriate the LR for their cause the Egyptian government took the initiative to close down that particular opportunity. The main cause of obedience, or non-activism, the evidence here has highlighted has been repression.

I have suggested that the lack of activism since the establishment of military dictatorship in Egypt can be explained by the mechanism *decertification*. Firstly with repression, but then through institutional means, the Egyptian regime set about stripping activism of political legitimacy in Egypt. Partly through fear, and partly by redirecting political claim making the regime encouraged Egyptians to view activism as deviant, and then to reduce the options available to would-be activists. This process began to reverse to some extent in the Mubarak period, but in the aftermath of the 2013 coup it seems to have returned. I will argue in the coming chapters that this process was the first mechanism in the overall process of exile.

By comparison with Egypt the political opportunity structure in England can be categorised as ‘open’. While the country has little in the way of formal political institutions with a remit restricted solely to England, as part of the United Kingdom, the institutions in place as well as the practices established in society offer a range of opportunities activists can take advantage of. This is not surprising given that as part of the UK England is a mature democracy, but this in itself contributes to the range of opportunities available within the framework I have outlined in this thesis, the hallmark of the English political opportunity structure is stability.

Chapter Five
Social Movement Organisation in Egypt and England

I was a disruptive child, they tell me. Disruptive at school and at the dinner table. I've no shame in disrupting state and family institutions. But my parents are disruptive too. In their move from Egypt, in their staying away, they are resisting the country's cultural and political oppression. By staying in Exeter, quietly asserting their presence, living next door to people who want them out, they are disrupting, resisting the everyday racism of Britain and challenging its self-image as a tolerant society.

— Nadine El-Enany, *A Response to Subversive Property*

5.1. Introduction

Activism in English exile is different from activism in Egypt. This is true demographically. Most activists involved in the exile movement belong to professions and/or have postgraduate educations. This is markedly different from the situation in Egypt where the pro-democracy movement has always been bound up with the workers movement (Beinin and Lockman, 1988; Alexander, 2012). It is also true at an organisational level. Many of the activists on the English scene are veterans of Egyptian organisations such as Kefaya or the April 6th movement yet, with the (qualified) exception of the Muslim Brothers, have found new banners under which to march in exile. This is further evident through comparison of the methods of protest observed. While industrial action, strikes, sometimes sabotage were not unusual in Egypt they were absent from the range of performances in England. In their place alternative forms of expression have come to predominate, more common in the repertoires of activists in democracies.

In this chapter I describe mobilising structures in Egypt and in England.[113] Mobilising structures at a basic level consist of activism networks, the main unit of organisation being the social movement organisation (SMO). The mobilising structure is, however, more than just the aggregation of individuals and organisations. It is also their actions, which I describe and compare through the lens of the contentious repertoire. I posit two mechanisms to account for the particularities of exiled activism; decertification and brokerage. The research presented here

[113] In the previous chapter I placed greater descriptive stress on the Egyptian case than the English case. That was appropriate for an account of political opportunity structures as the institutions of politics in England are democratic, stable and well known. In this chapter the burden of description is reversed so that more words are devoted to the English case. Egyptian activism is well documented as attested to by the citations I provide in this chapter. The novel contribution I make in this chapter is an account of activism by Egyptian exiles in England.

continues my argument from the previous chapter, that activism had been decertified as a form of political participation in the broad sweep of Egyptian history. Here is a preview of the argument I make in this chapter. In England decertification continues to function as an endogenous part of the exile process prohibiting mobilisation from abroad. However the presence of allies on the English activism scene is an exogenous counter balance. English activists can and do act as political entrepreneurs who establish and nurture connections between previously unconnected groups.

My descriptive aims in this chapter are to summarise and analyse the organisations and events that make up relevant mobilising structures in Egypt and England. This chapter tells the story of Egyptian activism before and after exile. My explanatory aims in this chapter are to account for the mechanisms by which mobilisation changed throughout the exile process. I present the information more or less chronologically. Section two describes the contentious history of activism before exile. This is a story of industrial strife and democratic agitation culminating in the 2011 revolution and 2013 counter-revolution, or military takeover. Section three gives a more detailed treatment of activism in exile. I begin by examining the networks of activism manifest through the SMOs activist affiliate with. In section 3.5 I deepen the analysis by examining cooperation between different SMOs and comparing the repertoire of exile with the pre-exile repertoire. This comparison suggests the new context and allies radically transformed the exile repertoire. Sections four and five develop the explanation for this variance, particularly focusing on the interplay of decertification and brokerage which respectively inhibit and encourage mobilisation.

5.2. Overview of Egyptian Activism

Table two (previous chapter) lists the most salient episodes of contention in Egypt since the FO coup. These episodes are the tip of the iceberg of Egyptian contention for a host of reasons.[114] Nonetheless, they are the ones that give the best indication of the overall character of the

[114] Only a tiny fraction of protest events are reported in newspapers. Police keep only marginally more detailed records. This section is based largely on secondary sources, in particular history books, as these texts identify the most salient episodes of contention and provide reasonable interpretations of their causality. Corroborations were sought in the press and in several databases of nonviolent action such as the GNAD. For the account of the revolution numerous sources were used including transcripts of eyewitness interviews by researchers at AUC.

activism that was efficacious in Egypt as they are the ones the regime could not manage to conceal.

As could be expected, most protests were based in Cairo, the most populous Egyptian city and the seat of power. Yet there is also a tradition of protest in other major cities and particularly in industrial areas on the outskirts of large cities. The arc of history appears to be that increasingly since the FO coup contention has migrated from the industrial periphery to the centre of Cairo. This has much to do with the growth of financial and service industries at the expense of manufacturing that took place from the 1980s onwards (Amin, 2001: 32; Issawi, 1963: 118; 56). Indeed this observation is borne out by the detail of Egyptian contention and tells us something about its causes and character.

Following the FO coup the first social group to voice their political claims were textile workers in the industrial town Kafr Al-Dawr. Their protest was a straightforward industrial dispute with their private sector employers over pay and conditions that was not necessarily a matter of contentious politics.[115] However, the workers shrewdly took advantage of political instability caused by the FO coup to frame their claims as politically motivated. Although their declarations of loyalty to the new regime may have helped convince management (well known supporters of the monarchy that was replaced by the FO) to make concessions the response of the state made the new regime's approach to activism clear. Five-hundred and forty-nine strikers were arrested with three leaders sentenced to death (one received a reduced life sentence).

The disproportionate response by the military regime sent the clearest signal possible regarding their view of activism.[116] This message was heeded by the largest organised opposition in the country, the Muslim Brotherhood, who publicly condemned the strikes. Until

[115] Strictly speaking contentious politics are interactions involving state actors.

[116] It should be noted that this response to industrial action did cause divisions within the RCC with moderates privately opposing the government crackdown. The 'left wing' of the RCC, comprised of Khaled Moheiddin and Yusuf Sidiq, opposed the executions and even supported the strikers aims. Nasser and his supporters however viewed the event as a security threat and the left's support of it as a continuation of the threat. Nasser moved against his colleagues. He had them black listed from the media, had their publications banned and eventually forced their resignation (Vatikiotis, 1978: 134). Furthermore Nasser saw the opportunity to isolate any threat to his own power from the broader left. Between August and July he had thirty known and suspected communists arrested and charged with treason (Vatikiotis, 1978: 134; Vatikiotis, 1980: 377).

the 2011 revolution the MB for the most part restricted their activities to preaching and philanthropy, undoubtedly partly in fear of repression (Wickham, 2008). In fact the threat of repression was always more reality than perception in the Nasser years. In 1954 a march (organised by the government) that got out of hand resulted in the arrest of four-hundred and fifty MB youth and in 1968 protests by munitions workers and students resulted in more than six-hundred arrests.[117] This period of excessive repression had such a deterrent effect later generations of Egyptian authorities only had to rely on the reputation Nasser had achieved for repression to discourage activism. Throughout the Sadat years arrests and military deployment at protests decreased. By the time of Mubarak's government the regime's reputation for brutality was so well known that the regime became complacent enough to allow explicitly anti-regime protests such as Kefaya pass off without arrests.[118]

While the earliest episodes of contention analysed here were industrial actions, the years from 1968 until 1976 were effectively years of student radicalism.[119] In particular the episodes of 1968 and 1972 have become known in the popular history of student activism as years of 'uprising'. This phase of activism was also initiated by perceptions of political instability when workers marched in protest against Egyptian defeat in the six day war between Israel and the Arab nations. In 1968 following workers protests at Helwan students at Cairo University formed a twelve man committee to coordinate and organise protests in solidarity with marching workers. This committee organised several contentious performances including

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[117] On January 12th 1954 The LR put on a bus to take secondary school students to the downtown campus of Cairo University. The students were expected to march and chant in commemoration of two martyrs of nationalist guerrilla fighting in the Suez canal zone in 1951 and 1952 (Cook, 2012: 53). Muslim Brotherhood students of the university were also at the commemoration.

Friction started between the two groups over conflicting chants. The Brothers chanted: "God is great… thanks to God". The Liberation Rally youth chanted: "God is great… dignity to Egypt". To the assembled the distinction was tantamount to ideological sacrilege. The chanting gave way to fist fighting between the Islamist and Nasserist youth. (Abdalla, 1985: 122; Erlich, 1989: 173; Vatikiotis, 1978: 139; Vatikiotis, 1980: 380,381).

Nasser saw in this episode the opportunity to finally break the power of his chief civilian rival; the Muslim Brotherhood. In response 450 brothers were arrested (Cook, 2012 :53; Vatikiotis, 1980: 381). Overnight the Muslim Brotherhood was declared a political party and dissolved (Abdulla, 1985: 122; Erlich, 1989: 173).

[118] Commentators have argued that this complacency spread to other fields such as literature and press freedom where open criticism of the regime became widespread throughout Mubarak's reign. This freedom of expression may have contributed to the 2011 uprising.

[119] There is a gap in the historical record of activism between 1954 and 1968. This gap has been commented on by historians. "In the following days students passed beyond the university gates and made their presence felt on the streets of Cairo and Alexandria for the first time since 1954." (Abdalla, 1985: 149,150). "The student riots and workers' demonstrations of February 1968, however, came as an unexpected blow to Nasser's recovery from the 1967 debacle. In magnitude and ferocity they were the first since 1954, indeed since 1952." (Vatikiotis, 1978: 185).

marches, sit-ins and static demonstrations. Members of the committee were allowed into the parliament to put their demands to Sadat who at the time was speaker of the house; they were later arrested. The committee also managed to coordinate, by telephone, simultaneous student marches in Cairo and Alexandria.

2.1 Activism in the 21st Century

Activism in Mubarak's era was more explicitly political.[120] When, in 2003, America invaded Iraq, protesters gathered in Cairo's central Tahrir Square (Sachs, 2003). The protests were not overtly subversive as their demands were anti-American, not anti-Mubarak. Yet they met with fast repression and dispersal, a job the police were ruthless in carrying out. Through criticism of American foreign policy Egyptian protesters were criticising their own government by association (Selim, 2012: 61-62).

Following the anti-war demonstrations Tahrir Square became a regular venue for protest (Interview 1, 4). The Egyptian public became accustomed to two relatively novel aspects of political expression and one well known aspect: public claim-making, organised protest and repression. The first to organise were 'Kefaya!': a group of pro-democracy activists whose name in Arabic means 'Enough!' (Osman, 2010: 112). Kefaya were primarily protesting censorship under the regime and merely asserted their claimed right to protest (Interview 6). Their more ambitious long term aim, however, was to prevent a Mubarak family succession and ensure the presidency did not fall to Hosni's son Gamal (Marfleet, 2016, 49). Their first protest was small. Protesters gathered in Tahrir square for a silent protest wearing yellow stickers on their mouth to symbolise the regime's censorship (El-Mahdi, 2009: 89; Khalil, 2012: 62). The protest was repressed (Naguib, 2011: 9; Oweidat *et al*, 2008: 11).

Yet Kefaya kept up agitation and from time to time staged protests (GNAD, 2005). Their method was innovative by Egyptian standards because they organised entirely online. The absence of a physical headquarters in their earliest days seems to have guarded against surveillance by a regime caught by surprise. Even after the activists disbanded the group left a

[120] The exception to this trend towards politicisation being protests surrounding the Danish publication of cartoons depicting images offensive to some Muslims (Sami, Al-Ahram, 2006).

legacy on Egyptian activism in the form of various blogs which served as an alternative press in the days before a regime to could dismiss citizen journalism as 'fake news' (Lim, 2012; 235-238).

One unintended side effect of Kefaya's primary existence online was to restrict activism to those with internet access, mainly the young middle class. A new group of activists led by Ahmed Maher tried to broaden the base of protest by calling a general strike on the 6th of April 2008. The strike led to two days of violent clashes between riot police and workers at Egypt's largest textile factory at the Nile delta (Khalil, 2012: 72,73). To commemorate the battle the group took the date April 6th as their name. The strike was intended to extend opposition to include both the youth and the industrial working class (Interview 1; Marfleet, 2016: 50). The movement was successful in this regard. In discussions exiles in England have stressed the ongoing motivational effects of the solidarity achieved between social classes during the April 6 campaign (interviews 1, 5, 6, 7). Observers such as Naguib and Marfleet (2016, 50) have argued the networks developed between activists and trade unions during this campaign mattered more to mobilisation in the 2011 revolution than the networks developed by Kefaya.

In addition to extending protest offline the April 6th Movement also extended it online. While Kefaya had been active in the blogosphere, using social media primarily as an alternative press, Maher found that social media, Facebook and Twitter, to be exceptional tools for communicating with activists and arranging and organising protest. The impact of April 6th is worth noting (Interview 6). At one year old in 2009 the group's Facebook page had seventy-thousand members. By 2009, however, online agitation was old news to the regime who had little trouble in locating, arresting and detaining one of the group's co-founders Esraa Abdel Fatah (Lim, 2012; 239-241).

Possibly the most famous organised dissent came from the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page. The page was created anonymously by Wael Ghonim a high ranking employee of internet search giant Google. It commemorated a particularly brutal act of police violence and campaigned for an end to such police brutality. Prior to the revolution Ghonim organised

various acts of protest both online and offline. The first act of resistance was symbolic. Ghonim asked his group's members to change their Facebook profile pictures in a display of solidarity with the victims of the police (Ghonim, 2102). Emboldened by the success of this protest, at the suggestion of one of the group's members, Ghonim organised a series of silent offline protests. The first protest took place in Alexandria along the banks of the Nile as police in Cairo preempted protesters there and refused to allow them to assemble. The protest in Alexandria was a success and was repeated successfully in both cities a further two times. In his memoir Ghonim describes the philosophy underpinning the style of protest.

> The most important comment was that the effort should not turn into a typical political demonstration, so I called it the Silent Stand, to make the name a clear reminder to all participants that they were not supposed to chant or wave placards or banners. Following a suggestion from one of the members, participants were asked to bring along a copy of the Qur'an or Bible to read in peace. We wanted to send out a clear message that although we were both sad and angry, we were nevertheless nonviolent. (Ghonim, 2012; 144,145)

5.2.2 Summary: The Transformation of Activism in Egypt

Table four (previous chapter) is a chronology of those protests and other episodes of Egyptian contention that have been recorded in the pages of history. The trends it suggests support the argument put forward in the previous chapter that as political opportunities in Egypt were monopolised by the regime, activism underwent a process of decertification. The historical record shows that not only was activism discouraged it was also physically contained. Whereas when Nasser took power in the 1950s contention had been geographically dispersed, with the industrial periphery at least as active as the centres of political and executive power in Cairo and Alexandria. This containment of activism is further evident in the Egyptian activism repertoire. At the beginning of the period surveyed protesters marched as they made their claims. Then, by the modern period when basically all activism had migrated to Cairo, the 'occupation' style protest came to dominate, almost as if the protests had come to a standstill. Today, even outside of Egypt, 'Tahrir' is often taken as a symbol of liberation and rebellion. Viewed through this historical lens it seems just as reasonable to think of it not as a liberated space but as one in which activists are cornered.

5.3. Activism in England

The Egyptian exile movement in England is composed mainly of young professionals, those who could afford to get out, but contains diversity within. There are researchers and students, as

we would expect given the demographic profile of the Arab Spring that has become common in political discourse, but also human rights workers, journalists, artists, filmmakers, novelists and musicians. Some are affiliated with activist organisations while others remain neutral. Despite ideological differences between groups, exiles meet from time to time on the Edgeware road in central London, a focal point where they congregate in shisha cafes and other Arab run businesses. Particularly around Ramadan and the anniversary of the 2011 revolution Egyptian exiles meet in such locations and in one another's homes (interview 7, 8, 9). Sometimes these meetings are a source of motivation in which activists entertain one another with the songs of revolution and reminisce about past victories (interview 8). Other times, activists are unable to do more than offer solace to one another as they collectively despair of the political reversals that have taken place and of their friends who are now missing, presumably in an Egyptian prison if they are alive at all (interview 1, 6).

Described in this way the exile community brings to mind revolutionary cells from various times in European history, but in fact, these are entirely modern people living in one of the world's most glamorous capital cities who work comfortably on MacBooks in air-conditioned offices or study with leading professors at the School of Oriental and African Studies and whose exposure to the public sphere is primarily on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. Egyptians in English exile are people out of place and out of time whose country and region have failed, stubbornly, to catch up with their democratic ambitions. London, and England, offer them the chance to lead the professional lives they seek. It also offers the promise of political freedom, as political opportunities are structured in such as way as to facilitate their political claim-making, even if some of them are only temporarily resident.

In London, as in Egypt, there is essentially a unified Islamist block and a divided left. It is not at all surprising that intra-movement cleavages in the diaspora should replicate those of the Egyptian opposition; their causes are the same. Yet before describing exile politics in more detail it is worth noting a key difference. The main Egyptian SMOs in the modern period, April 6 and Kefaya, do not have an organised presence in England. In their place are SMOs that have a legitimate claim to being specifically English Egyptian SMOs being either founded in or run

from England. Although there are activists who had roles in April 6 and Kefaya in London, some with an organisational brief, they do not continue to affiliate primarily with these groups and crucially do not mobilise in their name (Interviews, 1, 7, 8).

The main SMOs active in London are the Muslim Brotherhood and the Revolutionary Socialists of Egypt (Interviews 4, 10). In addition they have allies in the international organisation Egypt Solidarity Initiative, among others (Interviews 14,15). Observers refer to those organisations other than the Brotherhood as 'the left' however this is only partially accurate. It has long been true that there is little need for organised right wing opposition in Egypt as the military is effective in absorbing (and in fact monopolising) business interests in Egypt (Lutterbeck, 2013; Hashim, 2012). It is hardly controversial to suggest that the current institutional set up in Egypt is in the interests of those who would in a democratic context support the right (Blaydes, 2008; Marfleet, 2013). So it is true in the sense that these organisations do not voice the demands of the right that they are the left. Excepting the socialists their supporters do not necessarily adhere to or voice left wing demands. Some object to the dogmatism of the socialists while others state that their conception of a free Egypt is one with a free market as well as political and social freedom (interviews 1, 7, 8). Another way to categorise these organisations and activists is as democratic, while they would often refer to themselves as revolutionaries.

5.3.1 The Muslim Brotherhood in England

Both in organisational terms and in mobilisation capacity the Muslim Brotherhood have the most extensive apparatus in England. This is partly because their presence in England, and across Europe, has been established since their earlier proscribed periods in the 20th century. Before 2013 Muslim Brothers in England benefited from funding by the Gulf states but none the less lacked the self confidence to organise under their own name preferring to mobilise through proxy organisations (Rich, 2010: 131; Whine, 2005: 35). After the 2013 coup the Brotherhood shifted their headquarters to London to avoid persecution (*The Times*, May 15, 2015).

FIGURE TWO. MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD SUPPORTERS PROTEST OUTSIDE THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY ON LONDON'S 'BORIS BIKES'

Despite having taken up semi-official residence in London it is more meaningful to talk of the MB in England as an SMO rather than a party. That is to say that given the size of the MB in Egypt and abroad, in London as with other European capitals, the MB have substantial numbers of supporters and followers rather than members over whom the leadership could exert direct control (Interviews 2, 8, 10).[121] So in London, the label SMO appropriately describes the range of more and less formal organisations that support the MB.

The Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), for example, is a respectable Muslim, civil society organisation in the UK that happens to be 'dominated' by supporters of the MB, to use the language of a recent UK government report (Jenkins and Farr, 2015: 23).[122] The MAB have worked with the UK government in combatting terrorism within the UK, for instance by assisting police in their operation to remove Abu Hamza from his central London mosque. Yet they share the goals and values of the MB, have been active in London mayoral elections (supporting Ken Livingstone and Sadiq Khan) and sending speakers and grassroots members to MB protests (Interview 16). MB supporters in London have an online presence primarily through Facebook pages, in particular R4BIA, British Egyptians for Democracy and Stop Sisi (Jenkins and Farr, 2015: 26). The former is an ongoing campaign that protests regularly on the streets of London and provides an online forum for raising awareness of Brotherhood claims.

[121] There is one former minister of Morsi's government currently resident in London, at the time of writing still awaiting the outcome of an asylum request. He now works with the Muslim Association of Britain and regularly attends street protests outside the Egyptian embassy in London although he is not involved in their organisation (Interview 16, 10; Jenkins and Farr, 2015: 25).

[122] The UK government in 2015 published redacted findings from a report into the 'activities' of the MB in the UK at the request of the Saudi government (*The Times*, November 5, 2015).

Stop Sisi is a campaign that was established to mobilise protest on the streets of London to coincide with Sisi's state visit to the UK.

Characterising the Brotherhood's ideology is complicated by internal debates (Naguib, 2009: 105). These in turn shed more light on the specific character of the organisation in London. The London leadership in late 2015 were embroiled in a power struggle with the new Egyptian leadership which had elected a radical spokesperson who had publicly condoned the use of violence in politics. London attempted to impose a moderate candidate for leader suggesting the commitment to democracy in England is strong (Mada Masr, 2015). As is well known the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology is Islamist and their commitment to democracy has for most of their history been far from assured. Nonetheless their claims to democratic legitimacy have dominated their discourse in the west since the Raab'a massacre of 2013 in which the military dictatorship brutally killed thousands of their members and supporters.[123] The Brotherhood pioneered the 'secret cell' structure that has characterised Islamist groups subsequently and therefore it is futile to attempt to put a figure to their English membership. Nonetheless it is clear to any observer who has spent time attending protests or events in London that of all the groups active in England it is the Brotherhood who command the force of numbers (Underhill, 2015, 28-29). This is partly because unaffiliated Islamists are willing to lend their support to Brotherhood events (interviews 6, 10).

On the streets of London supporters of the MB have claimed a space for their protests outside of the Egyptian Embassy which they often march to from Marble Arch.[124] Their protests reveal aspects of their discourse that attempts to state their democratic claims to power in Egypt while simultaneously affirming their identity as British Egyptians. For example, bearded Islamists have posed for photos on protest at the embassy atop 'Boris Bikes', civic bicycles introduced to London by former mayor Boris Johnson (see Figure two). Another claim making

[123] In 2013 supporters of Morsi's governments were massacred by the military when they refused to disperse their peaceful demonstration in Tahrir square. For the supporters of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood this event has taken on equal, if not greater, significance as Tahrir Square in their historical memory (Human Rights Watch, 2014).
[124] This is a strategic location as Marble Arch is both a meeting point for locals and a tourist attraction so mobilising there allows the activists a greater audience for their claims.

FIGURE THREE. 'THE KISS' DIGITAL ARTWORK BY AN EGYPTIAN STREET ARTIST (DEPICTING CHILEAN ACTIVISTS), DISPLAYED BY BANKSY AT DISMALAND

technique used by MB supporters is the use of protesting wearing the face of deposed MB president Morsi as a mask.

5.3.2 Revolutionary Socialists of Egypt (RSE)

The RSE are a Trotskyist political faction who have operated in Egypt since circa 2003. Similar to the MB some of their prominent and grassroots members have been political prisoners since the 2013 coup. Their numbers have always been smaller than those of the MB, the 2003 protests in solidarity with Palestine remained, until the 2011 revolution, their primary period of recruitment (Ali, 2011). Despite organising in a manner reminiscent of formal political parties the RSE have refused to grant successive Egyptian dictatorships approval by participating in fraudulent elections and have opted instead to voice their political claims through extra-parliamentary yet nonviolent activism (El-Hamalawy, 2011).

Since the coup those members of the RSE leadership who have evaded arrest have relocated to England where they have taken up roles as guest scholars at UK universities. From English exile they have continued their work of peaceful activism, yet unlike the Muslim Brothers the RSE have focussed on working with English activists and spreading their message through dialogue rather than protest (Interview 7). Revolutionary Socialists have not maintained a presence outside the Egyptian embassy and were absent from anti-Sisi protests at Downing street (Interview 10, 15). The RSE have nurtured connections with British socialist organisations such as the Socialist Workers Party whose conference they have addressed three years running (Interview 7).

5.3.3 Egypt Solidarity Initiative (ESI)

When Egyptians in exile have shown reticence voicing their political claims, sympathetic allies have mobilised on their behalf, doing what they could to encourage exiled activism. The Egypt Solidarity Initiative (ESI) has developed, since 2014, a brand that is known within activist



FIGURE FOUR. JOHN MCDONNELL MP POSES WITH AN ESI FLYER.

circles. It is a nimble and effective outfit that was born of the UK trade union movement to mobilise union resources around campaigns in solidarity with the repressed workers movement in Egypt. Nimble because, rather than develop a new organisation, when its organisers perceived a need for an Egypt specific campaign they launched the organisation as a campaign belonging to, and with access to resources belonging to, a previously established wing of trade unionism, the MENA solidarity network (Interview 14). Similar to other SMOs discussed in this paper ESI are able to operate with, in this case, union resources with comparatively low costs as they avoid the administration involved with a formal membership structure. Grassroots ESI activists are volunteers borrowed from trade union and student movements whose actions are directed (in a collective sense) by a permanent steering group (Interviews 14, 15).

Their effectiveness, a function of tactics, is evident in movement outcomes. ESI campaigns have reached a level of brand recognition such that on most campaign literature the ESI logo appears alongside the MENA solidarity logo in order to lend some prestige to the latter, although the two are in reality not distinct units (Interview 13). The steering group officially includes names well known in UK politics from the trade union movement such as the late Bob Crowe, John McDonnell and Jeremy Corbyn who were present at the founding meeting and lend their own prestige to the movement. Day to day however the group is staffed by a core of dedicated activists who have day jobs, are less well known to the UK public, and for varying reasons happen to have a particular interest in the Egyptian workers movement (Interviews 14, 15).

ESI are open about their trade union funding sources which are listed on their website in order to avoid accusations of political subterfuge by Egyptian authorities. For the same reason (in addition to security fears) ESI restrict their activism to within the UK. Since 2014 they have

staged a number of creative public protests in London designed to draw public attention to human rights violations and workers' struggles in Egypt. An analogous tactic has been to piggy-back on larger protests, such as students marches and protests after Brexit in order to spread their message at street level.

Their most ambitious, and probably most effective, actions have been two conferences on the topic of Arab counter-revolutions and the publication a quarterly journal, in the format of a glossy magazine.

5.3.4 Non-Partisan Activism

Other activists in England prefer to lend their support to events rather than to any group or ideology.[125] These people are the grassroots of the movement, which is something distinct from a political party in any case. Movements, more than parties, are fluid and share supporters between and across chapters. These activists are the real colour and emotion of the exile scene. There is, for example, an Egyptian singer living in London who in 2011 had performed on stage in Tahrir Square songs she had composed for the revolution. She left Egypt following the coup and now sings love songs in night clubs around England but also performs the songs of revolution at exile protests (Interview 9). Her songs are popular within the exile community, but probably more popular with activist organisers who implicitly or explicitly understand that music can offer more selective incentives (the solution to Olsen's collective action problem) than a noble cause can.

Several alliances have been established between exiles and British activists. Several Labour MPs have devoted some parliamentary and extra-parliamentary resources to working with the movement. John McDonnell is a long term member of the ESI steering committee and along with Jeremy Corbyn have both appeared on ESI marches (Interview 14; Middle East Solidarity Autumn 2015: 22). Daniel Zeichner, discussed in more detail below, the Labour MP

[125] There is also a woman who performs a solitary protest every evening outside the Egyptian embassy, usually with a placard making a point about the day's headline. Often, when her husband is working late, she will bring her baby with and protest alone for an hour or so. She posts a selfie of her protest on Facebook every evening (interview 5). Her story is an important part of the exile movement, yet it must be excluded from the analysis as it is not *collective* action.

for Cambridge has worked with Amnesty[126] and ESI on the campaign against police brutality in Egypt (Interview 13). Even the artist Banksy has worked with Egyptian exiles who worked on the Arab Spring themed artwork in his 'Dismaland' exhibition (Interview 7; *Mada Masr*, September 27, 2015).

5.3.5 Summary: Comparing Activism in Egypt and England

The exile movement represents a limited range of political views. They are mostly pro-democratic whether in principle or for strategic reasons. They are mostly of the left conceived generally with the major exception of the MB, whose supporters nonetheless voice progressive claims and when in government did pursue a somewhat redistributive economic agenda. The repertoire of exile is more diverse than the Egyptian repertoire. Activists in England have found a home on campus and have directed much of their energy toward intellectual activities (research, conferences) that straddle the boundary between research and activism. This variation in repertoire is partially explained by the variation in political opportunity structures discussed in the previous chapter. There is little to no danger associated with activism in England and the opportunities are there to be taken.

The variation in repertoire is visualised in figure five.[127] From left to right there is a clear transformation in the methods of protest activists have drawn on with a slight overlap in the centre ground. These three performances which appear in Egypt and England, demonstrations, sit ins and marches are near universal modes of contention. The Egyptian end of the spectrum is fundamentally more radical as it contains riots, the English repertoire being more peaceful.[128] Importantly activism in Egypt has a closer tie to economics and industrial action as there the repertoire involves boycotts and strikes while in England these two performances are absent. This may reflect in part the differences in demography mentioned earlier, the exile movement is wealthier than its Egyptian counterpart, however logically strikes

[126] In a very real way, the entire Egypt branch of Amnesty International is in exile in England. The staff were forced to leave Cairo and chose to set up in London when Sisi made foreign NGOs illegal (Interview 5).
[127] N.B. Frequency in this graph is an aggregation. Performances are grouped into campaigns rather than presented as discrete events. The performances are coded from the records compiled in tables two and three. They are therefore records of those events recorded in history books, the systematic newspaper searches I conducted and observations recounted in interviews.
[128] It is worth noting however that within the Egyptian repertoire riots are the second least frequent form of contention.



FIGURE FIVE. CONTENTIOUS REPERTOIRES

by Egyptian workers in England would have no political significance in Egypt. It is also better educated and based in professions and education directs its claims to a different audience.

There is more to the explanation. In the following sections I discuss two mechanisms, decertification and brokerage that have through contradictory means produced an equilibrium of activism in exile.

5.4. Decertification (Part Two): Fear and Rumour within the Movement

In chapter four I described how decertification functioned at a macro-historical level.[129] The conditions for modern exile were established as long ago as the 1950s when political institutions in Egypt were refashioned to discourage and contain political contestation. The claim in this section, however, is that decertification continues to operate even after the act of exile, prohibiting new mobilisations from abroad. In particular, decertification at this micro-sociological level manifests itself in the spread of fear and rumour within activist circles, or mobilising structures. As these variables, fear and rumour, are endogenous (to the mobilising structures) this suggests that decertification behaves, after a point, in a way that is self-reinforcing. That is, pre-exile institutional path dependence delegitimised activism or focussed political claim-making within arenas that did not challenge the regime's hegemony. Post-exile

[129] Decertification: an external authority's signal that it is withdrawing recognition and support from a political actor.

decertification has become a part of the movement itself as fear and rumour (founded or unfounded) inhibit the diffusion of activism.

At this level of description the operation of decertification becomes difficult to evidence. In historical terms it is simple enough to identify external authorities engineering structural restrictions on mobilisation as in the previous chapter.[130] However, within mobilising structures this is a unique challenge. Can the absence of evidence be taken as evidence of absence?[131] In the paragraphs that follow I have attempted to square this circle by identifying and describing two related but distinct indicators of the micro-sociological operation of decertification within the exile mobilising structures: fear and rumour. Although I will draw attention to counterfactual arguments that support my assertion about decertification I have tried to present the argument in a way that relies more on the evidence.

It is helpful at this point to restate that Egyptians arriving in England are accustomed to fear and mistrust of authority. Although they are objectively safer in England their previous life experiences have taught them to avoid political contestations. Previous researchers have argued that Egyptians abroad are as mistrustful of authority as Egyptians at home citing examples such as occasions of Egyptians forgoing their right to vote at the local embassy due to fear of surveillance (Morsi, 2000; Baraulina *et al*, 2007;). Yet that is not to suggest that within exile mobilising structures any general sense of conspiracy or atmosphere of intrigue exists. It has been my anecdotal experience in the field that Egyptian exiles are more or less reasonable people and this sense is echoed by other researchers working with the same group (Underhill, 2016: xx). Nonetheless fear and rumour are actively prohibiting mobilisations.

[130] See also (Keränen, 2013: 70,71; Gentile, 2016).

[131] The observation this section discusses was made in the field and did change my research plan significantly. In private discussions with exiles I noticed the pattern of otherwise reasonable, some highly educated, people voicing quite spectacular worries, bordering on conspiracy. When I noted the possibility I was observing decertification in action I refined my interview questions to test for this without leading the interviewee. Rather than ask about rumours and fears directly I would ask about challenges in mobilising activists or reasons for non-participation. I would follow up within the same interview or in further correspondence if a participant did describe rumours to me by asking them more directly about rumour and fear, in this way I felt confident that I had checked my interpretations with the participants, without putting words in their mouth.

5.4.1 Rumour

Rumour is a debilitating factor that has affected contention in Egypt. It is known to social movement scholars as a variable that can compel panics or equally initiate a mobilisation (Fine and Turner, 2001; Polletta, 2006). By rumour, I mean, quite narrowly, information that is spread without "secure standards of evidence" (Fine, 2013: 1594). For empirical reasons (i.e. measurement) there is no need to think of rumours as being more or less widespread. What matters here is the impact rumours can have on mobilisation. A rumour can have no truth yet still have enough purchase to dissuade potential activists from joining a march.[132]

Rumour affects SMOs. In Egypt the revolutionary socialists were rumoured to have been infiltrated by Egyptian secret police (Interview 4, 6, 11). The leadership of the RSE in England deny this. There is evidence to support the RSE's claims to independence; several of their members are currently political prisoners (Interview 7,14). (However, the nature of conspiracy theories is that they cannot be falsified with counter-evidence). Would-be RSE supporters and volunteers in English exile looked for British organisations, the British Communist Party and Socialist Workers Party, to work with instead of the RSE in order to avoid surveillance by Egyptian security forces (Interview 6, 11). Counterfactually it is possible that this rumour of infiltration accounts for the absence of Egyptian SMOs from the English scene, which is significant given that former senior activists from both Kefaya and April 6 now live in London (Interview 6). Both Kefaya and April 6 have been victims of the same rumours. In section 5 I will discuss brokerage as a counterweight to decertification, using the example of the Justice for Giulio campaign. It is worth noting here in the example of RSE activism the role of UK SMOs such as the Socialist Workers Party equally operated as a form of brokerage that redirected the energy of activists deterred by rumours of infiltration.

5.4.2 Fear

> The only reason I am not in Cairo is because there was a military coup and I had to leave. — Sameh Naguib, interviewed on *From Tahrir to London - Egyptian in Exile*

[132] Collective action situations are the ideal conditions for rumours to spread. Shibutani (1966) argued as much in his analysis of rumours in Japanese-American internment camps. Polletta (2006) found similar results in her study of movement diffusion. In these studies researchers observed activists developing rumours either to fill in gaps in official discourse, or to counter information from official sources that was contrary to their movement's discourse.

Fear is a less specific idea than rumour and is evident in more aspects of social movement activity. As mentioned above, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest Egyptians may broadly distrust authority. This is a normal outcome of decades of dictatorship. Given the brutality of the Egyptian regime there are legitimate security concerns surrounding Egyptian activism, even from exile.[133]

There are two basic fears that Egyptian exiles voice regarding participation in activism. (1) There is a common view of the Egyptian embassy as an institution whose function is to surveil the Egyptian diaspora. Would-be activists worry that if they are identified by diplomatic staff they will be arrested when they return to Egypt to visit their family. Indeed some activists do claim that they are subjected to harassment by airport security every time they fly to or from Cairo (Interview 10). (2) Related to this Egyptians worry that if they are identified as part of an opposition abroad their families in Egypt will be harassed or even arrested by security forces (Interview 10). In this sense, the Egyptian embassy is a bold choice of location for protests by the MB.

While rumour indicated specific aspects of decertification the effects of fear are widespread. Fears about the role of the Egyptian embassy and about repercussions for family have a direct impact on participation in contentious actions. Both Egyptian and UK based SMOs are aware of these concerns and have strategies for tackling them. More than any SMO, supporters of the MB have managed to mobilise protesters on the street. Partly this is attributable to their persistence organising events on a monthly, sometimes fortnightly, basis. Partly it is attributable to the style of event they host, with entertainment on a family friendly model, which makes the events feel less contentious. ESI experimented briefly with coordinating protest campaigns in England and Egypt simultaneously but decided to restrict their activities to the UK, partly to allay fears of repercussions for family members (interview

[133] This is among the reasons I have protected the identities of my informants. Although the Egyptians I worked with in England were probably the bravest people I will ever meet, their real security concerns affected my work from the offset. Basically every activist I met assumed I was working undercover for the Egyptian embassy. This meant I could not interview activists on Skype, which would have reduced the costs of the study. I had to go to London to meet these people and earn their trust. Even then, Egyptian exiles are so mistrustful I was unable to ever employ a snowball sampling technique as had been my intention.

13).[134] As with rumour, activists within the movement, both Egyptian and non-Egyptian, have noticed these issues and acted as brokers to overcome the challenges of decertification.

5.4.3 Summary

Fear and rumour therefore combine in the process of decertification. Unlike in the broader historical sense decertification at this stage in the exile process does not rely on any actual input from external authorities. Activists have internalised perceptions of the regime's danger and power (which in part motivated their original flight) and these are sufficient to ensure decertification continues to function and is in this sense self-reinforcing.

5.5. Brokerage

The chronology of exiled activism in Table five suggests one of the puzzles of this case. There has been more activism on behalf of Egyptians than by exiled Egyptians. Brokerage offers an explanation for this puzzle. Brokerage is the production of a new connection between previously unconnected or weakly connected sites. Sympathetic British activists are as much a part of this story as Egyptians in exile. When motivation is low among Egyptians or security concerns are high there are influential allies there to persuade Egyptians into action or to mobilise on their behalf. Where decertification worked to convince Egyptians activism would either be futile or counter-productive, brokerage was set in motion by 'political entrepreneurs' who brought Egyptians into contact with their allies (Lewis and Mosse, 2006: 13).

5.5.1 Justice for Giulio

We have already seen several brief examples of brokerage at work in how SMOs attempted to deal with the challenges of decertification thrown up by rumour and fear. Take the campaign surrounding Giulio Regeini as illustrative of the process in more detail.[135] Brokerage is at work whenever activists cooperate, and is of greater analytical significance whenever SMOs cooperate, the case of Regeini is an excellent example of SMOs cooperating with non-movement actors over a sustained campaign. Regeini was an Italian PhD student at Cambridge

[134] As mentioned previously this strategy had wider motivations. Restricting contention to the UK makes it harder for the Egyptian regime to accuse the ESI of 'foreign interference'.

[135] An equally telling example is that of the protests surrounding president Sisi's visit to Downing Street. These protests brought the full ideological spectrum of exiled activists onto the streets in common cause (as well as a bus of Sisi supporters) (*The Times*, November 5, 2015; Middle East Solidarity, Spring 2016: 22). However, in the run up to the visit MB activists actually reached out to secular and socialist organisations to coordinate activities (Interviews 5, 10, 15; *The Independent*, June 18, 2015).

University researching independent trade union activity in post-revolution Egypt. He died in Egypt while on field work for his thesis, his death bearing all the hallmarks of murder by the secret police. His body, found by the side of the road, bore the scars of torture. The case caused some outrage in the UK and Italy. For Egyptians torture and disappearance are common occurrences which invariably go unreported in the West, the death of Regeini brought the story home to UK news audience. Following his death a campaign called Justice for Giulio was set up by political entrepreneurs who brought Egyptian and English activists together.

The campaign began when the MP for Cambridge, Daniel Zeichner, took ownership of the matter and contacted Amnesty International (Interviews 5, 13, 14). He proposed a partnership to raise the profile of the issue. Zeichner, on his own initiative, first handled the case as a constituency matter acting independently. He raised the issue in parliament working with opposition MPs to raise an early day motion calling on the government to investigate the causes of death. He met with staff at Cambridge University to review security and ethical procedures. He also met with Regeini's parents at the European parliament. However, Zeichner, worked with Amnesty to bring the power of activism to bear on the issue. Zeichner organised town hall meetings in Cambridge where the issue was important to students and residents. Meetings were addressed by Zeichner as well as representatives of Amnesty, ESI (on the invitation of Amnesty) and the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) (Interview 12). The campaign spread as Amnesty produced campaign materials (placards, t-shirts, leaflets) which ESI took to the streets, campuses and conferences. ESI also used their magazine to report on and raise the profile of the issue.

The case may have had more resonance for the wider British audience than it did for Egyptian exiles, who, while they sympathised with Regeini, also understood that torture, disappearance and state killings are an ordinary part of life in Egypt. In fact, many Egyptians in England know people in Egypt who have suffered that fate. Egyptian exiles live with a variety of 'survivor's guilt' for this reason. Brokerage kicked in when Zeichner performed the functions of a political entrepreneur, connecting previously unconnected groups, including but not restricted to Amnesty, ESI, and the NUJ, initiating a fresh wave of activism in so doing. This

example is compelling because it illustrates how, by connecting diverse SMOs and allies around a single issue the mechanism fundamentally altered the character of the exile mobilizing structure both in terms of its network and its repertoire.

5.6. Conclusion

My goal with this chapter has been to describe relevant activism in Egypt and England, to explain variance therein and relate this evidence back to the thesis research question, how does exile change activism. The character and composition of activism in exile does vary from activism in Egypt. It is less working class yet more diverse in terms of its repertoire. Although groups like ESI are able to mobilise resources and activists from UK trade unions in solidarity with Egyptian workers it is misleading to suggest the exile movement has any particular industrial base. Most activists involved in the exile movement belong to professions and/or have postgraduate educations. This is markedly different from the situation in Egypt where the pro-democracy movement has always been bound up with the workers movement. This is further evident through comparison of the methods of protest observed. While industrial action, strikes, sometimes sabotage were not unusual in Egypt they were absent from the range of performances in England.

Analytically I have suggested that decertification and brokerage explain much of the mobilisation observed. Decertification has historical precedents that I have traced back to the establishment of the mass parties in mid 20th century Egypt in the previous chapter. In this chapter I have argued that after the act of exile has occurred, from the apparent safety of sanctuary abroad, decertification becomes a positive feedback loop. Historically external authorities were required to discourage activism, yet the act of exile is so traumatic that the need for external factors becomes replaced by rumour and fear in the new context abroad. Brokerage offers a way of breaking the decertification loop as political entrepreneurs connect exiles with local allies who are motivated to create and exploit political opportunities.

The role of rumour and fear raise interesting questions for existing accounts of and why how mobilisation occurs. Rumours, by definition unsubstantiated, challenge the notion that the decision to participate is based on rational calculation. In fact, the evidence in this chapter raises

the possibility that fears preventing participation may be in some senses *irrational*, based as they are on unsubstantiated claims.[136] What matters more to whether mobilisation occurs, and in which forms, are historical processes and causal mechanisms.

[136] Admittedly this is far from the sense in which rational choice theorists use the notions of rational and irrational. The point still stands that motivations to participate or not rely on contextual factors and are subject to political processes.

Chapter Six
Boundary Formation in Activist Discourse

6.1. Introduction

While the causes of exile lie in opportunity and mobilising structures it is in discourse that activists experience and understand exile. In its own way discourse contributes to the causation of exile as the framing of activists' discourse persuades exiles and allies to mobilise. I argue in this chapter that at the level of discourse a third discrete casual mechanism operates, *boundary formation*. In exile, as before exile, activists construct and maintain group identities that can at various times either enable or prevent mobilisations. Boundary formation is therefore a constant across historical and geographical variation. Comparatively it appears the least consequential of the three mechanisms described in this thesis as without variation across context it cannot be thought to have more than limited causal force. Nonetheless the evidence presented in this chapter is in a descriptive sense possibly the most important in the thesis. Activists' own words are the most honest account of their history.

The chapter is divided into two main sections, description and explanation. The first part contains an account of activist discourse. As with chapters four and five I have relied on coding techniques to aggregate the data from individual interviews and documents to interpretations of group positions (Saldaña, 2009, p. 69, 70). However, unlike the previous chapters I do not make the comparison between activism in Egypt and England so explicit as to warrant separate sections, with the exception of the general comparison in the first section.[137] Rather, as there is more continuity than variation in discourse I provide unbroken accounts of each discourse. As is implied by the concept of contentious politics I base the description of each SMO discourse around the claims the group voices.[138] In the second half of the chapter I extrapolate an account of boundary formation from the description of discourse.

[137] That is to say the data is presented without the comparison, not that the data were confused in the process of analysis. To do so would bias the interpretation. The evidence in this chapter is drawn from the same process of coding data as in previous chapters.

[138] Implied in that contentious politics are episodes of claim making (McAdam et al, 2001).

Before ending this introduction it is worth restating briefly the theory of discourse underpinning the argument in this chapter (set out fully in chapter one, section three). Discourse only matters to this thesis indirectly, as the relevant findings are about how the *framing* of discourse affects activism in exile, rather than the contents of the discourse per se. I raise this now as 'discourse' is among those concepts researchers debate.[139] I favour the formulations put forward by Laclau and Mouffe over others which rely on related concepts which are superfluous to this study such as class (Fairclough, 1992: 38, 39) or power (i.e. Foucault, 1976: 100).[140] 'Discourse' in the sense I use it, if I paraphrase Laclau and Mouffe, is an interpretation of the things people say and write on a topic.[141] This definition makes it possible to distinguish a discourse from an ideology. In short, discourses change more than ideologies do, they lack the aspect of dogmatism and occur in a more spontaneous sense, often without particular authors

[139] According to one count by Rosalind Gill (2000, 172-173) there are as many as 57 different methods passed off as discourse analysis.

[140] Foucaldian approaches to the concept of discourse can be said to do this, particularly through their conflation of 'discourse', 'power' and 'knowledge'. E.g. "Indeed, it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together. And for this very reason, we must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform or stable. To be more precise, we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies. It is this distribution that we must reconstruct with the things said and those concealed, the enunciations required and those forbidden, that it comprises; with the variants and different effects—according to who is speaking, his position of power, the institutional context context in which he happens to be situated—that it implies; and with the shifts and reutilisations of identical formulas for contrary objectives that it also includes" (Foucault, 1976: 100). This approach to the concept of discourse could be characterised as 'holistic'. It has made important contributions to social scientific research, yet it differs from the sense in which I use the term discourse in this thesis as the concepts of 'power' and knowledge are beyond the scope of the research presented in the thesis broadly and this chapter specifically. I limit the notion of discourse to the more narrow sense of the things the social movement investigated say and write.

[141] It is true that Laclau and Mouffe have been interpreted by some authors as suggesting that the concept of discourse is wider than I have put it here, typically inspired by their statements to the effect that researchers should "...liberate the concept of discourse from its restrictive meaning as speech and writing" (Laclau, 1990: 90). These statements are counter-intuitive, refer to a different idea and I would argue have been misinterpreted. Laclau's argument with these statements, as clarified elsewhere (see Laclau & Mouffe, 1990: 103-105), is that ontologically nothing has any existence outside of discourse as it is through discourse that people experience. This argument is clearly separate from the methodological point that *evidence* of discourse comes from text and talk. Laclau's ontological point may well have merit but is more or less irrelevant to the work in this thesis which follows social movement theory in incorporating discourse as a variable into a more holistic framework for understanding contentious politics.



FIGURE SIX. ACTIVIST DISCOURSE BEFORE AND AFTER EXILE

(Norval, 2000). What follows in this chapter does not follow the format of 'discourse analysis' which researchers often treat as a method (Gill, 2000). The chapter follows social movement theory in describing and explaining how activist discourse was framed in exile (Benford and Snow, 2000). The concept of discourse set out briefly in this passage underpins the arguments here.

Lastly, a short note on method.[142] The way I have worked with evidence in this chapter is (even) more in the style of interpretive research than in the previous two chapters (Taylor, 1985). This is in keeping with the overall ethos of my argument that the processes of contentious politics depend both on the structural availability of opportunities and the choices activists make of their own accord. The emphasis on framing in this chapter is intended to support my proposition that subjectivity and perceptions matter more than rationality. The thesis would be incomplete without an account of activist discourse, an account that can only ever be subjective. Of course a level of subjectivity is present in the previous two chapters but given the nature of the topic of chapters four and five that subjectivity was much easier to standardise into

[142] This chapter also posed a further, specific methodological issue around sampling criteria. The notion of analysing exile discourse raises again the question of whether to include an ethnic or residential criteria for deciding whose words to include in the discourse. As discussed in the methods chapter my sampling criteria side-stepped this issue relying on residency as a substitute for ethnicity in line with a civic view of nationality. In this chapter I decided to enforce that rule more strictly than in the previous two chapters where I drew on interviews with observers and allies of the movement. The passages in this chapter describing the experience of exile has been taken from interviews with activists who formerly lived in Egypt but now live in England.

tables, facts and figures. Evidence of discourse does not work that way and my judgement is ever present in this chapter.

This issue is compounded by the anonymity rules demanded both by the university ethics committee and a great many of the participants themselves which prohibit direct attribution of interview evidence. These are challenges, but not insurmountable ones. They are also worth addressing rather than avoiding. As set out in full detail in chapter one (section 2.3) methodological rigour is the solution to both over- or under-interpretation. Through coding a clear and defensible connection was maintained between evidence and interpretation. Following trends in anthropology I also took the step of checking my interpretations with activists and observers in interviews and correspondence. This way I maintained accuracy and relevance in the research by putting forward a novel position which does not directly contravene activists' own self-interpretations. To overcome this issue I have illustrated the arguments in this chapter by paraphrasing the claims, arguments and propositions activists made in interviews with myself and I have supplemented the evidence from interviews with quotes from published sources. In order to avoid misrepresenting the views of those interviewed I have provided quotations, but do so without attribution in order to protect identities.

Part One. The Discourse of Exile.

6.1. Revolution and Protest in Discourse.

As a point of departure in this account of activists' discourse consider the two word clouds in figure six. The first describes discourse in and around Tahrir square at the time of the revolution. The second represents the words of Egyptians exiled in England. This comparison is instructive as it was in the revolution that the discourse of activism in Egypt reached its heights of unity and expression. Both word clouds can be taken as accurate representations as they are based on the words of activists themselves. The second of these word clouds was generated from the transcripts of the interviews I conducted with Egyptian exiles for this thesis. The first is generated from transcriptions I made of 10 interviews with activists who were in Tahrir square by researchers at AUC. These sources are available as part of the AUC's University on the Square collection under 'oral histories' (AUC, 2012). The interviews were conducted in

2012 less than a year after the revolution. I also used these interviews as source material in my account of the 2012 revolution in chapter five. The availability of these interviews was the decisive factor in my choice here to compare exile discourse with revolution discourse. Both sets of interviews are broadly similar documents; reflections on periods of activism by the activists in the near aftermath of events. These graphics offer a useful summary of the main themes and signifiers in activist discourse as well as visualising how the discourse has changed following exile.[143]

Despite the events of recent history, which from an activist's perspective have been calamitous, the core of the discourse remained unchanged. Those activists who took to the Square in 2012 and by 2015 found themselves in exile made their main claim to legitimacy with reference to 'the people', a powerful concept. This observation was echoed in my research as activists across the spectrum of views framed their claims in this sense. Both Christian and Muslim activists stressed to me that their continuing opposition was based on their conviction that the military government does not represent the interests of society (interviews 1, 6, 10). Socialists emphasised the government's disregard for human rights (interview 5, 7) and activists who associate with international NGOs made similar claims regarding the impunity of the military (interview 6). For example, one activist described how the decision of the Sisi government to close down her organisation's Cairo office galvanised her to continue working for democracy in Egypt (interview 6). This approach to political argument has influenced the way demands have been framed, and in fact has influenced the demands themselves. Firstly, in the big picture, the discourse of activism both before and after exile is notable as a non-nationalist discourse, and partially the explanation for that can be derived from the sense of popular legitimacy activists base their discourse on.

That is, while activists frame their claims as those of 'the people' this signifier stands alone and is not articulated as part of a set of national symbols. This is a necessary precondition

[143] Yet summarising the information necessarily entails losing some of the detail. These figures conflate the various articulations and viewpoints of individuals and groups into one discourse. I will unpack the discourse into its components throughout the chapter.

for a discourse of opposition in Egyptian politics as the symbols of nation and state have been a central theme of the story the regime tells about itself and the discourse of the regime's supporters. Indeed regime supporters in Egypt are usually described as 'nationalists' in studies of political cleavages (Dune, 2015; Grand, 2014; Underhill, 2016). In consequence, the most politically organised of the regime's opponents are uncompromising in their rejection of national symbols such as flags.[144] For example, the Marxist position put forward by those associated with the RS has consistently downplayed the significance of flags as symbols easily manipulated by the regime. Instead they advocate cooperation between different interest groups, typically socialists and Islamists, based not on national unity but instead based on common interest in opposition to dictatorship.[145]

There is a further aspect to the absence of nationalism from activists' discourse and that is to do with the characteristics of national identity in Egypt. Egypt, at first glance appears a homogeneous nation as more than 90% of its population is Muslim. Yet this superficial analysis is misleading. Despite the fact of religious diversity, Egypt has well established Christian and Jewish minorities who have always cohabited peaceably with the Muslim majority (significant given tensions between Egypt and Israel).[146] National loyalties in this context have always been torn between conceptions of an Egyptian people, an Arab people and a Muslim community.[147]

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[144] The tactic of uniting opposition to the regime in discourse is ever present. A recent example comes from the daily protester at the London Egyptian embassy mentioned in the previous chapter. She often posts a photograph of her protest on Facebook and on February 27th 2017 her protest banner read "He who ordered the massacre of Port Said is the one who ordered the slaughter of the displaced people of Cena and reduce her enemy. Numerous massacres and the killers are the same junta military whom are named President of the Republic of Egypt" (Facebook, 2017). One of the two massacres she refers to happened before the revolution and one after the coup, the suggestion is therefore that there is one regime activists can unite against in opposition.

[145] Some examples from the interview data. "Technically I am Egyptian. But I'm not really pro nationalist propaganda. I see myself as a human more than an Egyptian. But then technically I am Egyptian. If you have a history of struggle, I think thats the thing. I talk about myself as Egyptian but I still see myself as more of a human." This affinity with humanity was a major recurring theme in my research. "I also most strongly identify with the people that I have seen in Tahrir, in Indignados, those young people around the world who believe in the same things I do. I have more in common with them I feel than with the average Brit, or even Egyptian. Most people seem to be much more conservative politically than I am. We're a minority in every single country, but taken as a whole we are actually huge."

[146] These points may only matter tangentially to political discourse within the exile community, but they may also matter in a more profound sense. As in western social movements, the activists I spoke to who do adhere to religious views were happy to admit that their religious convictions influence their political views. Christians described to me how their conception of religious teaching about forgiveness enters their internal calculous on whether to participate in protests (interviews 1, 4, 5) and activists associated with the MB described how their conviction that Islam is a religion of peace guides their choices to maintain a strong link with the Palestinian cause even when marching against Egyptian dictatorship (interview 2, 8, 10).

[147] Egyptian politicians have long capitalised on Arab nationalism, most evident in Nasser's expansionist project of unification with Syria. More recently Arab nationalism was more prominent than Egyptian nationalism in the 2011

In this sense national identity as an amalgamating idea echoes national identity in Britain which competes for loyalty in discourse with the four nations.

All of this is to say that due in part to the appropriation of Egyptian national symbols by the ruling regime and in part due to competing loyalties Egyptians in exile continue to deploy the signifier 'people' as a founding principle for their political claims but do so in a sense that is, while partisan, intended as unifying and maximising the legitimacy and audience for their claims.[148]

Other than the continuity before and after exile, it is instructive to consider the ways activists' discourse changed throughout the process of exile. Returning to the visualisations above several aspects of the discourse changed. In a fundamental sense exile appears to have modified the language of contention. This finding supports the claims made in the previous two chapters that exile initiated a period of repertoire change. Whereas in Egypt the word revolution was on everybody's lips, in England the talk is of protest and along with protest a number of related signifiers add up to a different way of doing politics. In Egypt activists were rightly focussed on police, in England they have accepted the police as a more or less benign arm of the state and are instead concerned with the organs of protracted opposition; 'organise', 'unions', 'solidarity'. As one Egyptian exile put it on the anniversary of the revolution: "If we are talking about the slogan of the revolution, 'bread, freedom and social justice', I think we still have many years of fight to achieve this" (Azer, the Economist, YouTube). In exile activists have come to arguing that the fight for democracy cannot come in a moment of revolution but is an ongoing process.

revolution which activists set in the context of the Arab Spring. The ongoing significance of internationalism for Islamists is clear in their articulations where for instance even in English they frequently use the Arab word 'umma' as a synonym for people, which refers more to the Muslim community.

[148] It would be an exaggeration to suggest that ethnic nationalism is absent from this discourse. A frequent grievance of Egyptian expatriates I encountered in my research and noted by previous researchers is exclusion from franchise while abroad. In the matter-of-fact way Egyptians put this complaint to me in interviews I was reminded of Anderson's concept of the power of 'banal nationalism' that is so entrenched it does not need to be enforced with symbols or procedures.

6.1.1 Two Arguments

The previous section introduced the discourse of exiled activism as one that is set in opposition to military rule, couched in civic language. Yet despite the civic character of the discourse it remains possible to identify distinct categories within the discourse. In order to get a sense of the mechanism responsible, boundary formation, it is necessary to examine the discourse in more detail. The discourse has two distinct arguments that, while not entirely contradictory, are nonetheless polarising. As will become clear it is not a straightforward matter to distil these arguments into labels. It is tempting to label one side secular and one side religious but this is factually untrue. While religion is central for Islamists,[149] non-Islamist arguments are put forward by practising Muslims, Christians and Jews. Both parties direct similar accusations at one another. Chief amongst these is the claim that the other has an aversion to democracy. Nonetheless both sides frame their demands in democratic terms and claim the legitimacy of 'the people'. In essence the cleavage at work here is between supporters of the MB and everybody else. While the various organisations, other than the MB, operating in England have their own priorities and interests their arguments are similar enough to group into one discursive faction.

6.1.2. Non-Islamist Discourse

It is notable but not surprising in the exile word cloud above that the MB are the most talked about political force. What is more surprising is their absence from earlier articulations. The MB loom large on the Egyptian political scene today, as they always have, but in a post-Morsi situation the organisation has a special significance as a polarising entity. This is the sense in which it is most realistic to group non-Islamists together as a more-or-less coherent perspective. A non-Islamist perspective is therefore advanced first from opposition to the government of Morsi and then to that of Sisi (interview 1, 6 11).[150]

[149] Most evident in the popular protest slogan 'Islam is the solution' which is omnipresent in Egyptian demonstrations in Egypt and England.

[150] Activists discuss the complexity of opposition to Morsi's rule and the ongoing tension this creates within the exile community. All three of the interviewees cited above admitted to their participation in the protests that preceded Sisi's coup d'etat and their continuing opposition to Morsi's constitutional changes, yet they are aware and regretful that their participation was taken (unjustifiably) by the military as consent for the brutality that followed.

The problem with maintaining a non-Islamist perspective that is more or less coherent is that the proponents of this position spend as much time criticising each other as they do the Islamists or Nationalists. For instance there are today, in London, activists who could be described as pro-democratic who take inspiration in their political views from Coptic Christianity, who attended the demonstrations against Morsi in Cairo which prefigured the 2013 coup. These activists now speak of their anti-Morsi activism with regret for what came after (interview, 1, 6, 7, 11). In the words of one activist who had been active in pre-revolution social movements:

> In 2013 I wanted Morsi to leave but not this way. I thought the best thing we should have done is that to wait and to mobilise and to find a real candidate to run against Morsi (interview 6).

At the same time the position of Egyptian socialists in the UK is generally that, despite power grabs by the Morsi government, the democratic process should have been observed and activists were wrong to effectively collaborate with the military in bringing about Morsi's downfall (interview 3, 4, 7; Naguib, 2011).[151] For example, writing in the online journal *Socialist Review* one prominent exile argued,

> Of course, the left must defend its principles with regard to the separation of religion from the state, and in defence of a secular state, but we also have to know when and how to enter the battle, and with whom. Secularism itself, as an abstract principle with no connection to the interests of the working class and poor, is meaningless, and in fact defence of secularism on such a basis only serves the Islamists (Naguib, 2011).

While these claims appear at odds they actually allude to a common start for a non-Islamist discourse. From the time of the 2011 revolution the main argument put forward by the loose coalition of opposition forces was introspective; that no candidate was strong enough to compete against the MB (interview 2, 5, 6, 11). At the time various candidates made efforts to unify but were ultimately unsuccessful with the final presidential run-off being between the MB candidate and the army's candidate, who had in fact been a member of Mubarak's pre-revolutionary government (Marfleet, 2016). This argument became consequential again in the

[151] One activist put it to me like this; "I don't have a real problem with the Muslim Brotherhood. We are ideological rivals. But we're both Egyptians, we're both humans, we both… they do have the right to… we must support their grievances. They have real grievances and we must… I mean there were thousands killed in Rabaa. Its something that any human should stand for whether they are Muslim Brotherhood or not. Independent of your ideology or your thinking or whatever. Muslims were killed." (Interview 7) Yet this activist still confessed that (s)he would not attend MB events, support for MB grievances was in this sense symbolic or private.

aftermath of the 2013 coup when the military was able to form a government unopposed. These arguments, which are in a sense a cry of despair, are the common starting point for a non-Islamist position, that is common opposition to both the MB and the involvement of the military in government.

In exile several campaigns have commanded the attention of the loose coalition of non-Islamist activists. Activists have mobilised against political imprisonment (AsianImage, 2014), around the case of Giulio Regeni (*The Guardian*, February 7 2016), for press freedom and against the visit of Sisi to Downing street (*Mada Masr*, November 5 2015), as was discussed in the previous chapter. The selection of these campaigns by activist organisers, while sincere, is itself an attempt to impose a narrative on the discourse of exile (interview 5, 7, 13). Each of these campaigns highlight the brutality of the Egyptian regime, in emotive terms, in the context of the sorts of human rights issues that do not require the audience to have any particular knowledge of Middle Eastern culture or politics. In this sense these cases have been selected carefully to enable activists to present their case to their western audience in their host country of England (interview 5, 7, 12, 13, 14).

The case of Guillio Regeni has brought together a coalition of activists on the streets of London and Cambridge as well as in parliament and in print. [152] Banners produced by Amnesty International bearing the slogan 'Justice for Giulio' are now common place at socialist or human rights based events in London.[153] As discussed in the previous chapter Regeni was an Italian graduate student at Cambridge University researching trade union organisation in contemporary Egypt who was found dead by a road on the outskirts of Cairo with the hallmarks of abduction and torture by Egyptian police (*The Guardian*, February 7 2016). The characteristics of this case, as it involved a major British university, allowed exiled activists to frame their claims against Egyptian dictatorship in a way that involved a British audience.

[152] Trade unions across the UK also backed this campaign writing to the Egyptian government to investigate Regeni's death and to UK MPs to ask that they also add pressure to Egyptian authorities (UCU, 2016).
[153] Their absence from Islamist protests at the embassy is not an indication that the MB do not care about this case. In interviews with myself MB activists speculated that the case had more resonance for the other side because the MB had powerful slogans and cases of their own, particularly in R'abaa (interview 8, 14). Secular activists made the case to me that the case falls well within the workers rights and human rights remit of organisations such as the ESI.

Activists used the media attention the case gained to draw attention to the wider issue of police brutality in Egypt which was among the proximate causes of exile for many activists (interview, 5, 6).[154]

Across the spectrum of voices and perspectives that constitute the non-Islamist perspective common argumentative techniques can be discerned. Activists of this persuasion often frame their arguments in precise and procedural terms focussed on the legality of specific actions of government (Interview, 1, 4, 7, 10). This may have appeared a normal engagement with the democratic process at the time of Morsi's government which was using its position as democratically elected to enact partisan constitutional changes. However as this microscopic focus persists in activist discourse from exile it appears worthy of comment.

Activists can be heard, perhaps surprisingly, voicing such arguments at street protests when media show an interest and appear for vox-pop style interviews.[155] When asked by (normally 'citizen') journalists to describe the demands of a protest activists offer a critique of the legality of particular cases of imprisonment rather than proclaiming slogans about democracy or social justice. For example, explaining the demands of a protest in London to a citizen journalist one activist claimed,

> We are also here to demand the abolition of the protest law. The legislation is illegal, because it was issued in the absence of the constitution. Additionally, the content of the law contains many provisions that breach international law and even Egyptian law - for example, it allows the use of live ammunition against protesters. It also violates the right to peaceful protest, as stipulated international law. (Quoted in Atkinson, 2014).

Less surprisingly the social media feeds of these same activists in exile are littered with debates about the legality of particular aspects of domestic policy in Egypt, often on seemingly benign

[154] In fact, the contribution allies of the exiled activists made to the discourse surrounding the case of Regeni may have further aided the movement by tempering the tone of discourse. An open letter to the Egyptian government signed by 'more than' 46,000 academics published in *the Guardian* took a markedly more gentile approach to political claim making than exiled activists typically do. "While we welcome the Egyptian authorities' statement that they will fully investigate Giulio's death, we note that according to Amnesty International, bodies reporting to the Egyptian interior and defence ministries routinely practise the same kinds of torture that Giulio suffered against hundreds of Egyptian citizens each year" (*The Guardian*, February 8 2016).

[155] For example, (MENASolidarity, YouTube, 2014).

matters. There is something jarring about the way activists describe the actions of an unopposed autocrat as 'contrary to the Egyptian constitution'.[156]

Framing arguments in this way serves various functions in activist discourse. Most obviously it is an attempt to delegitimise the dictatorship by demonstrating its arbitrariness and inability to adhere to its own rules. More subtly it also bolsters the reputation of activists who use their analytical prowess to demonstrate their political competence. In doing so it also asserts the group identity of opposition activists. From the perspective of framing with the goal of encouraging mobilisation there is the risk this approach to political discourse may put off potential activists who may regard it as elitist but this danger is possibly not as pronounced in an activism context as it may be in, say, an electoral context.

6.1.3 Islamist Discourse

Relative to non-Islamists, MB supporters in England have spoken with one voice. This is impressive given that their followers are not part of any rigid organisation. Their voice has clear demands. Firstly, as alluded to above, the MB frame their claims in the language of democracy. For their discourse this is a development from their pre-exile claims, and interestingly is sometimes at variance from the arguments of Islamists in Egypt.[157] The democratic basis of their argument is that they had formed the government in Egypt which was ousted in the 2013 coup. Their claim is that the MB are the rightful government of the people of Egypt (Interview 2, 3, 10).[158] The remainder of their public discourse follows from this and pertains to specific aspects of their claim to democratic legitimacy.

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[156] This tendency has been observed and criticised by activists on the scene. Writing in *Mada Masr* Azer argues "Once human rights activists and organizations in Egypt realise the importance of localizing their language, new windows of opportunity will open. We have seen before how cyberactivists were successful in framing issues like torture to the public. Instead of reproducing international human rights language by saying, for example, that "torture is a crime under ICCPR," they instead said things like, "torture hurts your dignity." Instead of using the concept of legality, they framed torture as a threat to one's "dignity," which is something that would resonate more in our local social setting. The concept of vernacularization needs to be employed more widely though. It is simply the gate through which activists can access a larger audience and convey the human rights message in the people's own language."

[157] MB leaders in London were involved in a public dispute with the new generation of radical leadership in Egypt over the acceptability of violence. The London leadership was firmly on the side of peaceful protest and respect for democratic process (*Mada Masr*, December 15 2015).

[158] In discussion's with MB activists in England it is clear how the military coup is as key a critical juncture to their discourse as the 2011 revolution is for secularists. Take one example; "I support Muslim Brotherhood. I'm a close supporter, not a member… Before the revolution it wasn't really clear to me who to support or why. My support for them actually increased after the military coup in 2013. And also after Mohammad Morsi was elected. I agreed with

The story that Islamists tell about their English exile starts with Rabaa. Rabaa is a square facing a mosque of the same name in the working class eastern side of Cairo. After the 2013 coup supporters of ousted President Morsi staged a sit in there to show their disdain for the new regime and loyalty to the Islamist cause. The sit in was broken up brutally by the military in an operation described by human rights watch as "one of the largest killings of demonstrators in a single day in recent history" (Human rights watch, 2014: 6). Human Rights Watch go as far as to estimate that as a consequence of the "systematic and intentional" use of lethal force by the army (and police) the death count at Rabaa exceeded that of Tiananmen Square (*Human Rights Watch*, 2014: 7).

Those peaceful protesters who lost their lives at Rabaa became martyrs for the Islamist cause (Interview 10). The theme of remembrance for Rabaa is ever present in Islamist discourse in exile across all mediums (*Mada Masr*, August 14, 2015). The main Facebook group of the MB in England (identified as a major mouth piece for the MB in the British government's report on their activities) is called R4BIA, a variant of the name (Jenkins and Farr, 2015: 26).[159] Their logo which carries the name in black print set against a yellow outline is ever present at Islamist rallies in London on placards and t-shirts. In Islamist discourse 'Rabaa' has therefore become a central signifier which imbues their claims with legitimacy.

Hopefully at this point it is evident that it is in Islamist discourse that the effect of exile is most clear. The framing of their discourse is all-encompassing in a way that merits further attention. The slogans of MB protest in Egypt are all but absent from protests in London. The most well-known of MB slogans is that 'Islam is the solution'. That this slogan is not chanted by protesters on London streets is in itself no mystery; it would undoubtedly attract aggression (Interview, 2, 3). However the absence of religious symbolism is an acute political choice by the proponents of the discourse. As the discourse is presented in civic terms, it not only disarms

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the values that they are preaching and kind of I saw them practice what they are preaching. This made my support for them increase. After the military coup I felt that some injustice has happened. It was then that I felt it was time for me to take some action rather than simply watch the events."

[159] Activists chose to spell the name this way for the Facebook group in order to give the cause a 'modern' feeling that can help keep the youth engaged (Interview 10). Discourse theorists have long argued that names carry as much weight as slogans and messages in framing political discourse (Laclau, 2005).

those who would dismiss their claims with signifiers such as 'extremist' or 'terrorist', it is an attempt to widen the audience for the discourse to those who sympathise with democratic struggle. Perhaps it is because the Islamists are the most vulnerable of all Egyptian exiles to ostracism that their discourse is most obviously presented in a way that can be interpreted as 'integrated'. This was demonstrated poignantly when a woman wearing the full body burqa implored of a Channel 4 news reporter, about former Prime Minister David Cameron's invitation to Sisi to visit Downing Street, "Where are the British values?" (Channel 4 News, 2015).[160]

Part Two. Boundary Formation

6.2.1 Pre-Exile Roots of the Boundary

It is through the mechanism *boundary formation* that the discourse of activists is embedded in the causal process of exile. Tilly and Tarrow define boundary formation as "the creation of an us-them distinction between two political actors"[161] (Tilly and Tarrow, 2008: 215). Logically it features to some degree in any case of contentious politics which by definition includes two competing actors. Yet its salience can vary from cases of war (in which it is not in itself sufficient to merit attention) to civilian cases such as this where the construction of an intra-movement cleavage is consequential. The consequences of boundary formation explain, in part, outcomes observed in chapter five regarding the structure of mobilisation in exile. It is therefore a major, if not central, part of the causal story of exile.

For the most part exile discourse adheres to the format of activist discourse pre-exile. The formation of boundaries in exile discourse begins with the distinction between the government of Egypt and the opposition, which claims to speak on behalf of the people. However, the cleavage that matters more for the functioning of activism in exile divides Islamists from non-Islamists. Most of the work in constructing this boundary is conducted from

[160] A less poignant but noteworthy example is to be found in the series of non-sequiturs an Islamist speaker concluded her remarks to activists assembled outside the Egyptian embassy with "..the hopes and determination of the revolution to see all political prisoners and journalists freed from prison. The Palestinian people suffer occupation on the siege of Gaza. The revolution inspired the world, let that inspiration be free. My respects and regards to Jeremy Corbyn." (sal64london, YouTube) These sentiments beautifully reflect the authentic internationalism espoused by many exiles.

[161] 'Actor' here is used metaphorically and refers to indeterminate sized groups.

the non-Islamist side. Secular and other non-Islamist activists unite around a common desire for a non-religious politics in Egypt. Partly this construction is defensive, in two senses. In one sense it reflects insecurities about the viability of non-Islamist political opposition in Egypt. In another sense it reflects a desire to be distanced from widespread perceptions of Arabs as religious fundamentalists.

6.2.2. Boundary Resilience

MB activists on the other hand have demonstrated a desire to work with non-Islamists. In interviews with myself activists on both sides have described private meetings with secular and British organisations, which came to nothing but were initiated by Islamists (Interview 8, 10, 15, 16).[162] Their moderation (for want of a better word) of their discourse in exile can also be interpreted as an attempt at building bridges. Despite these attempts the fact of the slogans and arguments they do deploy are sufficient to maintain and contribute to a boundary. While their argument is framed in democratic terms its naked partisanship, in favour of the deposed government of Morsi and the MB, is anathema to non-Islamists.

An example demonstrates how this cleavage between Islamist and non-Islamist manifests itself in discourse. Discourse theorists have developed a theory of 'performativity' in recent work. This is the idea that the distinction between word and action is difficult to maintain and that consequently on occasion discourse can be observed in deed rather than word.[163] Actions can speak louder than words. As described in the previous chapter, in London the MB have claimed a space for contention outside of the Egyptian embassy. Yet as these activists are supporters of the MB rather than official representatives they frequently organise demonstrations under alternative handles, partly with the intention of reaching out to non-MB

[162] One activist described the almost personal hurt following the rejection: "We are not getting on well with the socialists because basically… this was 2016. There were call for mass protests, I don't know if you have heard of them, but, there were calls to reunite the political activists of all opinions, but… and so we did attend the protests then. It was a Monday I think. And they [socialists] were there as well, some of them. They refused to join our protest. They held banners that said, against the Muslim Brotherhood. And we were willing, we can protest with them because we have the same goals. I don't mind protesting with anyone who is against the military coup and against current regime. But they are still against Muslim Brotherhood in general. That makes it quite difficult."

[163] The classic example is the phrase 'I do' spoken in a wedding ceremony. The words are actions given they carry the causal force of initiating the marriage. This observation was noted by Austin (1962:5) and brought to feminist theory by Butler (1988) in the 1980s and more recently has been theorised in the context of social movements by researchers at Essex (Norval, 1998; Griggs and Howarth, 2008).

activists. Activists on both sides of this cleavage often describe the scene when non-Islamist activists show up at a protest they heard about on social media without having realised the event was organised by supporters of the MB. On these occasions the non-Islamists either leave or form a separate protest, taking it in turns to chant at the embassy with the Islamists. In this way the discursive cleavage is expressed in action and contributes to the repertoire changes described in chapter five.

Conclusion

Exile has done little to change activists' discourse in this case. Both before and after the revolution it makes sense to speak of religious and non-religious activism, indeed observers of Egyptian politics have tended to do so. Broadly activists begin from a principle of civic opposition to military rule and support for the democratic process. Emotion is not absent from their arguments. The sense of regret in exile discourse is tangible. Activists of all perspectives are harsher critics of their own failures than most observers would be. Yet counterintuitively, the most evident contribution exile has made to their discourse is hope, of a tempered variety. Where once activists took a gamble on revolutionary change they have in exile come to appreciate the dangers of such volatile politics and yet have not given up their hope that Egyptian politics may, perhaps not within their lifetime, be democratic.[164]

Boundary formation is the mechanism at work in this discourse, both constructing and maintaining the distinction between the two opposition groupings. While activists start out from a common position of support for democracy and opposition to military rule they nonetheless separate into polarised camps. In discourse the evidence of this mechanism is subtle. Activists do not necessarily admit to it when first asked, and when they march, speak publicly and engage in the other contentious performances of their repertoire their slogans are directed at the regime, not at one another. Yet when pressed they do admit, on both sides, to a certain animosity. Not to overstate it, from the activists' perspective the cleavage is one of distinct ideologies, not

[164] This last observation requires a caveat. There is little evidence to connect this change in emphasis from revolutionary to gradualist discourse with exile. It may well be more an outcome of the volatile political process in Egypt itself and as such may have manifested itself in activist discourse without exile.

outright competition. The cleavage is therefore manifest in extra-discursive, material evidence. The two camps operate separately and actively avoid one another.

Secular, socialist or non-Muslim activists have found a common voice, often shared with British allies. Their discourse has concerned itself with a series of cases including that of anti-protest laws in Egypt, the murdered research student Giulio Regeni and political prisoners in Egypt. MB activists in England have a strong narrative of their own that focusses more on remembering and demanding justice for those who died in the R'abaa massacre. Despite the divergence in focus the message of the two discourses are broadly similar. Both are essentially arguing for respect for the democratic process in Egypt, and actively arguing against the rule of the military. There is a difference in emphasis within this argument that falls along partisan lines; the MB maintain that Morsi is the rightful, elected president of Egypt who should be returned to power whereas non-Islamists are more ambivalent on the details of how the democratic process ought to be respected.

Yet the cleavage between Islamist and non-islamist predates exile as is reflected in activists' discourse which as has been stated has varied little with exile. This is not surprising, there is every reason for social ties of friendship and activism to survive the move abroad. This demonstrates the role of framing in the exile process. Exile is manifest in discourse, that this is so is almost tautology, it is in discourse that activists experience, describe, understand and invest meaning in their exile. Yet there is little reason to think that framing played more than a limited role in mediating the changes in political opportunity structure and mobilising structures observed in the last two chapters. This can be attributed to a range of factors discussed throughout the chapter and in earlier chapters; on one hand the limited audience for activists discourse, the relative indifference of the host population to Middle Eastern politics, and on the other the radical changes in political opportunity structures and the availability of allies. The next concluding chapter will draw out these arguments in more detail. The final chapter of the thesis will bring the three strands of the argument set out in the last three chapters together to fully set out the ways in which exile changes activism.

Conclusion: The Mechanics of Exile

When exiles left Egypt for England they left behind a culture of suspicion that expressly prohibited political engagement. Most if not all had been present in the Tahrir revolution, arguably the first iconic moment of democratic history in the 21st century, but arrived in England fatigued, unengaged and often scared. In the permissive political culture of cosmopolitan London their movement flourished, contrary to the implicit aims of the authoritarian regime whose unofficial policy of exile had initiated the process. Yet it did not have to turn out like this. Had exile operated as the military regime of Egypt had intended the movement would have burned out into apathy. As it transpired exile did change activism, but it did not put a stop to it.

Each chapter of the thesis has added both detail and nuance to the propositions I have made throughout. In the first chapter I reviewed social movement theories as competing and/or complementary explanations for the causes and effects of activism. I disaggregated social movement theories into those treating structure and those treating agency as causal.[165] I argued in favour of a structural view of activism as the approaches favoured in key social movement texts provide sophisticated analytical tools for identifying and analysing the contextual factors that matter to activism outcomes. I also used this chapter to draw attention to a methodological tool that is rightly gaining prominence in social movement research: causal mechanisms. This idea, that the processes connecting cause and effect are every bit as important to analysis as the correlation of causal variables, has come to characterise research on social movements in the last decade and so too it was at the heart of the design of this thesis.

Having argued for a structural, mechanistic view of social movement causation in the second chapter I turned my attention to research on exiles, specifically exiled activism. The

[165] Following this logic I developed the categories of coding and analysis I relied upon in the case study partly around the structural view. I do not, however, believe this was to predetermine the outcome of the study as the mode of investigation was a qualitative case study, rich enough in observations that the findings would not be limited by analytical methods. The case study in fact provides examples of occasions when exiles opted to participate in politics based on individual calculus within a broader explanatory framework facilitated by a structural view. The case of hunger strikers in solidarity with political prisoners is a case in point; activists from ESI addressed students with their plan for protest and asked for volunteers to raise their hands for participation. The choice to participate could not be described as coerced, yet it occurred in a public social and political context that conditioned the choice. This outcome was fundamentally what I had in mind when opting for a structural view of activism as I discussed in the first chapter; people can and do make choices, but these choices are limited by political context.

reason for doing so is that while social movement researchers have uncovered a great deal of knowledge on the processes of activism they have paid little attention to cases of activists in exile. Describing work on exile I noted primarily that the reverse of that proposition holds, researchers interested in exile have rarely looked to insights from social movement theory; with the commendable exception of work by Yossi Shain and his colleagues. Within this body of literature two traditions predominate, those who view exiles as collective actors in international relations and those who study the psychological effects exile has on individuals. From this research I highlighted the findings with greatest significance for a theoretical understanding of exiled activists; transnational structures of opportunity, their influence in some cases over foreign policy, their role in other cases of funding opposition from abroad. In all I took this as an indication that exile for political purposes does not spell the end of activism and that the process would benefit from an analysis from the perspective of social movement theory.

In the third chapter I set out my research design and case study methods in more detail. I reiterated the factors of the phenomenon identified in the literature reviews that I felt pointed in the direction of certain methodological choices; the potential for theory building from study of activists exiled following military takeover, the ‘elite’ character of a close-knit exile community corresponding to the availability of testimony. Given these factors I developed a single case study of Egyptians in English exile. This case contained an in-built comparative distinction, before and after exile. It allowed detailed biographical interviews offering a holistic account of the development of the exile process with a complete group of key actors. This form of evidence, handled properly, is ideal for reconstructing the steps in a causal process in a thick descriptive case study. I delineated the theoretical factors the case study would revolve around; political opportunity structure, mobilising structures and framing processes. I continued to describe how I generated, corroborated and analysed data in a way that was systematic yet still allowed the data to speak for itself without over or under interpretation.

The case study consisted of three chapters. In chapter four I described the political context of the exile movement. This consists of two political opportunity structures within which lie the movement's distant antecedents. As long ago as the 1950s the Egyptian

government embarked on a nation-building process by which it dismantled familiar liberal institutions such as political parties and replaced them with unique participative bodies that removed the element of contestation from political claim-making that is central to democracy. Over time the regime monopolised political opportunities to the extent that political claim-making became fraught with danger. Exiles arriving in England became embedded within a much richer political context replete with representatives, allies and established procedures for voicing political claims including but not restricted to the electoral cycle. Within the Egyptian political system I traced the process of decertification at a macro-institutional level whereby authorities stripped activists of their political legitimacy.

In the fifth chapter I examined mobilising structures in more detail. Analytically I followed previous social movement researchers in viewing the structures from two perspectives; the networks of activism and the contentious repertoires they drew upon. The results of this investigation indicated a significant transformation of the type and focus of performance from the repertoires of industrial dispute to a more human-rights focussed campaign. This follows in part from the class transformation that accompanied exile as it is only the wealthier Egyptian dissidents who were able to make the journey west. This comes despite close links between Egyptian activists in England and British trade union networks. It also follows in part from strategic decisions by activists to frame their argument and stage their performances in such a way as to attract support from their western audience. At this intersubjective level of analysis I continued tracing the process of decertification which activists appeared to have internalised and brought with them, indicated by the role of fear and rumour in mobilisation and demobilisation. Unlike in Egypt however the role of a second counter-mechanism, brokerage, was more pronounced as it solidified activist networks on both an exile-exile and exile-ally basis.

Finally in the sixth chapter I examined the discourse of activism, in part to complete the explanation and in part to give a voice to the claims of the activists. At the level of discourse there is more continuity before and after exile as across the many activist organisations operating on the English scene the salient cleavage between Islamists and non-Islamists

pertains. I found evidence of this cleavage in the opinions the two camps voice of one another, evidence of failed coordination between the two camps and even expression in material-factors external to discourse such as open hostility at protest events. I traced this factor back to the mechanism boundary formation well known from previous studies of contentious politics whereby the production of political identities in discourse gives meaning to political claims and substance to the framing of discourse which has further ramifications for the audience of political claim-making.

I have not as of yet fully discussed these findings in a complete sense. In the following sections I begin with a summary of the causal process of exile. This account differs from the detailed discussions in the previous three chapters by providing a complete view of how the three mechanisms mediating the changes exile brings to activism interact. I begin with a discussion of how decertification, brokerage and boundary formation combine in the case of Egyptians exiled to England before considering the generalisations this case has to offer social movement theory. Then in the second section I consider the broader implications this research has to offer scholarship on social movements and on Egyptian activism.

1. Principal Findings: The Exile Process

Exile changes activism in two overt ways but can also add novel dimensions to the framing of political claims. The change in context caused by moving from one location to another brings about changes in the political opportunity structure activists operate with according to a process of *decertification*. Within that new context mobilising structures are altered by a process of *brokerage* whereby new allegiances are formed between incoming activists and sympathetic actors in the host country. *Decertification* and *brokerage* are in turn augmented by a third process, *boundary formation*, by which activists articulate a sense of identity in exile that encourages certain forms of political participation.

These processes have been illustrated in this thesis with evidence from the case of Egyptians exiled in England. Most of the activists described in this thesis came to England after the 2013 military coup. All of the activists who came faced imprisonment for either their political views or activities were they to remain in Egypt. The move from Egypt to England

involved a transformation in their political opportunity structure from a closed to an open system, more or less. Yet the process of decertification that accompanied this move had been in motion for decades in advance as successive Egyptian regimes sought to both delegitimise and prohibit opposition politics. The fact of exile simply brought decertification to a head by physically removing opposition activists from the domestic Egyptian political scene.

In the new context of English democracy political opportunities were readily available. Although activists were often demotivated as a result of decertification newfound allies were there on hand to mobilise on behalf of exiles and to provide encouragement to reengage. The structure of opportunities in England are characterised by a self-contained political system that has remained stable in the face of exogenous (and endogenous) shocks.[166] The hallmarks of this stability are the separation of powers, freedom of speech and association and transparent election cycles. Beyond simply ensuring a cohesive environment for activism these characteristics feed into the dynamics of contention as they account for the availability of political allies for the Egyptian exiles. The presence of organised and sympathetic allies in the English political scene has set exiled contention in motion through the mechanism brokerage. This mechanism linking exiles with each other and domestic allies caused the exile movement to grow both in terms of membership and in terms of activities.

The discourse of exiled activism was less affected by the move. In discourse the cognitive mechanism boundary formation operated, to some degree at variance to brokerage, to maintain distinct within-movement identities. These identities existed in more or less similar terms before exile and so discursive framing appears a historical constant, less affected by exile than political opportunity structure or mobilising structures. In text and in talk activists can be disaggregated into two camps, Islamist and non-Islamist activists.[167] The religious camp is dominated in England by the voices of the Muslim Brotherhood yet they have no formalised

[166] In the last one hundred years these have included two global wars, imperial decline, numerous recessions, constitutional change in the form of devolution and the threat of further change in the 2014 Scottish referendum and most recently the vote on exiting from the European Union.

[167] It is worth restating here that I follow Richards and Waterbury (2008) in my understanding of 'Islamism' as an essentially political movement distinct from Islam (the religion) that shares the characteristics of transnational social movements. This point is pertinent as there are many (perhaps even a majority) of Muslims within the non-Islamist camp described in this thesis.

structure of which to speak so the allegiance has its primary existence in discourse. The sheer size of this faction, which dominates street politics, is enough to compel the more organised plethora of other SMOs, which includes religious activists unconvinced by MB arguments, to act in a largely cohesive sense.

1.1 Broader Findings

Throughout the research I attempted to maintain a dialogue between the detailed findings from the English case and the wider question about exile this thesis addresses. Several standard methodological procedures enable this conversation; the inbuilt comparison between Egyptian and English activism is typically the most widespread methodological tool political scientists use to suggest that some of the findings may have a wider relevance. Furthermore the procedural style of data collection and the systematic mode of data analysis were in essence employed to support the proposition that the findings of the study are more than simply coincidence, they are to a degree replicable.

To take each point in turn, the study focussed on the mechanisms of contention but departed from standard theories about the variables involved in social movement activity. This approach views social movement theory as a more or less general explanation for social movement mobilisation and the particular mechanisms as mid-range theories with less general explanatory purchase, able to explain certain cases better than others. Political opportunity structure, mobilising structures, and framing processes are taken as explanations for social movements writ large while decertification, brokerage and boundary formation together can be taken as an explanation for the relationship between exile and activism. The movement from a closed to open political opportunity structure can be reasonably thought as a standard outcome of exile as dictatorships tend to produce more exiles than democracies, a point discussed in my review of exile literature and the typological theory proposed in the introduction.

Again the changes in mobilising structures observed in chapter four may also be reasonably thought a consistent feature of exile, however doing so rests upon the reader's willingness to accept the explanatory power of context implied by the concept of political opportunity structure. I would argue that the details of the changes in mobilising structures

observed in this case support the argument in favour of generalisation; it was not simply that moving from a closed to open system increased mobilisation, in fact due to decertification mobilisation may have been reduced, rather the character of mobilisation changed as it adopted a more democratic protest mode rather than the radical repertoire of revolution witnessed in Egypt.[168] This is significant as it evidences a clear link between political opportunity structure and mobilising structures as the repertoire drawn on by activists in England, who had drawn on a different repertoire in Egypt, reflected the wider approaches to activism in England.

Finally the variable of framing did matter to the character of activism as it explained nuances within the discourse of the two camps, namely both shifted their discourse to suit the audience in the new country. Yet the boundary itself survived the move more or less intact. This suggests that comparatively framing can be suggested to explain a good deal of mobilisation but boundary formation less so. In the causal process of exile framing and boundary formation were observed to play a secondary role once mobilisation was in effect.[169] This aspect of the research does raise questions for exiles in England about the efficacy of the way they talk about their cause and activism but those questions are beyond the scope of this research.

1.2 Scope of the Theory

Having specified the generalisations that can be taken from the theory it is worthwhile to reconsider the study's scope condition in light of the findings. Theoretically the findings are context bound to cases of exiled activism. This is significant given that the reach of social movement theory is wider. Exiles carry a unique range of restraints that are not applicable to domestic or other transnational movements. Methodologically generalisation from the data is hampered as it is qualitative, non-random and interpretive. Yet it would be in error to suggest

[168] A shortcoming of the data relied on in this study is that it does not facilitate measuring contention. This follows from the evidence of protest events, which while generated in a means that was systematic and fully exploited the range of primary and secondary sources cannot be said to be representative as it is drawn from disparate, inconsistent and non-neutral sources, generally either from the memory of activists themselves or from third party observers such as newspapers who tend to report sensational rather than ordinary activism. As discussed in the methods chapter I did submit an FOI request for data on police records of activism involving the groups and locations studied in this thesis. This would have been necessary to permit measurements as the most recent data stored in the public records at Kew gardens concerned activism a decade before the period described in this study. The FOI did not return any data hence it is impossible to know whether activism increased or decreased in the period studied.

[169] There has been a tendency among researchers to view mechanisms in general as synonymous with intermediate variables. To some extent this is an accurate characterisation of boundary formation in the process of exile, yet it is less accurate with regards to decertification and brokerage which had a direct relationship with the forms and frequency of mobilisation.

that the findings of this study are bound entirely to the English case as the rigour of the comparative method built into the case combined with the data analysis techniques of structured, cyclical coding are established methods of generalising from such evidence.

2. Implications

In addition to providing these answers to the questions posed in this thesis, these findings pose new questions and suggest new avenues of research both for social movement theory and for the study of Egyptian contention.

2.1. Implications: for Social Movement Theory

Research on the mechanisms of contention remains in its infancy despite a decade and a half having passed since Tilly *et al's* call in *Dynamics of contention* (2001). Part of the reason for the shortage of case studies is the high volume of evidence required to illustrate arguments about mechanisms. In the broadest sense the research in this thesis can be taken as corroborative of the main hypotheses set out by social movement theory; that the causes of activism are a form of feedback loop linking three interdependent variables; political opportunity structure, mobilising structure and framing processes.[170] This thesis has contributed substantive evidence of the operation of three mechanisms. The main contribution this work has made to the study of contentious politics is a detailed account of the way exile changes activism. Activism continues after exile and social movement theory equips researchers with the analytical tools to account for it. The implications of this work for social movement theory can be disaggregated into methodological and theoretical considerations.

In terms of methods, it has long been argued that within the current state of the art qualitative methods have numerous strengths in recording observations of mechanisms, independently of the merits of measurement (Klandermans and Staggenborg, 2002). I argue that the approach taken in this study of combining long-form interviews with purposive sampling was particularly fruitful. Firstly, although it would be misleading to suggest that interviews side-step the issue of identifying reliable indicators which affects quantitative approaches

[170] Testing this theory was not explicitly part of the studies aims but nonetheless this framework for understanding contentious politics has proved to be a persuasive means of understanding causation in this case, more than the competing proposition that individual choice and calculus matters more than context.

(interviews require interpretation and are therefore every bit as 'indirect' an observation as any survey evidence) it is true that interviews lend themselves to inductive coding approaches. In lieu of widely agreed indicators I was able to approach the research with a catalogue of mechanisms but without any particular idea of which mechanisms I expected to constitute the process of exiled activism. I was therefore able to employ inductive coding techniques at the level of the mechanism (that is within a deductive framework informed by social movement theory) which allowed me to frame the research findings as reflecting the contents of the data, rather than imposing my views on the data. From the perspective of the methods of studying contentious politics the findings of this study point to an enlarged role for methods such as those employed by grounded theorists, that rely on inductive codes in a more formal sense than I have in this study, which could be useful in unearthing more reliable indicators for mechanisms researchers have observed previously.

Theoretically this research has contributed a wealth of primary evidence of the operation of three well-known but under-researched mechanisms; decertification, brokerage and boundary formation. While the evidence used to illustrate these mechanisms was drawn from both secondary and primary sources the manner in which they became apparent through inductive coding is of use to future research. Although decertification was seen to operate at a macro-historical level it, like all of the mechanisms in this study, was apparent in secondary cycle coding, that is at a micro-sociological or intersubjective level. The main indicators of decertification to emerge from the research are possibly the most significant touched on in this research; rumour and fear operating at an intra-movement but cross-organisation level. As mentioned above, these indicators were drawn from the data, I had not gone into the field expecting to encounter rumour or fear yet the strength of these themes in the research was suggestive of the cumulation of a process of decertification, and equally they fail to evidence other mechanisms which could be taken as competing explanations.

Social movement researchers have on occasion noted similar instances of intra-movement panics but have not noted the ways the enemies of social movements make use of

their destabilising consequences (Drake, 1989; Goode, 2010).[171] It has been an achievement of this work, quite distinct from the aims of the study, to note the significance of rumour and fear for social movement causation. The findings of this study are of course limited to cases of activists exiled following military takeovers. It seems unreasonably short-sighted to assume that rumour and fear could not have the same or similar significance in other social movements. I have begun the work of theorising these factors in this work but that was beyond the scope of the study. The centrality of these factors to the operation of decertification point to a valuable future avenue of research.

A final lesson this case study has for social movement theorists pertains to the nature of political opportunity structures for exiled activists. Political opportunity structure has long been the most fiercely contested concept in social movement research, a fact attributable to the concept's popularity and utility. While researchers disagree about ways to operationalise the variable, whether this is best achieved by employing strategic indicators or by offering a broad, qualitative, historical account, some consensus has emerged around the factors that tend to constitute the political opportunity structure. In a series of pieces arguing from a theoretical perspective authoritative authors on the subject have been articulating a new theoretical perspective on how political opportunity structure operates across borders for transnational movements. McAdam and Tarrow have both argued that for cross-border movements, activists have access to opportunities that are intrinsically transnational (McAdam and Tarrow, 2005). Their argument is that political opportunity structures have been modified as a result of globalisation. That proposition has not been supported by the evidence in this case study. None of the activism observed in this case can be traced to transnational structures of opportunity; the movement abroad simply saw Egyptian activists trade one set of national opportunities for another. There was little coordination between activists in Egypt and England, and in fact even within the MB, the one organisation that already had a transnational structure, the only contact between the two branches was in a dispute over leadership. The research in this thesis therefore

[171] In a sense these works, or their focus on the debilitating effect of rumour for activism, harken back to the earliest studies of social movements such as Le Bon's *the Crowd*.

supports the proposition that national structures continue to determine the causality of social movements in the age of globalisation, particularly so given that the movement this thesis described is itself inherently transnational.

2.2. Implications: for Research on Egyptian Activism

There is today a growing body of research dealing with Egyptian contention, yet this study is one of a handful to address the Egyptian diaspora (Underhill, 2016). While research on Egyptian contention is now fairly advanced, typified by a number of exemplary works, it is more or less a new development. This is because, as with research on Middle Eastern politics broadly, research on Egyptian politics has tended to adopt what Tolstoy scorned as the 'great men' approach to history. Where Tolstoy argued that Napoleon was not the prime mover in European politics and history, research on Egyptian history can be equally criticised for focussing on the decisions of Nasser or Mubarak. The effects of this school of thought are most evident in chapter four of this thesis where I have had to rely on scattered mentions of activism across history books as the only available data on popular participation in Egyptian politics.

The situation is improving as the work of skilled researchers such as Asef Bayat (2013), Dianne Singerman (1995) and Philip Marfleet (2016) have done much to demonstrate the agency of ordinary Egyptians in determining their own political fortunes. It is to this body of work that the research in this thesis contributes. As I have argued consistently throughout this thesis the distinction between structure and agency is in a sense a false dichotomy, or at least an unresolvable philosophical problem. My reliance on the lessons of social movement theory in explaining Egyptian activism reminds us at every opportunity of the ways the actions of individuals both shape and are shaped by their political context. Their actions can have profound impacts in ways that can be impossible to predict as they may not always act in ways that appear rational to observers.

To this growing body of literature researchers may benefit by considering my experience of researching exiles in terms of the methodological and ethical challenges I faced. The research would have been impossible were it not for the generosity of researchers already working with exiles who introduced me to informants with their personal recommendation.

Even with those endorsements it took considerable effort to persuade many activists to speak with me. The most fruitful means of meeting activists was at protests and meetings (as opposed to unsolicited emails on social media which were almost universally ignored) where I could present myself, shake hands and do my best to reassure that my intentions were benign. Even after I had concluded interviews, several activists confessed that they had been guarded throughout in case I was an agent of the Egyptian government posing as a student. This level of distrust was an ethical challenge I had not fully anticipated, at least not in the scale I encountered it. Yet there is no single means of overcoming this (the nature of conspiracy theories is that any counter-evidence can be reinterpreted by the conspirator as a confirmation), I found that persistence and honesty, revealing something of my own politics and activism, were the best means of overcoming distrust. The challenge was not to give too much of my own politics away before the interview in case this would change the focus of interviewee's answers to finding common ground.[172]

The chief insight this thesis brings to this body of work is the utility of existing approaches in political science for analysing and explaining the often unique forms of activism employed by oppressed peoples in the Middle East. In chapter one I introduced the challenge Marfleet set for researchers of Middle Eastern activism; "How are micro-level perspectives made relevant to 'high politics' — because certain aspects of the latter do remain important? As we learned in 2011, 'Ash-sha'b yurid isqat an-nizam' (The people want/will the fall of the order/regime). The 'order'/'the regime' has indeed been a focus of the movements. How are studies of those 'below the radar' to be integrated into mainstream scholarship, with its emphasis on institutional actors?" (Marfleet, 2016: 10).

Here Marfleet is noting a (mostly) new development in research on Egyptian contention, a focus on workers' struggles (Alexander, 2012), student activism (Abdalla, 1985), socialist and democratic activism (Marfleet, 2016) and activism by those sociologists might controversially term an 'underclass' (Bayat, 2015), taken more often than not out of context of

[172] Or the further challenge of alienating those activists whose views I did not fully agree with, or at all. Luckily, more often than not it was those whose views I found most questionable who were the most keen to speak with me.

the political systems they challenge. I argue, and present the work in this thesis as one example, that social movement theory presents an adaptable framework to understand the relations between activists and the political systems they operate within. Conversely it could be argued that Middle Eastern activism cannot be viewed through the lens of western explanations. This is a danger, yet I argue that the search for causal mechanisms necessitated by modern social movement theory resolves this issue by keeping researchers alert to the possibilities of counterfactual outcomes. In this thesis, this central methodological principle reveals the remarkable nature of exiled activism which has in England energised and inspired a great deal of political participation despite many obstacles.

Appendix: Materials for the Study of Exiled Activism

Appendix A: Interview Guide

Part One: Egypt Option 1. Opening (biographical) questions

Tell me about growing up in Cairo. / Could you describe an average day in your childhood home as you remember it?

Who lived in your childhood home? Any members of the extended family?

Tell me about your schooling.

- Which subjects were your favourite?
- Did you have any good or inspiring teachers?
- Was there anything in your schooling that could have contributed to your interest in politics?

Were you raised in a religious household?

- Are you religious?
- Can you describe to me, as a non-Muslim (or Copt/Jew), the ways religion affects your day and week personally, e.g. do you observe daily prayers and regularly attend mosque.
- Does your religion (or atheism) affect your political views?

Do you remember your childhood ambitions?

Did you pursue these ambitions? (If not why not)

Did you attend university?

- What did you study?
- What was your dissertation on?
- Were you a member of any student organisations?
- Can you tell me about the wall newspapers?
- Were you involved in any student activism?
    - Did you attend or witness any demonstrations?
    - How did you learn about this event? What was your motivation for participating?
    - Were there any risks to participation?
    - Did you consider not participating?
    - What would have convinced you to miss the event?
    - Were demonstrations restricted on your campus?
    - Was there any rivalry between student organisations at your university? E.g. between Muslim Brothers and leftists?

Can you tell me about your employment history?

Option 2. Activism

Could you describe to me an average protest event you attended in Cairo?

- What were the claims of the protestors?
- How did they articulate their message?
- How did you learn about the protests?
- What was your motivation for participating?
- Were there any risks to participation?
- Did you consider not participating?
- What would have convinced you to miss the event?
- Did you attend alone or did you go with other people?
- Did you make any new friends or acquaintances at these events?
- Were these events policed? Did you have any interactions with police?
- What were your opinions of police conduct?

Can you describe how you came to be interested in politics?

How would you describe your political views, in broad ideological terms.

- More specifically, what are your views about Egyptian politics? (Or, how would you describe Egypt's political challenges and what would you do about them?)
- Do you vote? Have you ever sold your vote?5 What was your motivation in do- ing so? Could you describe how the transaction works?
- Could you describe your voting history?
- Do you support any particular party?
- What are your views on Egypt's party system? (Is there choice?)
- Do you consider Egypt democratic?
- What are your views on Sisi's government?

- At the time of his takeover did you consider his government legitimate?
- Did your views on this change?
- What are your views on Morsi's government?
- What are your views on Mubarak's government?
- Are you familiar with Egyptian history? Do you have views on Sadat or Nass- er's governments?
- Did you read the Egyptian press when you lived there? What are your views on press freedom in Egypt?
- Were you ever, in Egypt, a member of a trade union? Did you ever strike?

Did you participate in the Tahir revolution?

- How did you learn about the protests?
- What was your motivation for participating?
- Were there any risks to participation?
- Did you consider not participating?
- What would have convinced you to miss the event?
- Could you describe your participation in those events?
- Did you attend alone or did you go with other people?
- Did you make any new friends or acquaintances at these events? Did attend or witness the so-called 'battle of the camel'?
- Did you suffer any injuries?
- Did these affect your commitment to the movement or your motivation to participate?
- Did you have any interactions with police?
- What were your opinions of police conduct?
- Did you interact with the military?
- What was your opinion of military conduct in the revolution?
- Why would you say there was a revolution?

Other claim-making performances (should be rephrased as a question)

- Have you ever authored, signed or delivered a petition?
- Have you had any contact with an MP? Do you know who your MP is?
- Are you a member of any party?
- Have you ever campaigned in an election for a party?
- Have you attended or participated in political seminars or conferences?
- Do you contribute to blogs?
- Do you read or share blogs?
- Do you use social media for political purposes?
- How important would you say online activism is?

Part two: England

Tell me what you do in an average day in England please.

Why did you come to England?

- Do you intend to remain here or do you plan to leave in the future?
- Are you happy here? Was it difficult to adjust to life in the UK?
- Do you follow UK politics?
- Do you read a daily paper?
- Which one?
- Do you get news online?
- Do you support any parties in the UK?
- How would you say that UK democracy compares to politics in Egypt?
- What do you think about UK foreign policy?
- Do you intend to return to Egypt?

Other claim-making performances

- Have you ever authored, signed or delivered a petition?
- Have you had any contact with an MP? Do you know who your MP is?
- Are you a member of any party?
- Have you ever campaigned in an election for a party?
- Have you attended or participated in political seminars or conferences?
- Do you contribute to blogs? Do you read or share blogs?
- Do you use social media for political purposes? How important would you say online activism is?

- Do you maintain contact with activists in Egypt?

How did you get involved in protest in England?

- Can you describe any political organisations you are part of?
- How did you learn about these groups?
- Did you know any of the members in Egypt or did you meet them in the UK?
- Do you have a role or position in the organisation?
- What are the group's aims or agenda?
- Do you know how the organisation was established?
- What are the group's operations and activities?
- Are these activities different to your activities in Egypt?
- How many members are there?
- How is the organisation funded?
- Where do you meet?
- Or are communications all online?

Have you attended or witnessed any specific protest events by Egyptians in England?

- Can you describe these?
- What were the claims of the protestors?
- Could you describe their message?
- How did you learn about the protests?
- What was your motivation for participating?
- Were there any risks to participation?
- Did you consider not participating?
- What would have convinced you to miss the event?
- Did you attend alone or did you go with other people?
- Did you make any new friends or acquaintances at these events?
- Were these events policed? Did you have any interactions with police? What were your opinions of police conduct?
- Why did you, as an Egyptian, decide to protest in England about politics in Egypt?

Have you attended any protest events that were not to do with Egyptian politics?

- What were the claims of the protestors?
- Could you describe their message?
- How did you learn about the protests?
- What was your motivation for participating?
- Were there any risks to participation?
- Did you consider not participating?
- What would have convinced you to miss the event?
- Did you attend alone or did you go with other people?
- Did you make any new friends or acquaintances at these events?
- Were these events policed? Did you have any interactions with police?
- What were your opinions of police conduct?
- As an activist, did you learn anything from these events that you used in your Egypt focussed activism?

How would you say protest in England compares to protest in Egypt?

Appendix B: Information for Participants

Project: Egyptian Exile in England: A study in the mechanisms of contentious politics

Researcher: David McKeever
Supervisory team: Máire Braniff, Markus Ketola, and Rory O'Connell

Invitation

You are being invited to take part in a research study. It is important that you understand what the research is about and what you will you be asked to do. Please read the following information and do not hesitate to ask any questions. Thank you for taking the time to consider this invitation.

What is the purpose of the research?

The research aims to understand the ways in which exile is a process that changes the causes, processes and effects of activism. The study is an attempt to describe and explain how opportunities for activism vary between countries, how activists regroup and expand networks abroad and how they manage to redirect their political claims to a new audience in their new country.

What is the contribution of the project?

The project will contribute to current debates in social movement theory and research on contentious politics. It is hoped that the study will contribute meaningful information on the relationship between context and activism. Above all, the story of Egyptian activists abroad is an important one in the contemporary democratic struggle and telling this story will contribute to a fuller understanding of the 'Arab Spring' and its consequences.

Why have I been chosen?

You have been chosen as a potential interviewee for this research based on what the researcher has learned about your activism.

What will happen to me if I take part?

You will be asked to participate in a biographical interview with the researcher in order to produce an account of your history of activism. The interview can be long and may take place over several meetings. You will be provided with a consent form and be asked to complete it, which will outline the use of the research data which will be collected during the course of the interview by the re- searcher. The interviews will be audio-recorded, with your permission.

What do I have to do?

You are asked to respond to the questions asked in the interview as honestly and comprehensively as possible. Please remember you will be given full anonymity. You are free to withdraw from the interview at any time and discontinue your participation in the project at any time without penalty.

Are there any risks?

Information provided during the interview, including the attached consent form will be securely stored and your name will not be made public. All work is conducted within the code of practice and data protection policy of Ulster University. The data will be stored securely for 10 years in accordance with the University's policy. If you choose to withdraw from the study your data

will be destroyed. The objectives, methodology and ethical considerations of this research have been re- viewed and fully approved by an ethics committee within Ulster University. If you have any queries in relation to this ethical approval, you can contact Ulster University Research Governance Department for further details. If you wish to change the venue of the interview you may do so.

Prior consent will be sought to record the interviews. The digital recordings will be kept in a lock- able file in a lockable office in the University in line with the University's Data Protection Policy. Transcripts of the interviews will be written by the researcher and will not contain any identifiable information about you. Data and consent forms will be stored separately to ensure confidentiality is not breached. No material will be made public without all identifying information being removed. As far as legally possible all efforts will be made to ensure confidentiality. But there may be a situation where researchers can be compelled by law to provide transcripts or recordings of interviews.

The researcher will ask you to consent to taking part in the interview and to agree to the interview being recorded. All information and data collected will be held securely and in confidence and all efforts will be made to ensure that participants cannot be identified as a participant in the study except as may be required by law.

Are there any possible benefits in taking part?
You may view your contribution to the research and its subsequent dissemination and possible contribution to the academic and public debate on activism as a possible benefit to taking part in the research.

What will happen to the results of the study?
The results of the study will be published in a form of a Doctoral Dissertation. They are expected to be published in 2017 by Ulster University. If possible, the results will be published by academic publisher and disseminated to the public. The results can possibly lead to further research on the topic. If you like the researcher can supply you with a copy of the Dissertation.

Who is organising and funding the research?
The research is organised by a research team that includes a PhD student and his supervisors. The research has been funded by Ulster University and a DEL scholarship.

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Appendix C: Consent Form



Appendix D: Example Report Card

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Title: Protest at Helwan Aircraft base	No: 3	Start date: 20/2/1968	End date:

Location	Distant Antecedents	Proximate Antecedents
Helwan	Six day war (1967)	Trial of officers
Cairo		
Alexandria		
Egypt		

Movement claims	Performance Forms	Actors	Casualties	Arrests
Officers responsible for war defeat should receive harsh sentences	March	Workers	23 injured workers	more than 600 workers and students arrested
		Students	2 civilian deaths	
		Police		

Linkages with other performances (no.)	Consequences
1968 uprising (No. 4) — student committee continued to coordinate contention	Concessions granted to students
	Restrictions placed on ASU

Sources
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Dishon, Daniel. Middle East Record. Volume 4 ed. Tel Aviv: John Wiley, 1973. p. 785
Waterbury, John. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes. 2nd ed. United States: Princeton University Press, 1992. p. 329
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Event Description:

1968 was a big year for protest. In America civil rights activists were on the march. In Europe de Gaulle deployed the army on the streets of Paris. In Egypt demonstrators were concerned with questions of war and peace. Workers representatives from the Helman munitions factories met to discuss the sentencing of officers responsible for the 1967 war defeat. They agreed, through the channels of the ASU and the SYO, with the Ministry of Interior to demonstrate the following day, February 20 (Erlich, 1989: 189). The ministry imposed the condition that rallies were to be confined within the workers' industrial complex (MER, 785).

Contemporary readers may find war as a protest cause counterintuitive. Vatikiotis articulated the salience of the issue in what could be termed ‘popular opinion’: "'We accept the regime did not do much for us, but being a military one, it could at least have given a good account of itself in the war against Israel" (Vatikiotis, 1978: 185). Much the same interpretation is proposed by Wickham: "The reapearance of opposition activism thus occurred during a serious political crisis, in which not only the officers but in a sense, the regime itself was on trial" (Wickham, 2002: 33).

The workers protests began as anticipated on the morning of the 21st (Wickham, 2002: 32). Workers from plant 36 decided to march out from their plant to the town centre. Hearing of the decision a message from the ministry of interior was communicated to workers that such an unauthorised protest would be broken up by police. Despite the warning workers from plants 35, 36, and 360 marched on the local police station chanting "To the National Assembly" indicating their desire to have their demands put before parliament (Middle East Report, 785). Cashes followed between workers and police (Booth, 2009: 29).

When the students of Cairo University heard of the demonstration at Helwan they called an emergency meeting. They called a twelve man delegation to present their position on the events. The delegation met with university officials but discussions came to nothing (Middle East Report, 785). By chance the same day was an official day for students, Student Day, in memory of an episode of student activism in 1946 (Erlich, 1989: 189). This provided a pretext for students to march through Cairo and Alexandria ostensibly in solidarity with the workers. (Abdalla, 1985: 149-150; Booth, 2009: 29).

At least two civilians were killed in Helwan and across the sites of contention more than six hundred workers and students were arrested (Waterbury, 329). There were 23 injuries sustained by workers (Middle East Record, 785).

In his assessment of the events Nasser perceived a growing organisational capacity in the ASU. He later said of the protests: “The ASU marched with the demonstrators — one might assume this meant the demonstration was permitted, but we know, of course, that demonstrations are forbidden especially in the circumstances in which we live”. (Nasser quoted in MER, 785). In that organisational capacity he saw a threat and therefore moved immediately to grant concessions to the protagonists, but later to curtail the ASU. Nasser granted students concessions. 1. The authority of the University Guard was reduced. 2. A new student newspaper was approved. 3. A more permissive legal framework for student activities, for example the freedom to form unsupervised unions, was established by presidential decree. (Erlich, 1989: 190; Wickham, 2002: 33). On this basis Abdalla argues the reforms created new "structures of opportunity" for protest on university campuses (Abdalla, 1985: 158-159).

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